
Class ftFtU K' 
Bonk .'ft 'fo 

PRESENTED BY 



THE 



PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME 



Historically and Philosophically Considered 
with . Extended Experiments 










BY 



HERBERT NICHOLS 

ii 

Fellow in Psychology at Clark University 



^■*t,X 




NEW YORK 

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 

1891 



^ 



s** 



<% 



^ 



7- 



Copyrighted 1891, by G. Stanley Hall 



Tlie Jni^ersity 



Approved as a Thesis for the Degree of Doctor of Philoso- 
phy in Psychology at Clark University. 



G. STANLEY HALL. 
E. C. SANFOKD. 



Worcester, Mass., 

Friday, May 1st, 1891. 



PEEFACE. 



The present monograph, reprinted from the American 
Journal of Psychology, Vol. Ill, No. 4 and Vol. IV, No. 
1, comprises work done at Clark University in the year 
1889-90. In presenting the same in its new form, I take the 
opportunity of expressing very gratefully my indebtedness to 
valuable advice and suggestions continually extended to me 
by President G. Stanley Hall, in whose Department of Psy- 
chology the work was undertaken, by Dr. Edmund C. San- 
ford, Instructor in Psychology, and by Dr. Warren P. Lom- 
bard, Assistant Professor in Physiology. Also to the many 
others who have submitted themselves to tedious and time- 
robbing experimentation, I wish here to make the poor return 
of my thankful appreciation. 



HEEBEET NICHOLS. 



Clark University, Worcester, Mass., 
February 7th, 1891. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 



I. — Historical. 

In the history of language, words for ' time ' are long pre- 
ceded by words for 'past/ < present, ' and < future,' and in 
myth and philosophy, Time makes a late appearance. The 
early Greek philosophers, even Parmenides and Heraclitus, 
naively took it for granted. Yet in this period questions 
were discussed that involved time; it is certain that the 
speculation of Pythagoras regarding number, descended with 
direct formative influence upon Aristotle's philosophy of time, 
and problems like Zeno's of Achilles and the tortoise, turned 
attention critically toward time. 

All of previous philosophy is said to be summed up in Plato. 
I have discovered nothing more indicative of the status of 
time philosophy in Plato than the following found under 
'time' in Day's "Analytical Index" of Plato's Dialogues 
(London, 1870.) " Time is the image of eternity (Tr. ii, 341, 
342 ; Tim. 37 D, E; 38 A, B, C, D, E ; Tr. vi, 155 ; Tim. 
97 C); 1 belongs Wholly to generation (Tr. ii, 338 ; Tim. 35, B, 
C ; 36, A); is measured by the movements of heavenly bodies 
(see references above); time to depart and die (Tr. 129 ; 
Apol. 42, A); time is short compared with eternity (Tr. ii, 
298, 186; Eep. 608, C ; 498, D ; see references in Stallbaum); 
time is nothing, and is not deserving of the solicitude of an 
immortal being (Tr. 298 ; 608, C); time and tune synonymous 
with good education (Tr. ii, 96 ; Bep. 413, D)." Time, per 
se, is nowhere psychologically contemplated by Plato; his 
nearest approach is in the Timaeus as above. Time is not one 
of his five categories given in the Sophist, (being, rest, 
motion, sameness, difference). He conceived that motion 
was given to things because necessary to change ; to the 
Kosmos alone was given rotation in a fixed circle, this being 

i u rp r n re f ers to translation in Bonn's Classical Library ; numbers and 
capital letters refer to the register of Ast and Stallbaum. 



2 NICHOLS : 

"the movement most in harmony with reason. " With the 
rotation of the Kosmos began the course of Time — years, 
months, days, etc. Anterior to the Kosmos, there was no 
time, no past, present and future ; no numerable or measur- 
able motion or change. The ideas being without fluctuation 
or change, existing sub specie ceternitatis, had only a perpet- 
ual present, no past or future ; along with them subsisted 
only the disorderly, immeasurable movements of Chaos. The 
nearest approach which the Demiurgus could make in copying 
these ideas, was by assigning to the Kosmos an eternal and 
unchanging motion, marked and measured by the varying 
positions of the heavenly bodies. For this purpose the sun, 
moon, and planets were distributed among the various por- 
tions of the Circle of the Different, while the fixed stars were 
placed in the Circle of the Same, or the outer circle, revolving 
in one uniform rotation, and in unaltered position in regard 
to each other. The interval of one day was marked by one 
revolution of this outer or most rational circle, etc. . . . 
The phenomena of vision and hearing are included among the 
works of reason, because the final cause of these higher senses 
is to give men perceptions of number through contemplation 
of the measures of time. . . . An eternal sameness or 
duration, without succession, change, generation or destruc- 
tion, this passes into perpetual succession or change, with 
frequent generation and destruction, into time. 1 This is the 
most specific conception previous to Aristotle, but it is really 
the naive idea of time interwoven with Plato's doctrines of 
creation. In later philosophers the problems of time and 
memory are closely involved, but for Plato the latter is only 
1 ' the power which the soul has of recovering, when by itself, 
some feeling which it experienced when in company with the 
body." His illustration is that of impressions left in wax. 2 

Aristotle was the first to ask how we perceive time. 3 He 
did not conceive his Kosmos to have had a beginning; 
all in it is an eternally changing correlation between matter 

1 "Plato and other companions of Sokrates" by George Grote, 
(London, 1865) III, 248—257, and notes. 

2 Phsedo, 73, 74. 

3 Alfred Wm. Benn, "The Greek Philosophers," I, 326. Wilhelm 
"Volkmann, "Lehrbuch der Psych.," I, 37. Edwin Wallace, "Aristotle's 
Psych.," introduction. Also Grote, Lewes, etc. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 3 

and form. 1 " Matter is the original substratum, while form 
is|no thing apart from form." 2 There are all gradations of 
this correlation, from clay bank to statue, from statue to 
human soul. 8 Soul ranks with form, not with matter. The 
matter to which soul stands correlated, is a natural body (t. 
€., a body having within it an inherent principle of motion 
and rest) organized in a certain way, or fitted out with certain 
capacities and preparations to which soul is the active and 
indispensable complement.* The soul is dependent on the 
body for all its acts and manifestations, and brings to con- 
summation what in the body exists as potential only. 5 
. . . We do not say the soul weaves or builds ; 6 we say 
that the animated subject, the aggregate of soul and body, 
the man, weaves or builds. So we ought also to say, not that 
the soul feels anger, pity, love, hatred, etc., but that the man 
with his soul does these things. . . . This is true, not 
only in regard to our passions, emotions, and appetites, but 
also in regard to our perceptions, phantasms, reminiscences, 
reasonings, efforts of attention, etc. . . . The actual move- 
ment throughout these processes is not in the soul, but in the 
body . . . They are at once corporal and psychical. . . . 
Soul is the movent, inasmuch as it determines the local displace- 
ment, as well as all the active functions of the body — nutrition, 
growth, generation, sensation, etc. 7 . . . Soul in all its 
varieties proceeds from the Celestial Body or abode of Divinity. 8 
. . . The varieties of soul are distributed into successive 
stages. . . . The lowest soul is the primary cause of 
digestion and nutrition ; it is cognate with celestial heat. 9 
. . . We advance upward now from the nutritive soul to 
that higher soul, which is at once nutritive and sentient 
. . . with multiple faculties and functions. . . . 
Sensible perception with its accompaniments, forms the char- 

1 De Celo, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (Ed. Sprengel) ; Wallace, op. ct., p. xii. 

2 Metaph. Z, 8, 1033, b. 12 seq. ; 6. 3, 1047 a. 25. 

3 De Anima, II, 2, 414; Physica, II, 2, 194, C 8; Metaph. H 6, 1045, 
C 18 ; De Gener. Aninal. II, 1, 735 a 9 ; De Celo, IV, 3, 310, C 14. 

4 De Anima, II, 1 sq. 

5 De Generat. Animal. II, i, p. 731, b. 29. 

6 De Anima I, iv, p. 408, b. 12. 

7 De Anima II, iv, p. 415, b. 1. 

8 See Grote, Ibid. 220. 

9 De Anima II, i, p. 731, b. 33. 



4 NICHOLS : 

is that which gives thereto definite individual being. Matter 
acteristic privilege of the animal 1 . . . and admits of 
many diversities from the simplest and rudest tactile sensa- 
tions . . . to the full five senses. 2 . . . The sentient 
faculty, even in its latest stage, indicates a remarkable 
exaltation of the soul in its character of form. . . . The 
soul, qua sentient and percipient, receives the form of the 
perception* ... as wax from a signet. 4 . . . The 
sentient soul (its 2d stage) requires a cause to stimulate it 
into actual seeing or hearing, . . .a stimulus from with- 
out, from some individual object, tangible, visible or audible \ 
but the noetic or cognizant soul (3d stage) is put into action 
by the abstract and universal ... so that a man can at 
any time meditate on what he pleases 5 . . . All the objects 
generating sensible perception are magnitudes. 6 

Some perceptions are peculiar to one sense alone, as color 
to the eye, etc. There are some perceivables not peculiar to 
any one sense alone, but appreciable by two or more . . . 
such are motion, rest, number, figure, magnitude. 7 " But each 
single sense perceives nothing but one single quality or group 
of qualities. 8 . . . There is required then some one func- 
tion of the mind, by means of which it gains perceptions of all 
objects, 9 . . . some common central organ of perception 
in which the separate communications of the senses are com- 
bined ; ... it must within one and the same moment of 
time, present before itself two or more reports of sense." 10 
. . . This exercise of comparison, which Aristotle thus 
assigns to the central or the common sense, is not, however, 
restricted to the work of distinguishing the separate commu- 
nications of the senses ; it displays further its synthetic power 
in grasping the common properties which are involved in the 

1 De Sensu., i, p. 436, b. 12. 

2 De Anima II, Hi, p. 414, b. 2; 415 a. 3; III, i, p. 424, b. 22; xiii, p. 
435, b. 15. 

3 Ibid. II, xii, p. 424, a. 32, b. 4. 
* Ibid. II, xii, p. 424, a. 19. 

5 Ibid. II, v, p. 417, b. 22; III, iii, p. 427, b. 18. 

6 De Sensu., vii, p. 449, a. 20. 

7 Grote's Aristotle II, 186-198 ; De S. et S. i, p. 437, a. 8 ; iv, p. 442 r 
p. 4-12. 

8 Psychology iii, 7, p. 431, a. 24. 

9 De S. et S. 7. p. 449, a. 8. 
10 Psy., p. 426, b. 22. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 5 

existence of the qualities of the body. 1 For at the same time 
as we perceive, say color, we perceive it, further, as a colored 
surface or magnitude ; at the same time as we have the sensation 
of notes following on one another, we perceive the fact of num- 
ber ; and at the same time again, as we feel a surface hard or 
soft, we perceive it as some kind of figure. Beyond these, 
the particular objects of the single senses, we require to 
recognize a number of qualities ( ' ' categories ' ' ) which enter 
more or less into each of our sensations . . . and which r 
in Aristotle's words, " we perceive immediately in connection 
with each perception." 2 Chief of these qualities or " cate- 
gories" were "motion" and u rts6; %1 next came " number. " 
Finally, for our purpose, Aristotle remarks: " Time is the 
number of motion."* Psychologically considered, then, time 
is an immediate (central) sense- perception of u the number of 
motion." 

But is not memory requisite for perception of time? We 
are told " Memory, as well as phantasy (imagination) are 
continuations, remnants, traces or secondary consequences of 
the primary movements of sense. Both of them belong to the 
same psychological department — to the central sentient prin- 
ciple, and not to the cogitant or intelligent nous."* " In acts of 
remembrance we have a conception of past time, and we recog- 
nize what is now present to our mind, as a copy of what has 
been formerly present to us either as perception of sense or 
as actual cognition 5 ; while in phantasms there is no concep- 
tion of past time, nor any similar recognition, nor any neces- 
sary reference to our past mental states." " What is remem- 
bered is a present phantasm assimilated to an impression of 
the past." 6 Aristotle draws a marked distinction between the 
(memorial) retentive and reviving functions, when working 
unconsciously and instinctively, and the same two functions 
when stimulated and guided by a deliberate purpose of our 



1 De Anima III. i, p. 425, a. 15. 

2 De S. et S., C. 4, p. 442, b. 4; De A. II, 6, p. 418, a. 17. Wallace's 
Aristotle, Psych., lxxvi-lxxix. 

3 De Oelo, Ch. 9, 8-10. 

4 De Memor. et. Remin. i, p. 451, a. 5 ; p. 449, a. 10. 

5 Ibid, i, p. 449, b. 22. 

6 Ibid., p. 450, a. 30; 451, a. 15 ; De Memor., p. 240. 



6 NICHOLS : 

own, which last he calls reminiscence. He considers memory 
as a movement proceeding from the centre (heart) and organs 
of sense to the soul, and stamping an impression thereupon ; 
while reminiscence is a counter- movement proceeding from 
the soul to the organs of sense. " 1 " 2 * 8 

On occasion, however, he used time both to denote an 
objective and a subjective concept. "Both motion and time 
are thus eternal, both are also continuous ; for either the two 
are identical, or time is an affection (nddog) f motion." 4 

Thus in brief, time-perception with Aristotle was a direct 
sense-perception — the immediate function of the sentient 
faculty or soul ; this, whether under the presentation of primary 
sensation or of memory. We have given much space to this 
remarkable first exposition of time because it is most important 
historically, and in its essential features it has survived in all 
ages, and is even now the accepted theory of prominent psy- 
chologists. 

Post- Aristotelian and Medieval discussions of "the 
faculties" are important, in so far as they lead to later 
theories. The doctrine of soul faculties is so old that 
Diogenes Laertius cites Pythagoras as its source. After 
Aristotle, the Stoics found difficulty in agreeing upon the 
number of the faculties, and in reconciling any plurality of 
them with the unity of the soul. To these perplexities the 
Neo-Platonists joined that of the self- consciousness of the 
soul. Philo compared the relation of the soul to the faculties 
to that of the house to its tenants. The Patristic authorities 
insisted on the strict unity of the soul. Tertullian substituted 
the term J' soul-faculties " for the older term " soul parts " or 
" soul divisions," and compared the soul to the wind which 
blows the pipes of an organ ; the pipes representing the facul- 
ties. Gregory of Nazianz revived the simile of Plato, that the 

1 De Anima I, iv, p. 408, b. 17 ; De Memor. i, p. 450, a. 30; ii, p. 453, 
a. 10. 

2 Grote. op. ct. II, 212-215. 

3 Memory " is the permanent possession of a sensuous picture, as a 
copy which represents the object of which it is the picture." De Memor. 
I, p. 451, a. 15. He adds that memory is the function of our ultimate 
faculty of sense which " is also that by which we gain a consciousness 
of time." Ibid., p. 450, a. 12. 

4 Metaph. A, p. 1071, b. 15. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 7 

soul was the driver of the wagon ; and the faculties were the 
horses. St. Augustine developed advanced ideas of memory, 
but with the revival of Aristotle among the Scholastics, " the 
faculties'' again rose almost to supreme discussion; all 
deemed themselves bound to maintain the unity of the soul. 
The view of Thomas Aquinas was that most commonly held, 
i. e., " the faculties, from the essence of the soul, sicut aprinci- 
pio fiuunt. ri Eoger Bacon contended for the sensus communis 
of Aristotle, whose philosophy in general he accepted. 2 With 
Wm. of Occam, all thoughts are " conditions of the soul." 3 
During the Eeformation, the orthodox doctrine was defended 
by Suarez, while Melanchthon held nearly to the teachings of 
Aristotle. Thus the opposing views of " unity "vs. " facul- 
ties" occupied the field, at the date of Descartes, Hobbes, and 
Leibnitz. 

Eene Descartes followed the orthodox schoolmen as 
against Aristotle in considering the soul as one indivisible 
"thinking substance;" its diverse "faculties" are but 
different modes of the one "facultas cognoscitiva " — the 
"thinking soul." 4 Aristotle at least caught sight of the 
mystery of our perceiving at the single moment that is, the 
1 fore and aftness ' of a series which has past, and he conceived 
apparatus and processes to account therefor. Descartes, with 
naivete, looked on such mental acts as direct and indissoluble 
" modes," or " conditions," of the " thinking soul." 6 In this 
conception is the foundation of his philosophy ; the soul sees 
directly; ideas are intuitions, " the innate power of thought 
itself ; " " they are in the mind, and when exercised, are per- 
ceived to have been there before." 6 Certain of these innate con- 
cepts lie at the foundation of all the rest ; without them no 



1 For full references for above see Volkmann's Psychologie (1885), I, 
22, sq. 
« Erdmann's Hist. Philos., I, 478-481. 

3 Ibid., 504. 

4 Pass, de l'amel, 47 sq.; Med. end of II, IV; VI, 77, etc.; Prin. d. 
Philos. I, LIU ; Kuno Fischer — Descartes and his School — Tr. Gordy, p. 
419. 

5 Letter to Vatier, Nov. 17th, 1643; Ed. Elz. 1, Ep. 116; Ibid., Ep. 
105 ; Princ. i, § 57-59 ; Med. III. 

6 Reg. iii, p. 211-214; V, 225; Med. V, 64; Erdmann ? s Hist. Philos., 
Hough, Tr. II, 26. 



8 NICHOLS : 

kind of conception of anything is possible. Space and time 
are such direct, innate, and fundamental concepts. 

Descartes makes one advance npon Aristotle, in specially 
distinguishing duration from the " numbering of motion. " 
"We shall also have most distinct conceptions of duration, 
order, and number, if in place of mixing up with our notions 
of them, that which properly belongs to the concept of sub- 
stance, we merely think that the duration of a thing is a mode 
under which we conceive this thing in so far as it continues to 
exist ; m " for we do not indeed conceive the duration of things 
that are moved, to be different from the duration of things 
that are not moved." 2 

Descartes distinguished two kinds of thought — " active " 
and " passive; " the active are the " different modes of will- 
ing;" the " passive" include time-perceptions. Yet time 
was not with Descartes a sense perception as with Aristotle ; 
his time-perceptions spring innately " from the intellect " or 
soul "alone."* 

Yet Descartes' physiology is not always easily harmonized 
with his philosophy, nor his mechanical explanations of 
memory with entirely innate intuitions of time. He says 
" Eecollections are traces of images on the brain " — " traces 
of previous movements left in the brain like folds in paper ; J > 
the movements of the vital spirits through these traces ' ' be- 
come for the soul, occasion and opportunity for calling forth 
ideas which resemble them." 4 "By memory, we connect 
present and past." "When I think of myself as now 
existing, and recollect besides that I existed some time ago, 
and when I am conscious of various thoughts, whose number 
I know, I then acquire the ideas of duration and number, 
which I can afterwards transfer to as many objects as I 
please." 5 Descartes tells us " the movements of the brain 
affect the soul or mind." 6 " Perception is impossible without 



1 Prin. d. Phil., I, LV, 137. 

* Ibid., I, LVII, (Tr. Ed. Edinburgh, 1873.) 

3 Ibid., I, XXXII; Med., II, etc. 

4 Notse ad. progr. quodd., p. 185-188 ; Erdmann op. ct. II, 28. 

5 Med.VE, 88; III, 45. 

6 Prin. d. Philo. I, XLVIII, 170. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 9 

the body." 1 "From the motion of the body alone, can the 
various sensations be excited." 2 " The soul perceives only in 
so far as it is in the brain." 3 Yet he as distinctly says "by 
the omnipotence of God, the mind can exist without the 
body," 4 and one of his commentators says " according to the 
fundamental principles of his philosophy, mind, on account of 
its absolute diversity from body, is supposed to hold no 
immediate converse with matter, but only to be cognizant of 
it by means of its own modifications, determined hyperphysi- 
cally on occasion of certain affections of the body with which 
it is conjoined." 5 Kuno Fischer shows that it was these un- 
certainties or contradictions of Descartes, which led in oppos- 
ing directions to the occasionalism of Geulinx, the systems 
of Malebranche, of Spinoza and of Leibnitz." 

Thomas Hobbes declared that the soul is known only 
through faith, and is not a subject of philosophy; he was the 
first to confine his speculations to "mental facts," avoiding 
cognative "faculties;" though he did at times "see the need 
of some other sense to take note of sense by," he yet pre- 
saged so much that is explanatory in the unfathomed pro- 
cesses of thought, as bravely to declare ' i that all that is 
wanted to account for such introspective consciousness could 
be found in memory." 6 He says all sense and all thought are 
" subjective; " are " something that lies entirely in us ; " " yet 
is as mechanical as nature. " " According to a universally valid 
law of nature, the affections of the sense organ, when the im- 
pression has ceased, must continue, and this echo of the 
impression is called memory, thought, or imagination. It is 
so inseparable from the sensation that it may be compared to 
a sixth sense accompanying the rest. . . . Like water 
troubled, an organ of sense will remain in motion. . . . 
In that case the corresponding phantasm is called imagination; 
or memory , if regard is had to the fact of the lapse of time, 
which like distance in space, is found to render the phan- 

1 Med. II, 27. 

2 P. d. P. IV, CXCVII. 

3 Ibid. IV, CXCVI. 

4 Reply to the several objections — Prop. 14, (Tr. Edinburgh, 1S73.) 

5 Ibid. Note, p. 200; where see several references. 

6 " Hobbes " by George Croom Robertson (1886), p. 124. 



10 NICHOLS : 

tasms of sense both less clear as wholes, and less distinct in 
parts." 1 

InhisDeCorpore, Hobbes devotes Chapter YII to space and 
time. ' l All body . . . exists with one constant attribute of ex- 
tension mentally represented as space ; and all its variable and 
varying aspects explicable in terms of motion, are mentally 
represented in time. } ' Time is " a phantasm produced by body 
in motion;" it is " simply the idea of motion, or of moved 
body." Yet he adds that time " stands rather for the fact of 
succession or before and after in motion." 

As far as I know, the word " succession" or any exact 
equivalent, here enters the discussion for the first time. ' ' The 
comparison or assimilation of sense impressions into time 
percepts gets little further attention from Hobbes, though he 
notes in one place its ground-form, the recognition of identi- 
cal experiences had at different times." 2 Hobbes is the 
Father of the English School of Association. 3 His import- 
ance in the history of the problem of time rests on his being 
the first of moderns to plant himself on this doctrine, namely i 
" There is no conception in a man's mind that hath not at 
first totally or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of 
sense. The rest are derived from that original." 4 

With Spinoza time was a mode of his all-embracing sub- 
stance. 

John Locke believed in an immaterial soul that thinks.* 
Its faculties are not " separate agents," but " different ways " 
or "powers" of thinking; the first " power " is to perceive. 6 
There are two sources of ideas : First, sensation, and, second, 
" perception of the operations of our mind within us," which 
he calls "reflection." 7 "Which operations, when the soul 
comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding 
with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things 

1 Human Nature, C. 3. Also he speaks of memory as " decay of 
sense ; " i. e., fading. 

2 Robertson, op. ct. 127. 

3 Lewes Hist. Phil., p. 232 ; Sir Wm. Hamilton in " Reid's Works," 
p. 898. 

* Leviathan, C. i. See Robertson, op. ct., p. 84. 

5 Essay Concerning Human Understanding ; Bk. II,Ch. xxiii, Sec. 22. 

6 Ibid, vi, 2 ; ix, 1. 

7 i, 3 and 4. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 11 

without ; and such are perception, thinking, doubting, believ- 
ing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings 
of our mind ; which we, being conscious of and observing in 
ourselves, do from these receive into our understanding as 
distinct ideas as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This 
source of ideas every man has wholly in himself." 1 One of 
the fundamental acts or powers of mind is that of ' i bringing 
two ideas, whether simple or complex, together, and setting 
them by one another so as to take a view of them at once 
. . . by which it gets all its ideas of relations." 2 He 
devotes more than one chapter to "relations," which, I believe, 
though destined to an important place, are here, for the first 
time, brought onto the psychological field, as separate mental 
elements — surely the mark of an epoch, good or bad. Locke 
tells us that relations " consist in the consideration and com- 
paring one idea with another." 8 Had he been asked what 
1 < considering and comparing ' ' were, he probably would have 
said, " the act of perceiving relations." He says " the ideas 
of relations are often clearer than the subjects related." 4 He 
devotes a good share of his work to proving, against 
Descartes, that ideas are never innate, yet it is fundamental 
with his own system that these ' ' relations ' ' are perceived 
intuitively. With simple relations, " the mind is at no pains 
of proving or examining, but perceives the truth, as the eye 
doth light, only by being directed toward it. Thus the mind 
perceives that white is not black ; that a circle is not a tri- 
angle ; that three are more than two, etc." 6 " In every step 
reason makes . . . there is (and must be) an intuitive 
knowledge." 6 

Locke classifies time- perception as partly sensation and 
partly reflection. He sums up his chapter on our subject with 
six propositions: " (1) By observing what passes in our 
minds, how our ideas there in train, constantly some vanish 
and others begin to appear, we come by the idea of succession. 

1 i, 3 and 4. 

2 xii, 1. 

3 xii, 7. 

4 xxv, 8. 

5 IV, ii, 1. 

6 IV, ii, 7. 



12 NICHOLS : 

(2) By observing a distance in the parts of this succession, 
we get the idea of duration. (3) By sensation observing cer- 
tain appearances, at certain regular and seeming equidistant 
periods, we get the ideas of certain lengths or measures of 
duration as minutes, hours, days, years, etc. (4) By being 
able to repeat these measures of time, or ideas of stated length 
of duration in our minds, as often as we will, we can come to 
imagine duration where nothing does really endure or exist ; 
and thus we imagine to-morrow, next year, or seven years 
hence. (5) By being able to repeat ideas of any length of time, 
as of a minute, a year, an age, as often as we will in our 
thoughts, and adding them one to another, without ever com- 
ing to the end of such addition any nearer than we can come 
to the end of number, to which we can always add, we come 
by the idea of eternity, etc. . . . (6) By considering any 
part of infinite duration, as set out by periodical measures, 
we come by the idea of what we call time in general. " He 
says "by reflection, we perceive directly and intuitively the 
time-relation between these ideas." 1 "Most of the denomina- 
tions of things received from time are only relations." 2 
. . . " When one fixes his thoughts intently on one thing 
. . . he lets slip out of his account a good part of that 
duration, and thinks that time short." He denies, as against 
Aristotle, that we get our idea of succession from motion. 3 If 
motions are too slow, he says, we do not perceive their suc- 
cession ; if too fast, neither their duration or succession. The 
following presages psycho-physics: "Our train of ideas, 
when awake, probably succeed one another, in our mind at 
certain distances, not much unlike the images of a lantern 
turned round by the heat of the candle. This appearance of 
theirs in train, though perhaps it be sometimes faster and 
sometimes slower, yet I guess varies not very much in a wak- 
ing man ; so has a certain degree of quickness, with bounds 
beyond which it can neither delay or hasten. . . . So that 
to me it seems that the constant and regular succession of 

1 " Whenever the memory brings any idea into actual view, it is with 
a consciousness that it had been there before, and was not wholly a 
stranger to the mind." I, iv, 20. 

2 II, xxvi, 3. 

3 II, xiv, 6. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 13 

ideas in a waking man is, as it were, the measure and standard 
of all other successions." 1 He says u no two parts of duration 
can be certainly known to be equal." . . . " Time is not 
the measure of motion," but space and time . . . "time 
is to duration what place is to expansion." 2 In a word, time 
with Locke was an intuitive perception of relation between 
successive durative ideas ; his discussions show much advance 
in our subject. 

Leibnitz conceived the universe to comprise an infinite 
number of individual soul- units or monads, without causal 
relations to each other ; by pre-established harmony each 
monad developed within itself a psychic life, "mirroring" or 
corresponding to the world within a certain scope around it. 8 
Faculties, he declared, " were but fictions." The soul did not 
think, feel and perceive ; but thought, feeling, perception, were 
the soul itself under different forms of activity. Time was one 
of these forms. 4 All thoughts were innate ; " the mind itself 
is innate;" "all soul life develops from within itself." 6 
Time, therefore, is innate, and but a " phenomenon " of soul 
development. 6 Leibnitz can with more consistency than 
Descartes declare ideas to be innate, as in his system each of 
his monads mirrors every event in the entire universe. Each is 
unconscious of all below a certain stage ; thus all sensations 
and ideas are in the mind from the beginning, but rise to con- 
sciousness only when apperceived. 7 Characteristically of his 
system, he says space and time "express possibilities;" 
"they are of the nature of eternal truths, which relate 
equally to the possible and to the existing ; ' ' they de- 
termine existence in some of its relations, and as such 
are logically prior to any given form of existence. ' l Time 
(not duration) exists only as events are occurring, and 
is the relation of their succession." Time is purely rela- 



1 II, xiv, 8-12. 

2 II, xv, 5. 

3 Monadologie, p. 709, sq. 

4 De phen. real. p. 444; a Bayle, p. 159. 
6 Prin. d. 1. Nat., p. 714. 

6 Compare Noveaux Essais, LIV, ii, Ch. i; 1,IV, i; a. Bayle, p. 159; 
a. Clarke. 

7 a. Borguet, p. 720; a. Bayle, p. 187; Monadologie, p. 706; System 
Noveau, p. 127 ; Prin. d. 1. Nat., p. 715 ; ad. Des Bosses, p. 740. 



14 NICHOLS : 

tive and ideal; 1 a relation, he says, cannot be in the thing 
which it relates ; " can not have one leg in one object, and the 
other leg in the other.' ' The relation exists alone in the mind ; 
yet, if all objects and events were annihilated, time and space 
would still have their ideal existence in the intelligence of 
God as the eternal conditions of all phenomena. Leibnitz 
gives us few psychological details of time ; he included all 
vaguely under his Vorstellungskraft. He was perhaps the 
first of moderns to emphasize some requirement for "joining 
the manifold in one." 2 

Christian Wolff clarified the ideas of Leibnitz with 
greater influence upon German psychology in general than 
on our particular subject. 3 

Sir Isaac Newton 4 and Samuel Clarke (the latter by con- 
troversies with Leibnitz 5 ) focused to clearer definition the 
thought of their day regarding space and time. 

George Berkeley instituted one of the greatest epochs in 
psychology by first disclosing the complex make-up of seem- 
ingly elemental sensations, but gave attention to space rather 
than time. " When abstracted from the succession of ideas in 
our mind, I can form no idea of time at all ; it is nothing." 6 
He looked upon time perception as an act of reason rather 
than of sense. ' < Sense supplies images to memory ; these 
become subjects for fancy to work upon. Eeason considers 
and judges of the imaginations." " Number is no object of 
sense. " " The mind so far forth as sensitive, knoweth noth- 
ing." 7 " There is that in us not given by sense, though it is 
only in a latent state." Yet with Berkeley ideas were not 
innate preconditions as with Descartes ; all thoughts are the 
direct gift of God ; for as processes and laws they fall directly 
from His will. 8 



1 Opera Philos., p. 682, 752. 

1 Ep. Ill, ad. Des Bosses, op. Phil., 438. 

3 His chief departure from Leibnitz is that he denied that all monads 
are perceptive. 

4 Newton thought the omnipresent existence of the Deity constituted 
space and time. Principia, Ch. 1. 

5 Complete Works, London, 1732-42. 

6 Prin. of Human Knowl., § 99. 

7 Ibid. XXV; Siris § 288, 305. 

8 See Campbell Frazer's Berkeley, Phila., 1881. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 15 

David Hume was critical rather than constructive. From 
Aristotle, we have seen the requirement for some ' ' faculty ' ' 
to join the manifold of mind steadily forcing itself upon con- 
sideration. Hume stripped the problem of vagueness. After 
reducing mind to a succession of impressions, ideas, and rela- 
tions, he declares at the end of his treatise : " All my hopes 
vanish when I come to explain the principles which unite our 
successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness. 
. . . In short, there are two principles which I can not 
render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of 
them, viz., that all our distinct perceptions are distinct expe- 
riences ■, and that the mind never perceives any real connection 
among distinct existences. Did our perceptions either inhere 
In something simple or individual, or did the mind perceive 
some real connection among them, there would be no difficulty 
in the case." 1 Here is the essence of our time-problem set 
forth for the first time with isolated explicitness, if yet im- 
perfectly. It is perhaps the clearest proof of Hume's great- 
ness, that, seeing the difficulty, and not seeing the answer, he 
refrained from a " system." 

Following Locke, Hume recognized " perceptions of rela- 
tion " to be the " essence of cognition." 2 Perception of time- 
relations, thus became an act of reason — something more than 
sense. All reasoning " consists in nothing but comparison 
and discovery of the lelations, either constant or inconstant, 
which objects bear to each other." 3 Yet all he can explain of 
relation is, " that quality by which two ideas are connected." 4 

With Hume, " the ideas of space and time are copies of 
impressions perceived in a particular manner. The idea of 
necessary connection is merely the reproduction of an impres- 
sion which the mind feels compelled to conceive in a particu- 
lar manner." Our idea of time " is derived from the succes- 
sion of our perceptions of every kind." 5 "All impressions 

1 Works (ed. 1854), ii, 551; Hume says it will ever be impossible to 
decide as to the origin of impressions — p. 113. 

2 Ency. Brit. 

3 Ibid, i, 100. 

4 Ibid, i, 29. 

5 Ibid., p. 54. Hume thinks that the idea of duration is derived from 
succession of change. " We associate the continual successions of our 
mind with steadfast objects ; this gives us the idea of their (the stead- 
fast objects) duration; without this associate succession, they would 
not appear in time." pp. 90, 57. 



16 NICHOLS : 

and all ideas are received or form part of a mental experience 
only when received in a certain order — the order of succes- 
sion. ' ' Yet he distinctly declares that ' i Time is not a 
particular impression ... it rises from the manner of 
the succession of the impressions, yet without making one of 
the number." " Five notes, played on a flute, give us the 
impression and the idea of time, though time be not a sixth 
impression, which presents itself to the hearing or any other 
of the senses. Nor can the mind by revolving over a thousand 
times all its ideas of sensation, ever extract from them any 
new original idea, unless nature has so framed its faculties, 
that it feels some new original impression arise from such a 
contemplation. But here it only takes notice of the manner 
in which the different sounds make their appearance, and that 
(the manner) it may afterwards consider, without considering 
the particular sounds, but may conjoin it (the consideration 
of the manner) with any other objects. The ideas of some 
objects it certainly must have, nor is it possible without these 
ideas, ever to arive at any conception of time, which since it 
appears not as any primary distinct impression, can plainly 
be nothing but different ideas, or impressions, or objects, dis- 
posed in a certain manner, that is, succeeding each other." 1 
It is difficult to reconcile Hume's above u ideas of time 
derived from succession, " with his declaration that it " can 
plainly be nothing but different ideas . . . succeeding 
each other. ' ' He did not quite arrive at the great question 
whether the idea of time is ' i nothing but ideas succeeding 
each other, ' ' yet no one has more lucidly cleared his mind to 
what time-perceptions are not. He was hampered by tradi- 
tions of "relations," and that all ideas must be "unit repre- 
sentations" and "individual pictures;" yet he continually 
struggled toward the thought that time-perception should be 
explained by succession alone. One strangely isolated declara- 
tion markedly indicates his genius and the drift of his mind 
from his traditions. He says in his chapter on Ancient 
Philosophy: " The imagination readily takes one idea from 
another . . . is carried from one part of it (the succession) 
by an easy transition . . . This easy transition is the 

1 Ibid., p. 56. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 17 

effect or rather the essence of relation." 

Hartley first sought to carry back much of psychology to 
physiology, 1 yet conceived memory and time-perception to be 
fundamental acts of mind. 

Oondillac, abandoning Locke, declared "all our knowl- 
edge and all our faculties to be derived from sensations." 2 A 
sensation, which " preserves its vivacity, " becomes attention. 
"If a sensation acquire greater vivacity than the former, it 
will become in its turn attention. . . . Our capacity of 
sensation, therefore, is divided into the sensation we have had, 
and the sensation we now have ; we perceive them both at 
once, but we perceive them differently ; the one seems as past, 
the other as present. The name of sensation designates the 
impression actually made upon our senses (present); and it 
takes that of memory when it presents itself to us as a sensation 
which has formerly been felt (past). Memory is only the 
transformed sensation. When there is double attention (to 
present sensation and past memory) there is comparison ; for 
to be attentive to two ideas, and to compare them, are the same 
thing. But we can not compare them without perceiving some 
difference or some resemblance between them ; to perceive such 
relations is to judge. The acts of comparing and judging, 
therefore, are only attention ; it is thus that sensation becomes 

successively, attention, comparison, judgment 

Numbering, imagining, wondering, having abstract ideas, hav- 
ing ideas of time and number, knowing general and particular 
truths, are only different ways of attending;" 3 i. e., are but 
different successive combinations of sensation. 

Thus by Condillac, for the first time in history, is absolutely 
the whole of mind conceived to be but different successive 
combinations, derived from a like source and of essentially 
like nature ; the insufficient praise, which is bestowed upon 
Condillac for this position, is indicative of even a present lack 
of appreciation of its pre-eminent truth and importance ; a truth 
toward which all modern psychology seems gradually tending. 

It is just to Peter Brown, Bishop of Cork, to note that he 

1 See his Theory of Vibratiuncles. 

2 Traite d. Sensations, p. 1 sq. For condensed exposition see first 
chapters of his Logique. 

3 Ibid. 

2 



18 tflCHOLS : 

had, perhaps, previously arrived at a similar conception, 
though indefinitely. Condillac preserved his belief in the soul 
as an entity ; his follower, De Tracy, abandoned such, while 
Cabanis and Helvetius avoided the question. Cabanis, for 
the French, inaugurated the epoch of considering psychology 
as entirely dependent on physiology. That part of his work, 
which has most bearing upon the matter in hand, is his phys- 
iological differentiation of internal from external sense. 
Helvetius' views are practically those of Condillac 1 . Fran- 
cesco Maria Zannotti, an Italian disciple of Hartley, held 
developed conceptions of time-associations. 2 

Immanuel Kant took up the problems stated by Hume ; 
these were the mysteries of Mental Veracity and of the Unity 
of Diversities. For the solution of these questions Kant started 
with traditional belief inthedualistic entities, souls and things - 
in- themselves. 8 His day had not outgrown the error of conceiv- 
ing the soul or mind to be the direct, active, and sole organ of 
thought ; according to this view, things are known and seen 
immediately ; the bodily organism is looked upon as a mere 
spy-glass, or rather, is practically neglected altogether. To 
Kant's clear mind, the first essence of ultimate material 
entity was plainly, in the light of the discussioos of his day, 
immunity from change; 4 inasmuch, therefore, as to him, 
there was nothing but souls and things, since change could not 
happen to things, there was no alternative, but that such must 
be an effect or characteristic of mind. 5 This, then, is the first 
fundamental thought of, and key to, Kant : The cause of all 
change lies in the mind. But mental change means mental di- 
versity ; and having started with the unity of the soul, Kant 
was compelled to look upon mental Unity of Diversity as an 
ultimately insoluble mystery. Now comes the supreme merit 
of Kant, in that he inserted a clear wedge of distinction 
between the causative and the caused within the mind. He 
saw that diversity was a characteristic of the product or con- 
tent of mind, while unity was characteristic of the way this 

1 See his De l'Homme, Vol. I, c. iv ; De l'Esprit, Ch. 1. 

2 Delia forza attrativa delle Idei, (1747 (?) to 1790). 

3 Critique. 2d Ed. ; Meiklejohn's Tr. ; pp. 22, 45, 104, 167, etc. 

4 Ibid. 29, 136, etc. 

3 Ibid. 25, 29. To Kant our bodily organism was but more " things." 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 19 

content was held or bonnd together within or by the soul ; 
Close at hand follows Kant's great demerit and confusion. 
While he is clear and consistent throughout in distinguishing 
the diverse content from the unitary form, he is neither clear 
nor consistent anywhere, in distinguishing between unitary 
form as cause, and as some sort of conscious result — self-con- 
scious, even though he might conceive that result to be, in 
delusive distinction from other mental content or result. 

Time with Kant is an d priori form of mind (p. 22). But 
confusion and contradiction is betrayed in this phrase from 
the outset ; does he mean mind as cause ? or mind as result, 
as content? Surely a result, a content, never is till it is, 
therefore the term d priori is never in any way applicable to 
it ; yet we shall find Kant continually speaking of time as an 
a priori intuition, and classifying intuitions as content of 
mind. 

This confusion is vital to Kant's philosophy ; to understand 
it we must discover its origin. It will be noted that he first in- 
vestigates space, and most profoundly ; then he places time 
on precisely the same basis as space, asa" form of thought." 
Now when we consider sight, and remember that Kant was 
little, if at all, familiar with post-Berkeleyan psychology which 
splits up space- perception into disparate elements, we easily 
discover how he became impressed with the apparent unity 
of the visual field, in contradistinction to its diverse objective 
content ; here " nothing objective is added to the field, when 
two objects appear beside each other;" this apparent 
11 besideness " is nothing added to the objects, or to their ob- 
jectivity, or to the objectivity of the whole field ; it is, so it 
appeared to Kant, something apart from objectivity, from 
sense; he called it an "intuition." These objects are not 
thought beside each other ; they merely are in that mental 
aspect. In this way space, in the abstract, appeared to 
him something apart from objectivity ; Kant identified beside- 
ness with space, the apparent unity of abstract space with the 
apparent unity of the visual field ; he assumed that the ulti- 
mate cause of both lay in the unity of the soul. Conceiving 
hotjh. to be attributes of mind, in order to designate " the 
iieid " from its objects, and space from its make-up content, he 



20 NICHOLS : 

called the one " matter," the other " form." Falling in with 
the confusion of ages, in using mind indifferently as an 
equivalent both of soul and of consciousness — that is, as cause 
and as result, it was easy for him to fall into like confusion as 
to forms of mind, and as to space and time as such forms ; and 
finally he accustomed himself to declare that space and time 
are d priori intuitions 1 , though evidently he never intended 
to mean that intuitions as present mental results were a priori. 
It remains to discover how he came to put time upon the 
same basis as space as an d priori form or intuition. This 
appears to have come about entirely through careless suscep- 
tibility to analogy. Having worked out his problem with 
reference to the above and below of spatial diversities, it was 
easy to conceive that the same formula explained the fore and 
aftness of temporal diversities ; here was change, and again 
" nothing objective added," yet mental perspective and 
intuition of relation ; once more, according to his fundamental 
proposition, all cause of change can alone lie in the mind 
(soul); here, then, is but another a priori form of mind, need- 
ing nor permitting further analysis. The crucial error of Kant 
lay in not perceiving that the " unity of diversity " problem, 
and the " unity of space " problem, were, at the same time, 
time problems. Take away the co- existence of the diversity 
and there is no unity of diversity — these same diversities could 
then succeed each other in as many individual minds, as well 
as in an individual mind ; we are then compelled to investi- 
gate whether mere succession in an individual mind may be con- 
ceived to yield perceptions of time relations or not. Our pres- 
ent purpose is in no way critical ; we only wish to make plain 
that Kant did hold that the simplest possible succession in 
our mind was accompanied necessarily with some sort of intui- 
tion of fore and aftness, and to show how he came to this belief. 
The latter I have sufficiently indicated ; it remains to give clear 
evidence of the extent of his theory. Too frequently to be mis- 
taken, he makes explicit his position as follows : " Time is 
a necessary representation lying at the foundation of all 
intuitions. With regard to phenomena in general, we can not 
think away time from them " (p. 28). " It is the subjective 

1 Chapter on Time, p. 28 ; p. 22, 30 § 7. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 21 

condition under which all our intuitions take place " (p. 30). 
1 1 Time is the formal condition d priori of all phenomena what- 
soever " (p. 30). "All phenomena in general, that is, all 
objects of the senses, [not things, but all their objective repre- 
sentations] , are in time, and stand necessarily in relations of 
time" (p. 31). Hume's notes, therefore, according to Kant, 
carry with their occurrence some sort of intuition, or awareness 
of their succession, and of their time-relation. There is, we 
think, abundant evidence for this interpretation and none 
whatever against it. It is in harmony with his system of 
philosophy as a whole. His declarations of it are explicit 
and comparatively numberless. The genetic progress of his 
Critique shows how he arrived at this view. His whole future 
a priori handling of the categories and of the synthetic activi- 
ties of the understanding conforms to and supports it. 
It is upon precisely this conception that Kant, from the first, 
makes his main and fundamental division of the mental facul- 
ties ; drawing a sharp line between two chief faculties, the one 
passively receptive, the other active or spontaneous, he classi- 
fies intuitions entirely among the former ; to the latter belong 
all acts of the understanding. 1 There can be no doubt that 
any such complicated act as memory, used in the English 
school sense of the term and involving recognition of having 
been before, etc., would have been classed other than as pas- 
sive intuition ; *. e., than as he did classify time-intuition; 
yet excluding recognition or memory proper from reproduc- 
tion, we have Kant's imagination ; which, in so far as intuition 
of sequence or fore and aftness may be concerned, he placed 
undoubtedly upon identically the same footing as original 
sensations themselves. 2 There should be no reasonable doubt, 
therefore, by any school, that Kant's real position as to the 
time problem was that all mental series whatever, however 

1 pp. 18, 21, 45, etc. No metaphysician excels Kant in precision in 
defining his faculties. We have Vorstellen, representation ; Wahrnehmen, 
perception ; Kennen, knowing ; Erkennen, cognizing ; Verstanden, under- 
standing; Einsehen, perspecting; Begreifen, comprehending. See ap- 
pendix, Tr. Critique, London, 1838. An intuition with Kant was not 
even a perception, because not conceived as implicating self-conscious- 
ness, p. 86. Much less did time intuition include the English act of 
memory. 

2 No student of Kant will declare that he conceived memory neces- 
sary to an intuition of time. 



22 NICHOLS : 

simple, or whether original sensation, or reproductions 
thereof, were necessarily and invariably accompanied by some 
vague awareness or intuition of their successiveness — their time 
order, and that the cause of this fact lay a 'priori in the soul ; 
that the tying or joining lay altogether below the surface of 
consciousness in the substance of mind. It will be observed 
that in proportion as this conception expands in the mind and 
is extended over the whole range of associated reproductions, 
the less demand is there for any further explanation of 
memory; in fact, strictly speaking, this view does not 
require any further explanation for memory, and, as a 
final confirmation of the interpretation of Kant, which 
I have given, I would call attention to one of the 
most unique facts in all literature, (one I have nowhere seen 
mentioned), namely, that in Kant's Critique of Pure Eeason, 
in which time-intuition plays such a preponderating part, both 
fundamentally to the system, and also in the page- surface of 
the book the subject of memory is not once referred to, nor 
even the word memory or its equivalent once used, not even 
incidentally throughout. This — unless in some obscure place, 
it has escaped my special search for it, line by line, from cover 
to cover. Nothing could more conspicuously emphasize Kant's 
preternatural genius for following out precisely and consist- 
ently any principle, right or wrong, once believed to be deter- 
mined. Kant's entire system is built up on the d priori ; and 
when we come to think of it, d priori memory would have con- 
tradiction in the very sound of it ; and Kant, with instinctive 
and colossal consistency, actually builds up his system of 
mind utterly without memory. 

Kant nowhere approaches discussion of particular time 
relations, or of how any one relation is intuited rather than 
another, and this is the whole problem. He tells us u time 
ever flows ; " he does not make plain to us how his d priori 
conditions of the mind ever flow, and continually so adjust 
themselves that an event happening yesterday will inevitably 
be intuited by us to-day as yesterday, and a year from to-day 
be intuited by us as last year. Of one of a series of five notes, 

1 We do not intend to say he does not treat of memory in any of his 
works ; he does so in the Anthropology. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OP TIME. 23 

say the fourth, it would be interesting to know what particu- 
lar time order Kant would have conceived it necessarily to 
appear in ; would it be as after the second, or as after the first, or 
only as after the third? or again perhaps would it be before the 
fifth? or if related to any event in particular, why not to one 
of last week, or to the last century, or to all events all together? 

Thus it must be seen that Kant's own conception of an 
1 i intuition ' ' of time, at best could have been but a vague 
awareness of succession in general or in the abstract, 1 and the 
close student of the time problem must judge for himself what 
that could really mean or how much he has gained by this, or 
by being told by Kant that time is an a priori form of mind. 

Marcus Hertz 2 and other followers of Kant, wrote in ex- 
planation of his views of space and time which were adversely 
criticised, and particularly by Adam Weishaupt. 3 Jacobi 
in defending empiricism, denied the d priori space and 
time ; so also Herder. Schleiermacher held space and 
time to be both forms of intuition and forms of objective 
things. 

Beikhold followed Kant in essentials, but turned the 
current of Germany toward "a single faculty." Perceiv- 
ing Kant's confusion of causative form, with formed 
content, he confines his definition of time to the latter, but 
includes therein, as did Schleiermacher, both the matter and 
the form of the content. Yet this more objective ever-present 
time and space, which he calls ' l mere time ' ' and ' ' mere 
space," he insists is not empty time and space. What it is, 
as " ground form of all receptivity," he does not make quite 
clear. His struggle for more precise definition than his mas- 
ter, only brings more plainly to view the inherent vagueness 
of Kant's theory . 

Schtjlze (JEnesidemus) and Solomon Maimon threw 
over Kant's Ding-an-sich, and set the stream toward ideal- 
ism. Still struggling with the "Unity of Diversity," they 

1 p. 147. 

2 " Reflections in Speculative Philosophy." (Konigsberg, 1771). 
3 " Zweifel tiber die Kant'schen Begriffe von Zeit u. Eaum " 1787. The 

author has not been able to procure the above two works, and is unable 
to speak of them except at second-hand. 
4 " Versuch einer neuen Theorie." Buch III, S. 378-421. 



24 NICHOLS : 

reversed the usual deduction of time from the manifold — 
from " number of motion," and declared " Without space 
and time nothing would be discriminated, or separate in 
consciousness. 771 With them, time was as well a concept 
as an intuition. 2 

Beck has kinship with Jacobi and Eeinhold, but particu- 
larly he influenced Fichte. It was Beck who introduced 
' ' the mental act 7 7 into philosophy ; no phrase was ever more 
pregnant of systems. What this " mental act' 7 is, other 
than the coming and going of mental content, I do not find 
them to have made comprehensible. A self- consciousness of 
the act is of course supposed to be involved. With Beck 
space and time are Acts of Synthesis ; not Intuition, etc., but 
Intuiting, Eepresenting, Perceiving. Before the synthesis 
space and time are not ; they are generated in the act. Con- 
sciousness resulting from the synthetical act is ' ' pure intui- 
tion. 77 Continuation of the synthesis of space results in 
sequence. Synthesis of sequence is time. The act of syn- 
thesis must have a product ; i.e. the spatial figure or the time 
must be fixed; this " fixing 77 of the product gives definite 
particular figures or times. 3 

Fichte aspires to tell us the Why and the How, causative 
of mental life ; to disclose that which Kant assumed as a be- 
ginning. He admits that his first step is purely an assump- 
tion, and that the consequences that can be made to result 
therefrom are the only warrant therefor. 5 He assumes the 
mental act of Beck, 6 then declares that every mental act pre- 
supposes a power or force. (Why more than it presupposes 
a thing forceful or a soul mindful?) Thus he transposes 
every mental fact into a mental act, and finds for each act a 

1 Maimon's, Versuch iiber d. Transcendental Philos. S. 16-18. 

2 Ibid. S. 33, 36, etc. 

3 Einzig moglicher Standpunkt u. f . t. Abschn. II. § 3, § 141-167 ; 
Grundriss d. Kritischen Philos. I, § 10, 11. 12, 13. 

4 Samm. Werke (Berlin 1845), " Ueber d. Begriffe d. Wis. 1794," I, 
70; "Fichte's Science of Knowledge," Tr. by Kroeger (London,1889) , 
p. 49; Werke, " Grundriss," I, 411. 

5 " Begriffe, 1794," I, 58 sq. ; 74; " Grundlage, 1794," 92, 101, 226, 
etc. Tr. p. 34 sq., 54, 64, 75, 185. 

6 "Grundriss," I, 333 sq. ; Tr. p. 192; "Begriffe, 1794," I, 63, 70, 
etc. ; Tr. p. 40, 49, etc. 

7 Grundriss I, 372; Tr. 221. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 25 

power ; whereupon, strangely enough, he is able to reveal to 
us the truth that these powers so comport themselves as to 
produce and explain every possible mental phenomenon, thus 
entirely warranting and confirming his prime assumption. 
For example, a red spot appears to us spatially to exclude a 
blue spot : Fichte tells us that a red spot is a " deed-act," the 
blue spot another " deed-act," that all " deed-acts" mutu- 
ally exclude each other, and therefore it is that red spots ap- 
pear to exclude blue spots. Of course the value of such a 
system as this must depend somewhat upon the maker's pre- 
liminary interpretations of psychological facts ; so long as 
psychology remains undetermined, or uncertain, the most 
that can be said for such a system would seem to be that "if 
things work in this kind of way, why ! then this is the kind 
of way that things work." 

According to Fichte, space deed- acts exclude or condition 
each other co-existingly above, below, etc. Time deed-acts 
condition each other in the order of a series, that is : Of a 
series A, B, C, D ; C conditions D ; B conditions C ; A con- 
ditions B ; A is unconditioned of B, C, or D ; B is uncondi- 
tioned of CorD; C of D. Thus conditioned we must think 
them in the order of their series. 2 

Fichte adds the weight of his opinion to the theory that 
4 i There is for us no past, except in so far as it is thought in 
the present . . . Whatsoever was yesterday is not; it 
is only in so far as I think in the present moment that it was. 
. . . Of course a time is past, if you posit one as past ; 
and if you ask that question (is it past? ) you do posit a past 
time ; if you do not posit it you will not ask that question, 
and then no time has past for you." 3 Thus time with Fichte 
is a present thought. 

Schelling characteristically defines time as " The I itself 
thought in activity." 4 Erdmann finds Schelling' s deductions 
of space and time i ' most interesting ' ' in connection with the 

1 Grimdriss 391-405 ; Tr. 235-249. Also, see Kuno Fischer, Geschichte 
d. n. Phil., V, 476, u. s. f. 

2 Grimdriss 405-411 ; Tr. 249-255 ; Kuno Fischer, V, 476. 

3 Grundriss 409 ; Tr. 253. 

4 Tr. Idealism. Ep. II; D, HI, S. 467. 



26 NICHOLS : 

" distinction of outer and inner sense in consciousness ; " 
also, his combination of space and time with the categories. 1 

Hegel devotes §§ 257-260 of his Philosophy of Nature to 
time, and treats the subject less particularly in various 
places. Translated into ordinary language, § 257 tells us 
that time involves existence or being ; § 258 that it involves 
ceasing to exist, and coming into existence, i. e. change and 
" becoming." Then follow discussions of duration and eter- 
nity. No man will more rightly appreciate Hegel than the 
psychologist who sits dowii to discover precisely what the 
' i Great Master ' ? really tells him about some definite modern 
problem, say time. Imagine his satisfaction at having it re- 
vealed to him at the outset that " the Present " is " the tran- 
sition of Being into Nothing, or of Nothing into Being" 
(§ 259). A watchmaker might be equally pleased to learn in 
some supposed supreme treatise on his art, that a chronome- 
ter is a continued Identification of the Now. Perhaps the 
most definite thing regarding our subject which we learn of 
Hegel, is that, in comprehensible moods, he classed time as a 
"Pure form of Sensibility." (§ 258). 

Arthur Schopenhauer declares " From Kant's doctrine 
of the Transcendental Aesthetic, I know of nothing to take 
away; only of something to add." What he "adds" par- 
ticularly for us, the following will indicate: "Time is pri- 
marily the form of inner sense. . . . The only object of 
inner sense is the individual will of the knowing subject. 
Time is therefore the form by means of which self -conscious- 
ness becomes possible for the individual will, which origin- 
ally and in itself is without knowledge. In it the nature of 
the will, which in itself is simple and identical, appears 
drawn out into a course of life." 3 Also, "Time, space, and 
causalty are that arrangement of intellect by virtue of which 
the one being of each kind which alone really is, manifests to 
us a multiplicity of similar beings, constantly appearing and 
disappearing in endless succession." 

1 Gesch. d. Philos. § 318. Tr. p. 567. 

2 World as Will and Idea. Tr. Haldaue and Kemp. (Boston, 1888) 
Vol. II, p. 33. 

3 p. 207. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 27 

In a more empirical mood he declares i l Succession is the 
whole nature of time" j 1 this is adverse to the side of the 
great debate which Fichte took in declaring time to be not 
" succession" but a " present thought." 

Che. Hermann Weisse and I. H. Fichte (half -Hegelians) 
criticised their master for not treating space and time as any 
of the other categories of knowledge or ' ' forms of reality, ' y 
and in his Logic rather than in his Philosophy of Nature. 2 
Fichte developed space and time from certain " feelings of 
duration and extension which are inseparable from self con- 
sciousness, and which feelings have their oasis in the souPs 
oivn objective nature." 3 From a similar standpoint, E. H. 
Weber, in 1852, coined the now famous phrase " The Space- 
sense," and following him Czermak first used its analogue 
" The Time- Sense." These are important events in the ex- 
perimental history of time. Weber and Czermak looked 
upon space and time as being senses as disparate as sight 
and hearing. Yet from their universality they called them 
General Senses as opposed to the special. 4 

Fries was most influenced by Jacobi, but declaredly clung 
to Kant/s views of time. 5 Yet he distinguishes between a 
priori u cause" of intuition, and intuition perse. 6 He be- 
gins to take the bodily organism a little into account, 7 and 
was troubled as to what particular time- relations would be 
perceived from Hume's mere sequence of notes ; but he 
thought ' l in some sort of a way I get possession of these co- 
existently " (p. 142). He vaguely described this " some sort 
of a way " as " a fundamental determination or fixing of the 
mind." 8 He declares that all sense perception must appear 
in the mind " joined" (verbunden). Particular time-rela- 
tions Fries derives from the " reproductive " and u produc- 

ip.9. 

2 Article by Weisse in Fichte's Zeitschrift, 1837. 

3 Ibid, new Vols. 55, p. 237 sq. ; Vol. 56, p. 47, sq. 

4 Weber, Berichte ti. d. Verhandlungen, d. K. S. G. W. Math. Phys- 
isehe Classe, 1-4, S. 85. Jahrgang, 1849-52. Czermak — Gesamm. 
Schriften, I, 416. 

5 Kritik d. Vernunft (Heidelberg, 1828), Vol. I, p. 173, etc. Erd- 
mann's Hist. Philos. (Tr. 1890), II, 454. 

« p. 173 sq. 

7 p. 94. 

8 p. 69, 106, 110, 120, 124. 141, 171. 174, 177 sq. 188. 



28 NICHOLS : 

tive powers of Imagination " ; by which they are ' ' attribu- 
ted " their proper time-aspect in the passing content of 
mind. 2 In proportion as he conceived the course of our 
thoughts to be determined at will, these time- aspects were 
bestowed voluntarily. 3 Yet more than any German of his 
day he gave consideration to the roles which memory, 4 asso- 
ciation, nabit, training, 7 ''former occurrence," 8 " fading," 9 
etc., play in " mental inter- determination." In these he is 
abreast with the best of the Scotch- English school of his day. 
In all but the vague " some- sort " of intuition of sequence, 
Fries' time- relations are perceptive acts. 10 He also inclined to 
a more objective conception of space and time than Kant, in 
that he at times conveys the idea that space is " visible ex- 
tension void of particular or limited content " ; and that time 
is some sort of analogous objective inner sense. Fries is 
also more generous to realism than Kant, and is inclined to 
conceive relations actually existing between things, to which 
in themselves he consequently carries over Space, Time, Mo- 
tion and Change. 11 In view of the importance which the 
phrase, " The idea of succession is not a succession of ideas " 
assumes in subsequent stages of the discussion, it is impor- 
tant to note that Fries apparently was the first definitely to 
emphasize the declaration that " all the terms or elements of 
unification, comparison or relationship must be before con- 
sciousness at the same time." 12 

Thomas Eeid deserves great credit for bringing out many 
of the difficulties of the problem to clear and simple view. 
He declares : " I think it would be impossible to show how 
we could acquire a notion of duration, if we had no memory." 
This is against Kant's view. " Memory implies a conception 
and a belief of past duration. . . . Eemembrance is a 

1 p. 102, 137, 145, 161, 775, 177, 178 sq., 185, 188, 192. 

2 p. 161, 175. 

3 p. 77, 83, 163, 185, 187 sq., 196. 

4 p. 135 sq. 161, 165. 

5 p. 142, 148, 153 sq., 160, 162 sq., 187 sq., 193. 

6 p. 168. 

7 8 p. 137, 160, 162 sq., 165. 

9 p. 138. 

10 p. 86. 

11 p. 77, 83, 163, 185, 187 sq., 196. 

12 p. 141, 180. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 29 

particular act of the mind of which we are conscious. . . . 
I believe that I washed my hands and face this morning ; how 
do I come to believe it ? I remember it distinctly — that is all 
I can say. . . We know many past events by memory \ 
but how it gives us this information I believe is inexplicable. 
. . . I think it appears that memory is an original faculty, 
given us by the author of our being of which we can give no 
account, but that we are made so. . . . All our original 
faculties are unaccountable." 

Yet Eeid makes contributions to the time-problem. He 
takes Locke to task for confounding succession with duration : 
1 ' the notion or idea of duration must be antecedent to its be- 
ing measured " — to succession. 1 Also we must crown Eeid 
for grasping more definitely than anyone before his time this 
cardinal aspect of the subject: "It may be observed," he 
says, " that if we speak strictly and philosophically no kind 
of succession can be an object of either the senses or of con- 
sciousness ; because the operations of both are confined to the 
present point of time, and there can be no succession in a 
point of time ; and on that account the motion of a body,, 
which is a successive change of place could not be observed 
by the senses alone without the aid of memory" (p. 348). 
Criticising Hume for saying that impressions reappear, he 
declares "the thing is impossible." " Impressions are fleeting 
perishable things, which have no existence but when we are 
conscious of them" (p. 357). He makes rather lame fun of 
Hume's explanations of time by " reappearances of varying 
intensity." "Suppose a man strike his head against the 
wall, this is an impression ; now he has a faculty by which 
he can repeat this impression with less force. . . . This 
by Mr. Hume's account must be memory" (p. 357). Eeid 
admits that " it is probable that in the human frame memory 
is dependent on some proper state or temperament of the 
brain 5 yet says he " if we knew distinctly that state of the 
brain which causes memory we should still be as ignorant as 
before how that state contributes to memory " (p. 354) ; "an 
ability to revive our ideas or perceptions after they have 

1 Works. Edinburgh, 1872, p. 339-360. 



30 NICHOLS : 

ceased to be, can signify no more but an ability to create new 
ideas or perceptions similar to those we had before" (p. 355). 
How we recognize perceptions we have had before, is to Eeid 
inexplicable. 

Dugald Stewart advances our problem only in a general 
way by forcible analysis of such questions as Identity, Associa- 
tion, Memory and Eeason. He says, " the idea which is com- 
monly annexed to intuition as opposed to reasoning, turns, I 
suspect, entirely on the circumstance of time." 1 " For this 
reason I look upon the distinction between our intuitive and 
deductive judgments as, in many cases, merely an object of 
theoretical curiosity" (p. 71). He declared like Eeid "the 
theories which attempt to account for the phenomena of 
memory by means of impressions and traces in the brain, are 
entirely hypothetical, and throw no light on the subject which 
they profess to explain " (p. 393). 

Thomas Bkown deserves conspicuous rank among the 
Fathers of Psychology. One of his services was to disclose 
(it is not yet dispelled) what Prof. James calls the " Great 
Psychological Fallacy ; ' ' this consists in unconsciously 
carrying over and accrediting to some psychological act or 
phenomenon which we may be analyzing, those other feelings, 
mental acts or states which we have while introspectively mak- 
ing this analysis. This fallacy had led to the great debates 
before Brown's day, relative to the distinction between sensa- 
tion and perception, till then it having been almost universally 
maintained that perception included self-consciousness, a 
knowledge of a mind looking on at mind. Brown says, ' ' to 
me it appears, that this attempt to double, as it were, our va- 
rious feelings, by making them not to constitute our conscious- 
ness, but to be the object of it, as of a distinct intellectual pow- 
er, is not a faithful statement of the phenomena of the mind. 
.... Sensation is not the object of consciousness different 
from itself, but a particular sensation is the consciousness of 
the moment. . . . ' I am conscious of a certain feeling ' really 
means no more than 'I feel in a certain manner. \" 2 Also 
Brown's revelations regarding the genesis and make-up of 

1 Works— (Cambridge, 1829), II p. 69. 

2 "Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind." (Philada. 
1824), Vol. I, p. 135, sq. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 31 

our conception of space are important contributions to psy- 
chology ; from these he carried over certain analogous deter- 
minations to the enrichment of the time problem. Having 
deduced the notion of space from motion, and that of length 
from continued or successive motion, he conceived the origin 
of the idea of time to lie in identically the same thing — that 
length of extension and length of duration are ultimately one 
— (p. 305). He discovered this element of length in all men- 
tal processes. " Continuous length and divisibility, those 
great elementary notions of space and time and of all that 
space contains, are thus found in every succession of our feel- 
ings " (p. 306). He also gives us a nearer view of their de- 
velopment. "If," says he, "we gradually extend our arms in 
various directions, or bring them nearer to us again, we find 
that each degree of the motion is accompanied with a feeling 
that is distinct, so as to render us completely conscious of 
the progression. The gradual closing of the hand, therefore, 
must necessarily give a succession of feelings, a succession, 
which of itself might, or rather must furnish the notion in the 
manner before stated, the length being different according to 
the degree of the closing, and the gradual stretching out of 
the arm gives a succession of feelings, which in a like manner 
must furnish the notion of length — the length being different 
according to the degree of the stretching of the arm. 
. . . The Infant ... by frequent renewal of the 
series of feelings involved in each gradual contraction, cannot 
fail to become so well acquainted with the progress as to dis- 
tinguish each degree of contraction, and at last, after innum- 
erable repetitions, to associate with such degree, the notion 
of a certain length of succession. ... In these circumstances 
of acquired knowledge (after the series of muscular feelings, 
in the voluntary closing of the hand, has become so familiar, 
that the whole series is anticipated, and expected as soon as 
the motion has begun) when a ball or any other substance, is 
placed for the first time in the infant's hand, he feels that he 
can no longer perform the usual contraction ; or in other 
words, since he does not fancy that he has muscles which are 
contracted, he feels that the usual series of sensations does 
not follow his will to renew it j he knows how much of the 



32 NICHOLS : 

accustomed succession is still remaining, and the notion of 
the particular length which was expected and interrupted by 
a new sensation, is thus associated with the particular tactual 
feeling excited by the pressure of the ball. ... By frequent 
repetition and association" . . . these two feelings flow to- 
gether ; ... it becomes, at last, as impossible to separate the 
mere tactual feeling, from the length of feeling (time) as to 
separate the whiteness of a sphere in vision, from that con- 
vexity of the sphere, which the eye, of itself, would have been 
forever incapable of perceiving " (p. 309 sq.). "The series of 
muscular feelings of which the infant is conscious . . . must 
on these principles, be accompanied with the notion ... of 
a certain length of succession, and each stage of the contrac- 
tion, by frequent renewal, gradually becomes significant of a 
particular (time) length corresponding with the portion of 
the series " (p. 297). These deductions hold of all, as well 
as of the muscular sense. "Time or succession then, in- 
volves the very notion of longitudinal extension and divisi- 
bility and involves these, without the notion of anything ex- 
ternal to the mind itself ; for though the mind of man had 
been susceptible only of joy, grief, hope, and the other varieties 
of internal feeling, without the possibility of being affected by 
external things, he would have still been capable of consider- 
ing these feelings as successive to each other in a long con- 
tinued progression, divisible into separate parts. The notion 
of length, then, and of divisibility, are not confined to exter- 
nal things, but are involved in that very memory by which 
we consider the series of the past, not in the memory of dis- 
tant events only, but in those first successions of feeling by 
which the mind originally becomes conscious of its own per- 
manence and identity. The notion of time, then, is precisely 
coeval with that of the mind itself ; since it is implied in the 
knowledge of succession, by which alone, in the manner 
above explained, the mind acquires the knowledge of its own 
reality, as something more than the mere sensation of the 
present moment. Conceiving the notion of time, therefore, 
that is to say, of feelings past and present, to be thus one of 
the earliest notions which the infant mind can form, so as to 
precede its notions of external things, and to involve the 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 33 

notions of length and divisibility, I am inclined to reverse 
exactly the process commonly supposed, and instead of deriv- 
ing the measure of time from extension, to derive the knowl- 
edge and original measure of extension from time " (p. 307). 

This is one of the most noteworthy passages in the history 
of our subject; particularly so when we compare its truly 
remarkable penetrations and suggestiveness with its glaring 
contradictions ; evidently the crucial question, whether time 
is an idea or a succession of ideas had nob come to a focus in 
the mind of this acute psychologist ; within short spaces he 
confounds the two concepts in a way that must necessarily 
lead him to false conclusions. 1 All through the above dis- 
cussion we have been led to believe that the idea of time lies 
in the successions themselves, in precisely the same way as 
Brown took so much pains to explain that ' ' perception of a 
sensation " was the sensation itself; but the moment he takes 
up the subject of time under another aspect — that of memory 
or of relations — his traditions prove stronger than his origin- 
ality, and he tells us that " certain feelings of relation" con- 
stitute our notion of time. 

Before examining this let us make sure what, in the concep- 
tion of this great mental- chemist, these " relations M were. He 
says, "the feelings of relations are states of the mind essen- 
tially different from our simple perceptions or conceptions of 
the objects that seem to us related, or from the combinations 
which we form of these in the complex grouping of our fancy. " 
1 ' There is an original tendency or susceptibility of the mind, 
by which on perceiving together different objects, we are in- 
stantly, without the intervention of any other mental process 
sensible of their relations in certain respects, as truly as there 
is an original tendency or susceptibility of the mind, by 
which, when external objects are present and have produced 
a certain affection of our sensorial organ, we are instantly 
affected with the primary elementary feeling of perception." 
M As our sensations are of various species, so are there various 
species of relations . . . the number of relations, indeed, 
even of external things being almost infinite, 7 ' etc., (p. 146). 

1 Compare p. 297 with p. 307. 

3 



34 NICHOLS : 

We now may understand Brown when he says "time, as far 
as we are capable of understanding it, is nothing more than the 
varieties of the felt relation ; which in reference to one of the 
subjects of the relation we distinguish by the word before,, in 
reference to the other, by the word after . . . All of which 
we can be said to be conscious, is certainly the present mo- 
ment alone. But of that complex state of mind, which forms 
to us the present moment, there are parts which impress us 
irresistibly and beyond all the power of scepticism with the 
relation, which, as I have already said, we term priority in 
reference to the one, and succession or subsequence in refer- 
ence to the other ; time as felt by us, being this relation of 
the two and nothing more. m . . . " It is a relation we may 
remark, which we feel, nearly in the same manner as we feel 
the relation which bodies bear to each other as co-existing in 
space." 

This last is remarkable from one who has deduced space 
from time — from the mere successive feelings of "length 7 ' in 
stretching the arm. Also Brown's genesis of time as detailed 
above, and his notion that time is one of the earliest notions 
of the infant, " preceding its notion of external things," are 
difficult to reconcile with his declaration that " if we had been 
incapable of considering more than two events together, we 
probably never should have invented the word time " (p. 90). 
We have to regret that Brown did not give the same weighty 
scrutiny to "relations" which he gave to the analysis of 
space. 

Brown developed further the common doctrine of associa- 
tion or " suggestion " as he termed it, by adding thereto a 
further class or realm, of association among "relations" ; the 
former he termed " simple suggestion ; " the latter " relative 
suggestion." Among these last he classed time perception. 
Thus it must be observed, though arrived at from entirely 
different standpoints these " feelings of time relation" are 
essentially kin to the disparate "time-sense" of Ozermak 
and Vierordt, and the time "feeling " of I. H. Fichte, and as 
we shall see later of Horwicz, and James. 

1 Ibid, Vol. II, 91. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 35 

Sir William Hamilton falls back from Brown toward 
Kant. He nowhere gets beyond the antique vagueness that 
" time is the necessary condition of every conscious act. m 

Herbart is the Morning Star of modern German Psychol- 
ogy. Schwegler describes his system as " an extension of the 
Monadology of Leibnitz." 2 Herbart' s monads, however, are 
' ' eternally unchangeable, ' ' and in place of the Pre-established 
Harmony of Leibnitz, the reciprocal interactions of the monads 
or l < reals ' ' are the direct cause of their intelligence. The 
diversities of mental content are primarily due to respectively 
diverse kinds of "reals " — for every red, shrill or cold sen- 
sation, a red, shrill, or cold monad. 3 Mind as^the product of 
the interactions of these monads is a mathematical mechanism. 

The following indicates Herbart' s mechanism of time. 
Some "real" attacks our "real" (the soul)] which "seek- 
ing to preserve its own condition, ' ' a corresponding sensation 
a results ; a thus rises in consciousness till -equilibrium is 
reached between the force of the "real" and the "self -pre- 
serving ' ' force of the soul ; a " sinks ' ' as the soul gains the 
mastery and restores itself by expelling the attacking " real." 
The level at which any consciousness begins is its "thresh- 
old." 4 If while a durates in consciousness, another sensation 
b similarly rises, then a and b "fuse" (associate) propor- 
tionately to their "remnant" or remaining co-presence, 
height or intensity in consciousness ; thereafter, whenever 
either a or b appears in consciousness, it tends to bring back 
the other with a force proportional to the above "fusion." 
If a b c d rise in an original sequence, and a by any cause 
be brought back into consciousness, it will tend to bring with 
it b; b to bring c; and c to bring d; thus the whole series 
will repeat itself in the time order of its original occurrence. 5 
If, moreover, at any time thereafter c be the first of the series 
to be brought back, then its influence will work in two direc- 
tions; the series c d will repeat itself as in the original 

1 Lectures (Boston, 1871), I, 548. 

2 Hist. Philos. (Sterling Tr. Edinburgh, 10th Ed.) p. 285. 

3 Lehrbuch zur Psychol., § 150 sq., etc. ; Allgemeine Metaph. § 312, 
" Wie viele Merkmale— so viele Ursachen." 

4 Lehrbuch, ch. 1. 

5 Ibid. § 29 sq. 



36 NICHOLS : 

sequence ; but at the same time c will act both upon b and 
upon am proportion to its former "fusion-" with each of 
these ; consequently, while c d reinstates itself as a " series 
of evolution," the combination a b c rises simultaneously 
through "involution" c appearing brighter than b, and b 
than a, i. e., fixedly in proportion to their original fusion — 
that is again, in brightness proportional to the time-order of 
their original appearance. 1 These laws may be carried out 
through all the familiar complexities of Association, ' ' series 
and ever- compounding series of series " being substituted for 
the letters of our formula. 

But in particular how are time- perceptions formed 1 ? Sup- 
pose an original series a b c d e, as above. Should a be again 
presented the series tends to repeat itself by "evolution " in 
its original direction. Should e, however, be the first to ap- 
pear of a re- presentation, then the series tends to be brought 
back as a whole, co-existently and by the above process of 
' ' involution. ' ' Finally, should a and e be reproduced simul- 
taneously, a compound result would now occur ; a result in- 
cluding and combining both the previously mentioned results : 
that of the " involution," occurring from e, and the " evolu- 
tion" following from a. In this final process, it will be ob- 
served, are involved three requisites : (1) The involutive 
product — in which all the members of the series are simul- 
taneously represented, but each with a brightness correspond- 
ing to its time order or degree of i l fusion ' ' in the original 
sequence. This may be called the presentation of the series. 

(2) The evolutive product — which is an actual re-occurrence 
of the original series in the same time order, and each mem- 
ber in proportion though not with equal brightness, with that 
in which it first appeared. This may be called the presentation 
of the succession — that is, of the process itself or of change. 

(3) By the combination of (1) and (2) the two end terms of 
a series are presented in a proper double simultaneous rela- 
tion, that is as both co-existently present, yet both also in 
serial perspective of fixed single direction. This may be 
called the presentation of their terminal time- relation. Thus 
in (1), (2) and (3) together, we have the three elements, 

1 Ibid. § 167 sq. ; 75 sq. ; 89 sq ; Psych, als W. § 94, 112, 115. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 37 

which Herbart conceived to be essential to a complete per- 
ception or idea of time ; namely : An idea of the series, an 
idea of succession or change, and an idea of definite terminal 
relations. 1 

Suggestive as is the method, and scientific as is the spirit 
of Herbart' s time theories, it is of chief importance for us to 
note accurately Herbart' s true position regarding time-per- 
ception as an instantaneous state, or a succession of states ; 
this especially because of the weight of Herbart' s opinion as 
an authority ; of his great influence upon the German Psychol- 
ogy of to-day; of the constant misconception and misquota- 
tion of his opinion, and of the crucial value of the question 
itself. By holders of the first view, much is made of Her- 
bart' s phrase, " Succession in presentation is not a presenta- 
tion of succession." 2 While to any student of Herbart it is 
plain that not every succession of mental content suffices to 
constitute or yield an idea of time- relation, yet it is just as 
plain that no single simultaneous condition of mind does or 
can constitute the same. Herbart' s time- perception is a 
three-fold process — not a single present state. It is also im- 
portant to note that Herbart imports into his three-fold pro- 
cess no extra or disparate sense or feeling ; HerbarVs per- 
ception of time-relation , consists of certain proper successive 
combinations of our ordinary sensations or feelings, or of 
their reproduced representatives. 

Friedrich Eduard Beneke founded a new psychological 
system more or less kin to that of Herbart and to the English 
Empirical School, but he gave no new explanations of time. 3 

Moritz Wilhelm Drobisch, a disciple of Herbart, de- 
clared space and time to be but ''forms of succession" 
( Reih en form e n ) . 4 

Theodor Waitz, from an Herbart ian starting point, 5 intro- 
duces a new aspect of the problem — one that assumes great 
importance in the modern psychology of Wundt, Miinsterberg, 

1 Ibid. § 167 sq.; § 75 sq. ; § 89 sq. Psych, als TV. § 94 sq. ; § 112 
sq.: §115. 

2 Lehrbuch zur Psych. § 174; Allg. Metaph. ch. 1 sq. 

3 "Die neue Psych." Berlin, 1845 ; Lehrbuch d. n. Psych. 2d Ed. 
(Berlin, 1845) ; Pragmatische Psych. (Berlin, 1850), 2d Ed. 

4 Empirische Psych. (Leipzig, 1842), p. 67. 

5 Lehrbuch der Psych. (Braunschweig, 1849), p. 580, 583. 



38 NICHOLS : 

et ah He points out that " certain conditions of feeling' * 
such as constitute waiting, impatience, tediousness, straining 
of attention and the like, always accompany our objective con- 
tents of thought; and he holds that these are fundamental 
in the formation of our time percepts. The process by which 
this happens is not unlike that given above from Thomas 
Brown. A well remembered series of these obscure inner 
feelings, that is, a series of them which has been frequently 
repeated in us, is compared with, that is, "runs its course 
simultaneously with" a new objective series, say of vision: 
the new visual series over-runs, or runs short of the old con- 
stant series of feelings, and the shortage or overplus of these 
last constitute our means of judgment, or time- measures of 
the new series. These overplus and shortage earmarks become 
* ' fused ' ' or associated with all sorts of combinations and ab- 
stractions, and form the fundamental measure elements of all 
our time concepts^ 

Etjdolph Hermann Lotze, notwithstanding his eminence 
in modern philosophy and the originality of his determinations 
regarding ' l local signs ' ' and space, adds little to the discussion 
of the time problem. He believed in the " power of the soul to 
preserve impressions independently of physical conditions." 2 

Heinrich Czolbe, of all moderns, must be credited with 
the most unique view of time. He regarded all sensation as 
extended in space, and time as a fourth dimension of space. 8 

Wilhelm Eosenkrantz, last of the School of Schelling, 
newly discussed time as a category or form of thought in its 
intercourse with the outer world. 4 

Leopold George, pupil of Schleiermacher and Hegel, de- 
clared : " By means of memory the moment of time is intro- 
duced in the [t- e. his] system of localized points"; but 
' f memory does not reproduce traces of sensation as is gen- 
erally thought, but reproduces combinations, the occasions 

1 Ibid. § 52. 

2 Medicin. Psych. § 36, p. 473. 

3 Posthumous Work, " Outlines of an Extensional Theory of Knowl- 
edge. Edited by Dr. Johnson (1875). Compare with this from Diogenes 
L. VII, 141, "Time is the extension of the motion of the world 

(6ia.GTr)iia TTjg tov Koafiov tavf/oetog) . It is infinite both in the direction of the 
past and of the future. 

4 Die Wissenschaft des Wissens (Munich). 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 39 

for which have been supplied by the sensations." 1 Particu- 
larly he combats the time theories of Trendelenburg. 

Trendelenburg, going back to Aristotle, held space and 
time to be products of motion. 2 In opposition to Kuno Fisch- 
er he particularly criticized the time theories of Kant and 
Herbart. 3 

Ulrici examines the subject from the stand-point of 
" Speculative Theism," and semi-Hegelianism, but gets little 
further than such declarations as that ' ' Thought is bound by 
certain rules, of which time is one." 4 

Fechner discusses time, space and motion, as it would 
seem, with particular reference to the writings of Trendelen- 
burg, but without his usual originality. 6 

Brentano, Professor of Philosophy at Vienna, in his Psy- 
ch ologie vom empirischen Standpunkte (Leipzig, 1874), gives 
an interesting exposition of the views of a certain current 
transitional school, but does not focus definitely on the sub- 
ject of time. 

Horwicz is a prominent advocate of the modern tendency 
to make physiology the sole source and guide of both psy- 
chology and philosophy. 6 The metaphysical question of how 
the body excites any feeling at all in the soul, he considers 
vanity and folly. (I. 143). Soul is " a collective designa- 
tion for all psychic phenomena." (1.135). He reduces all 
of mind to simple elements of i l feeling. ' ' Change in feeling 
follows change in nerve substance. (2 Vol. Ill, 41). " All 
soul processes are built up (of the ultimate feeling elements) 
through repetition and complication." (1,202). Frequence 
of repetition plays the fundamental role (p. 345 sq.). Cer- 
tain frequency gives us sight, another sound, etc. Time- 
sense, and space or place sense are special senses to be classed 

1 Lehrbuch der Psych. (Berlin, 1854). p. 222, 399. 

2 Logisehe Untersuchungen (Berlin, 1840). Vol. VI. 

3 Vol. III. Hist. Beitrage zur Philos. ; (pamphlet) "Kuno Fischer 
und seinKant" (Leipzig, 1869) ; K. Fischer's Geschichted. neuren Philos. 
(2d ed.) Vols. Ill and IV, 1869. 

4 Das Grundprincip der Philosophic, Leipzig 1845-6; System der 
Logic (1852) ; Compendium der Logik (1860 and 1872) ; Outline of Prac- 
tical Philos., pp. 1-208. 

5 Physik. u. Philos. Atomenlehre (Leipzig, 1855-1864). Appendix. 

6 Psychologische Analysen auf physiologische Grundlage, 1st Part. 
Halle, 1872, 2d Part (2 Vols. Halle und Magdeburg, 1875-1878). 



40 NICHOLS : 

with sight, hearing, etc. (p. 340). This, though time ap- 
pears only with and always with other sensation. Horwicz' s 
classification of the senses, according to their objectivity 1 is 
strangely in opposition to Kant : " Objective (end of scale) ; 
Time- sense, space- sense, eye, ear, pressure, temperature, 
smell, taste, general feeling of the skin, feeling of the organ- 
ism or general feeling ; subjective (end of scale.)" 

Sensations, on their physical side, leave effects in the nerve 
elements, which are the basis of our ideas or reproduced sen- 
sations. Metaphysical identity Horwicz declares to be an in- 
solvable metaphysical question, but mental or objective iden- 
tity is at least an " unsuspected likeness" (p. 107). From 
reappearances of these unsuspected likenesses under the usual 
laws of reproduction and association, Horwicz builds all our 
concepts of memory and of time-relation. He plants himself 
unmistakably on the side of those who declare all perceptions 
of time- relation to be only certain successions of properly 
compounded sense presentations, or feelings. 

Horwicz betrays the influence of modern experimental time 
psychology ; rhythm now plays the important role. Ehythm 
he declares to be the measure and the only measure of time ; a 
being incapable of regular periodic intervals could attain no 
conception of time. All the rhythmic functions of the body 
serve this purpose ; as breathing, pulse, leg- swing and other 
such movements, hunger, sleep, labors, duties, customs of 
all kinds. Thus our time measures spring from and enter 
into the most fundamental and most subtle depths of our 
being (III, 145). 

Wilhelm Wundt, at present the most conspicuous figure 
in German Psychology, has given us positive determinations 
of unusual originality and value ; this whether the merit of 
his system be as entirely obvious or not. 1 He reduces all 
mind to ultimate elements of "will; " indeed, elementary acts 
of will, as activities, rather than as sensations, are the ulti- 
mate constituents of the entire universe. 2 Higher manifesta- 
tions of these elementary will components are feelings and 



1 For English criticism see " Mind," January, 1890. 
* System der Philosophic (Leipzig 1889), p. 438 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 41 

sense-perceptions. Combinations again of these last men- 
tioned products, give us sensations proper, but as a matter of 
fact, we never experience even sensations, as single elements, 
but alone complex combinations of them, such as our ordina- 
ry complex sights, sounds, etc. 1 The nature of this lowest 
element of mind is, however, that of a judgment ; in the 
merest experience, say of red, is a recognition — a judgment 
of it as red. Therein lies the root and nature of all reason, 
of all mental acts ; which acts are but complications or com- 
pilations of elementary willful judgments. 2 Inherent in the 
nature of this ultimate unitary judgment, is the problem of 
recognition of identity. 3 Why elements of mind exist at all 
we do not know ; why diversity rises from these units we do 
not know ; why we judge or identify the diverse we do not 
know. That we do these things is assumed as an ultimate 
fact. From these ultimate assumptions all mind develops ; 
the processes of its development are alone the province of 
psychology ; what may lie back of these is the province of 
metaphysics. 

In the same way that the content of mind is ultimately in- 
comprehensible, so also is the fact that its diversities succeed 
each other ; the nature and the manner of these successions is 
all that psychology can study. All mind then is but a succes- 
sion of diversities ; certain of these we call ideas, perceptions, 
conceptions or postulates — among others are those of time. 4 
Yet not every mental succession suffices to constitute an idea 
or perception of time — an idea or even the simplest possible 
perception being a highly complex product. The crucial 
process of time-perception Prof. Wundt describes as follows : 
" Assume that . . . similar pendulum strokes follow each 
other at regular intervals in a consciousness otherwise void. 
When the first one is over, an image of it remains in the 
fancy until the second succeeds. This, then, reproduces the 
first by virtue of the law of association by similarity, but at 
the same time meets with the aforesaid persisting image. . . 

1 Grundziige der Physiologischen Psychologic (Leipzig 1887) II, 226. 
* System, p. 573. 

3 System, p. 504. 

4 System, p. 428 sq ; 431 sq. 



42 Nichols : 

Thus does the simple repetition of the sound provide all the 
elements of time-perception. The first sound [as it is re- 
called by association] gives the beginning, the second the 
end, and the persistent image in the fancy represents the 
length of the interval. At the moment of the second impres- 
sion, the entire time- perception exists at once, for then all its 
elements are presented together, the second sound and the 
image in the fancy immediately, and the first impression by 
reproduction. But, in the same act, we are aware of a state 
in which only the first sound existed, and of another in which 
only its image existed in the fancy. Such a consciousness as 
this is that of time. . . . In it no succession of ideas takes 
place.' )n 

It can not fail to be observed that the above time-percep- 
tion is & process and not a state. Notwithstanding Wundt' s 
last words in italics this process is surely a succession ol 
some kind or kinds ; though of course it is not a S * succession 
of ideas," if by idea is meant the process as a whole. There 
seems no good reason for confusion on this point. 9 

Prof. Wundt discusses constancy (duration), change, and 
rhythm with perspicuity and truth. 3 

Prof. Lipps one of the representative German Psycholo- 
gists describes the time-process as follows: " Sensations 
arise, occupy consciousness, fade into images and vanish ; ac- 
cording as two of them, a and &, go through this process 

1 Physiological Psychol. 1st Ed. p. 681-2. Tr. in James' Psy- 
chology, Vol. I, 608. James adds " note here the assumption that 
the persistence and the reproduction of an impression are two processes 
which may go on simultaneously. Also that Wundt's description is 
merely an attempt to analyze the deliverance of a time-perception, and no 
explanation of the manner in which it comes about." 

2 Prof . Wundt contributes confusion as follows: Logik p. 432. "Die 
Vorstellung zeitlicher Aufeinanderfolge ist nicht selbst eine Aufeinan- 
derfolge von Vorstellungen, sonde rn eine aus der letzteren hervorge- 
hende simultane Anschauung, in welcher sich die Wahrnehmung zweier 
getrenter Vorstellung en, die als Anfangs- und Endpunkt einer Zeit- 
reihe gegeben sind, mit dem Bewusstsein eines sie trennenden anders- 
artigen Inhaltes verbindet. Dabei kann dieser letztere, entweder 
bloss aus der Nachdauer der ersten Vorstellung, oder ausserdem, aus 
neuen Vorstellungen bestehen, deren Xach-wirkungen zu derjenigen 
einer ersten Vorstellung hinzu tretten. Wesentlich fur die Anschauung 
der Zeit, ist somit, einerseits die Verbindung verscheidener getrennter 
Vorstellungen mittlest der Reproduction, und anderseits das ebensfalls 
durch Reproduction vermittelte Bewusstsein ihrer Trennung." 

3 p. 435. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 43 

simultaneously, or as one precedes, or follows the other, the 
phases of their fading will agree or differ ; and the difference 
will be proportional to the time- difference between their sev- 
eral moments of beginning. Thus there are differences of 
quality in the images, which the mind may translate into 
corresponding differences of their temporal order. There is 
no other possible middle term between the objective time- 
relations and those in the mind than these differences of 
phase." 1 

Prof. Lipps calls these ' ' temporal signs ' ' ; what his pro- 
cess of mental translation of these signs may be is difficult 
to conceive, and it were about as easy to call the whole prob- 
lem an inexplicable mystery and be done with it. 

Ernst Mach, a prominent representative of the experi- 
mental school, also carries back our problem to a special 
time-sense or feeling, " as special as that of color." 2 He says 
we can separate the rhythm of a melody from the tone, as 
much as the contour from a painting, and that this would not 
be possible were the rhythm not a separate series. He sug- 
gests that there may be in the ear some accommodation ap- 
paratus like that of the eye, which may be the organ of the 
temporal sense. Time- sense, therefore, would be, and is 
closely allied to the workings of attention ; certain ' l fixa- 
tion " sensations arise from this accommodation organ, vary- 
ing according to intensity, duration, pause, etc. ; a greater 
amount of attention always indicates the later impression ; 
this happens by reason of association with sense of fatigue 
of the organ. u But adapted condition" would in time be 
called up by external happenings, as in eye- adaptation and 
these called-up ear-marks thus give us temporal distance and 
sequence, in the same way as we get visual distance and per- 
spective. 3 

Dr. Hugo Munsterberg finds in respiration a solution of 
the time-problem (analogous to Mach's theory above) which 



1 Grundtatsaehen des Selenlebens (Bonn, 1883). p. 588. Tr. James* 
Psy. p. 632. 

2 " Untersuchen liber den Zeitsinn des Ohres," § IV. "Beitrage zur 
Analyse der Empfindungen," pp. 6-14. 

3 Ibid, p. 103 sq. 



44 NICHOLS : 

will be considered presently in connection with the work of 
other experimentalists. 

Prof. Wilhelm Volkmann discusses time with his nsual 
comprehensiveness. A brief review of his discussion will 
close the history of the German schools, and thus, what may 
be considered a fair representation of the latest status of our 
problem in that country, will be brought into close compari- 
son with the views of James Mill of the English school, 
which will then follow. 

The general system of Yolkmann is so essentially that of 
Herbart as to need no further exposition here. Eegarding 
time, however, Volkmann takes a more literal position than 
his master as to whether the idea of succession is or is not a 
succession of ideas. He says : " Indeed when one considers 
the matter precisely, he discovers the antithesis, that the pre- 
sentations A and B, in order to be perceived as successive, 
must be presented simultaneously ; that is, in order to appear 
to be after each other, they must be present.' 71 " In order to 
become conscious of a presentation as ended, we must bring 
it into some other presentation which appears to us as going 
on." In original sensations as opposed to their reproduced 
images he finds the requisite data of distinction for the "going 
on ;" these form our present. Of a succession of sensations 
ABC only one is present — " the present of one excludes that 
of the others. But this exclusion is purely negative ; if a 
time-presentation is to arise, the not-present (say of A and C, 
while B is present) must be raised from the negative to the 
positive form." " This happens in that A and C (while B is 
present) each in a different manner, continue to influence B " 
(according to ordinary Herbartian psycho-mechanics). A, 
although having passed out of the focus of sensation, strug- 
gles to preserve to itself that condition as against B ; B repells 
this endeavor, and in the reflex, which the presentation of A 
in itself suffers, lies the perception (Bewusstwerden) of time 
as a quality of A, i. e. the perception of it as "no more." 
Thus with Yolkmann this secondary reflex feeling of strife, 

1 Lehrbuch der Psychologie von Standpunkt des Realismus 
(Cothen, 1885), II, p. 12. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 45 

suffered by reason of the contention of the sensations them- 
selves for the focus-point or present of consciousness, is 
the essential element of time-perception. Similarly to this 
struggle of " no-more," or " feeling of past," of A, is devel- 
oped the "not-yet" of C, i. e., the feeling or intuition of 
future. The time- sense with Yolkmann is, therefore, more 
thoroughly a disparate sense, though also a " general sense," 
than even sight or hearing. 

" No-more and not- yet," he continues, " are the specific 
( eigentlicheri) time-feelings, and we should never become con- 
scious of time otherwise than through these feelings. . . . 
When a series has once taken on this time-form (as above) 
it preserves the acquired characteristic, in future reproduc- 
tion of the same, but only when, and in so far as the same 
conditions are renewed, under which the original time-form was 
developed. . . . The presentations (A B C) remain what 
they are, but the manner of their presentation changes ; all 
time- consciousness, as feeling, is a perception (Bewusstwer- 
den) of presentations" (§§ 86, 87). 

Eegarding duration, a corresponding struggle to that of 
" no-more", and u not- yet- there," gives us the feelings of 
" yet-there." Complications of these constitute our feelings 
of tediousness, ennui, expectation, monotony, haste, fast, 
slow, etc. " The rise and fall of these strifes, bring into the 
life of the individual certain rhythms ' ' which become our 
measures of duration and of time. So separate is the sense 
of time from the content, that various presentations may pro- 
duce the same feelings of time or of duration, i. e., the same 
perceptions of time-length and time- relationship (§ 88). 

Upon these main principles, Volkmann develops all the 
more varied and complicated time concepts, up to those of 
eternity and of time in the abstract. This, in a truly master- 
ly manner, whether the fundamental metaphysical assump- 
tion of all his strife mechanism between mental elements be 
in any way warranted or not. 

James Mill follows Thomas Brown in denying any differ- 
ence of essential nature between sensation and perception. 
He took upon himself the task of removing still more com- 
pletely the " Psychological Fallacy" of self- consciousness, 



46 NICHOLS : 

from our conceptions of mental processes. 1 Yet Mill was not 
altogether able to free himself at once from the inbred uses of 
language, or even from the habits of thought current in his 
age, and indeed still current in the popular psychology of to- 
day. If, however, Mill's point of view be borne in mind and 
his meaning be sought for with any generosity and fairness, 
psychological truths and subtle suggestions of the profound- 
est and most far-reaching importance may be found in his 
writings in germ, if not always fully developed. 

Time, memory and personal identity are intimately inter- 
twined ; the same fundamental mystery lies at the root of all 
three. With Herbart and his school Mill distinctly declares 
that not any and every mental succession will give us a per- 
ception either of time- relation, of memory, or of identity : 
and in close accord with Herbart, he asserts, that certain 
proper successive combinations of sensations, their reproduc- 
tions, and repetitions of these reproductions do alone and of 
themselves constitute all possible forms of all three. He 
says: " Imagination consists of ideas. . . . Memory has 
in it all that imagination has, but it must also have something 
more. ... In memory is not only the idea of the thing 
remembered, there is also the idea of my having seen it. 
Now these two, (1) the idea of the thing, (2) the idea of my 
having seen it, combined, make up, it will not be doubted, the 
whole of that state of conscience which we call memory. But 
what is it that we are to understand by what I have called 
'the idea of my having seen the object"? " (p. 32d). To 
clear up this question he supposes a case as follows : "I have 
one sensation, and then another sensation ; call them A and 
jB, and I recognize them as successive." Then, "the con- 
sciousness of the present moment (by law of association) 
calls up the idea of the consciousness of the preceding mo- 
ment. The consciousness of the present moment is not abso- 

1 "Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind" (London, 1869) 
I, p. 235. A pregnant passage in Mill is " The term 'I conceive ' has 
the form of an active verb, and with the form of an active verb, the 
idea of action is so frequently conjoined that we are rarely able to sep- 
arate them." Perhaps the chief point of difference in the general sys- 
tems of Brown and Mill is, that the latter abandons "relations " as a 
separate element or phenomenon of mind. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 47 

lately simple ; for whether I have a sensation or idea, the 
idea of what I call myself is always inseparably combined 
with it. The conscionsness then of the second of the two 
moments in the case supposed, is the sensation combined 
with the idea of myself, which compound I call < Myself Sen- 
tient.' This Self Sentient, in other words, sensation B com- 
bined with the idea of self, calls up the idea of sensation A 
combined with self. This we call Memory" (p. 337). Mem- 
ory then, Mill finds to consist of three parts : " the remember- 
ing self ; the remembered self ; and the train which inter- 
rened. Of these three parts, the last has been fully ex- 
pounded. The recalling of the successive states of conscious- 
ness, which composed the intervening train, is an ordinary 
case of association ; the other parts, the two selves, at the ex- 
tremes of this train, require further consideration. The self 
at the first end, is the remembered self; the self which had a 
sensation or an idea. The idea of this self, therefore, con- 
sists of two parts : of self, and a sensation or an idea. The 
last mentioned part of this combination, the sensation or idea, 
needs no explanation ; the first, that which is called self, 
does. The self at the other extremity of the chain of con- 
sciousness, is the remembering self. Remembering is asso- 
ciating. The idea of this self, then, is the combination of 
self with the idea of associating. And here, too, associating 
needs no explanation ; it is the other part of the combination 
that does. The analysis, then, of self, or the account of 
what is included in that state of consciousness commonly 
called the idea of personal identity, is still wanting to com- 
plete the development of memory" (p. 338). In modern 
times the associational conception of self, or personal iden- 
tity, is too well known to need here that long and subtle ex- 
planation which Mill in his day found it difficult to express 
with any sort of comprehension. The self-problem is ab- 
struse and obscure even in our day of ' 'fringes, ' ' and of feelings 
of " ifs, buts and ands." It is not to be wondered, therefore, 
that Mill's first handling of the subject should contain con- 
tradictions and short- comings of the grossest order ; but the 
student who is alive to its full significance will find in Mill's 
elucidations the traces of a master psychologist. 



48 NICHOLS: 

The gist of Mill's theory, and particularly as applied to 
time, is, that we do not go outside of our ordinary sensations 
and their corresponding reproductions, as governed by the 
natural laws of production, association, and reproduction, in 
any of the processes of mind whatever ; whether of personal 
identification, memory or perception of time relations. 

This view differs from that of Herbart chiefly, in that the 
elements of sensation are not looked upon by Mill as " reals'' 
between which there is direct attraction and repulsion, a 
metaphysical assumption for which there is to be found no 
scientific warrant ; and it differs still more from the view of 
Yolkmann in that no secondary feeling or sense of con- 
tention in the ordinary mental content, is needed ; which sec- 
ondary order of feeling is itself another metaphysical specu- 
lation without scientific justification or support. 

John Stuart Mill sums up the case against the crucial 
point of his father as follows : ' ( The distinction between a 
mere combination of ideas in thought, and one which reveals 
to us a combination of sensations as actually experienced, 
always returns on our hands as an ultimate postulate." 1 

But this can scarcely be conceived to be relevant to the 
position of his father, with whom a series of mental states 
actually occurring, that is, "a combination of sensations as 
actually experienced" was accepted as an ultimate postulate. 
The father's endeavor was, this being accepted or postulated, 
to show how the processes of memory worked under this 
postulate. With the elder Mill the ultimate postulate was 
that " series actually occurred " — out of these he developed 
the memory and the belief. His son first postulated the be- 
lief ; the fault of which seems to be the same as postulating 
any other function, or faculty of the mind before inquiring if 
that faculty or function cannot be discovered to be a com- 
pound process. The " belief" can be deduced from the 
series, not the series from the ''belief." J. S. Mill also 
went back to and emphasized the English school's theory of 
relations as taught by Brown. 

Herbert Spencer's evolutionary system of realism is well 
known ; it conceives the entire physical world to be devel- 

Ibid. Appendix I, 416. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 4# 

oped from ultimate homogeneous units, and all consciousness 
to be a corresponding development of mental units. The 
salient feature of Mr. Spencer's psychology is his theory of 
Relations. " The proximate components of mind are of two 
broadly contrasted kinds : Feelings, and the Relations be- 
tween feelings. . . . Each feeling, as we here define it, is 
any portion of consciousness, which occupies a place suffi- 
ciently large to give it a perceivable individuality ; which has 
its individuality marked off from adjacent portions of con- 
sciousness by qualitative contrasts ; and which when intro- 
spectively contemplated, appears to be homogeneous ... A 
relation between feelings is on the contrary, characterized by 
occupying no appreciable part of consciousness. Take away 
the terms which it unites, and it disappears along with them ; 
having do independent place, no individuality of its own. It 
is true that under an ultimate analysis, what we call a rela- 
tion proves to be itself a kind of feeling — the momentary feel- 
ing accompanying the transition from one conspicuous feeling 
to an adjacent conspicuous feeling. And it is true that not- 
withstanding its extreme brevity, its qualitative character is 
appreciable ; for relations are distinguishable from one an- 
other, only by the unlikeness of the feelings which accom- 
pany the momentary transitions. Each relational feeling 
may, in fact, be regarded as one of those nervous shocks, 
which we suspect to be the units of composition of feelings ; 
and though instantaneous, it is known of greater or less 
strength and as taking place with greater or less facility. 
But the contrasts between these relational feelings and what 
we ordinarily call feelings is so strong that we must class 
them apart." 1 Relations, then, with Mr. Spencer are an 
entirely disparate sense, as much as the time- sense of Czer- 
mak, or the time-feelings of Horwicz. "A succession of 
changes " Mr. Spencer declares to be " the subject matter of 
psychology ; it is the business of psychology to determine the 
law of their order. ' ' Of particular importance for the time 
question is Mr. Spencer's fundamental conception of percep- 
tions of likeness and unlikeness of relations of succession. 

1 Principles of Psychology (New York, 1877), I, 163. 

4 



50 NICHOLS : 

" The requisite to the existence of a relation is the existence 
of two feelings between which it is the link. The requisite 
to the existence of two feelings is some difference. And 
therefore the requisite to the existence of a relation is the 
occurrence of a change, the passage from one apparently uni- 
form state to another apparently uniform state, implying the 
momentary shock produced by the commencement of a new 
state. " * u The ultimate relation therefore, is nothing more 
than a change in the state of consciousness ; and we call it 
♦either a relation of unlikeness, or a relation of sequence, ac- 
cording as we think of the contrast between the antecedent 
and consequent states, or of their order. ' ' 2 Mr Spencer suffers 
much difficulty with his relations of likeness. " The two 
terms of a relation of likeness are the antecedent and conse- 
quent of what, in one sense, is no change ; seeing that it 
leaves consciousness in the same condition as before." But 
as above, because " two states if not different can not exist 
as separate . . . accurately speaking, therefore, a relation of 
likeness consists of two relations of unlikeness which neutral- 
ize each other. It is a change from some relatively endur- 
ing state A to another state X (which represents the feeling 
we have while passing from one of the like things to the 
other) and a change from the transitory state X, to a second 
relatively enduring state A 1 which would be indistinguish- 
able from the first state were it not divided from it by the 
state X" (p. 284). Surely here are contradictions as obvious 
as print can make them. Yet these are Mr. Spencer's theo- 
ries of Eelations, which he considers the fundamental princi- 
ple of all reason and all intelligence, 3 including of course all 
problems of identity, memory and time- perception. 

Mr. Spencer's manner of elucidating the latter is, however, 
more successful, and is perhaps more profound than that of 

1 Vol. II, p. 287. Query: If a 'shock of relation' intervened be- 
tween the two like states, would not this s-uffice, by Mr. Spencer's own 
theory, for the two states to be known as separate and also as like? 
Again : Why may not consciousness be in two states at the same time? 
Have we any proof that an area of red and an area of blue may not be 
simultaneously in consciousness? Rather this is what apparently does 
take place. 

2 Ibid. 

3 Ibid, chapters on Reason and Intelligence. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 51 

any other writer. This, if his theory of relations be borne in 
mind, may be sufficiently indicated by saying that it develops 
from his standpoint of Eelations, along the traditional lines of 
English association (especially of James Mill), perfected and 
enlarged in accordance with the doctrines of evolution. 

S. H. Hodgson, in his " Philosophy of Beflection" (Vol. 
1, p. 248-254) has produced a discussion, which deserves a 
place here, if for nothing more than to sample the loose, irre- 
sponsible sort of imagination regarding the subject, that not 
only gets printed, but also gets quoted. " What I find, when 
I look at consciousness at all is, that what I can not divest 
myself of, or not have in consciousness, if I have conscious- 
ness at all, is a sequence of different feelings. . . . The 
simultaneous perception of both sub-feelings, whether as 
parts of a co-existence or of a sequence, is the total feeling — 
the minimum of consciousness — and this minimum has dura- 
tion. . . . Time duration, however, is inseparable from 
the minimum, notwithstanding that, in an isolated moment 
we could not tell which part of it came first, which last. . . 
. . We do not require to know that the sub-feelings come 
in sequence, first one, then the other ; nor to know what 
coming in sequence means. But we have in an artificially 
isolated minimum of consciousness, the rudiments of the per- 
ception of former and latter in time, in the sub-feeling that 
grows fainter, and the sub-feeling that grows stronger, and 
the change between them. ... In the next place, I re- 
mark that the rudiments of memory are involved in the min- 
imum of consciousness. The first beginnings of it appear in 
that minimum, just as the first beginnings of perception do. 
As each member of the change or difference which goes to 
compose that minimum is the rudiment of a single percep- 
tion, so the priority of one member to the other, although 
both are given to consciousness in one empirical present mo- 
ment, is the rudiment of memory. The fact that the mini- 
mum of consciousness is difference or change in feelings, is 
the explanation of memory as well as of single perceptions. 
A former and a latter are included in the minimum of con- 
sciousness ; and this is what is meant by saying that all con- 
sciousness is in the form of time, or that time is the form of 



52 NICHOLS : 

feeling, the form of sensibility. ... It is clear that the 
minimum of feeling contains two portions, a sub- feeling that 
goes and a sub-feeling that comes." Mr. Hodgson seems to 
mean by " having rudiments of perception," etc., that alone 
which he conceives to take place in a single momentary se- 
quence ; and by ' ' knowing how these take place ' ' to mean 
the long processes of his thought when he thinks about the 
rudimentary process ; but why confuse the two so con- 
tinually? To say that "a former and a latter are included 
in the minimum of consciousness " is in reality declaring that 
a former term of a sequence includes a latter term of that 
sequence. 

E. E. Clay, in his " The Alternative" (p. 167), also adds 
under title of the " Specious Present" another confusion to 
the problem. The gist of his view is as follows: " All the 
changes of place of a meteor seem to the beholder to be con- 
tained in the present. At the instant of the termination of 
such series, no part of the time measured by them seems to 
be past 1 ." Supposing the meteor went on whirling about for 
an hour, a day, a year or two : there might continue to ap- 
pear to the observer an unbroken streak of light around the 
heavens in the path of the meteor, yet would he never dis- 
cover beside this simple case of visual after-image, certain 
sensations of motion " going on?" When he did discover 
the process of this going- on- series would u all of this series 
seem to be contained in the present? " The continuing after- 
image seems confounded by this author with a remembrance 
of the motion series ; there is no more justification for con- 
founding the momentary after-image with a momentary mo- 
tion series than there would be for confounding a week of after- 
image with the eternal path of the hypothetical meteor. 

M. Guyau, in his " La Genese del' Idee de Temps (Paris, 
1890), from an entirely empirical standpoint, develops the 
idea of time out of our ideas of space. Every co-existent 
presentation which constitutes our idea of a series as such, 
is more or less a figurative presentation ; i. e., spatial. Both 
space and time he traces back to feelings of effort of motion. 
The will is the present ; the desire is the future. M. Guyau 

1 Cited by Prof. James, I, 609. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 53 

fairly represents the present tendency of psychology in 
France. 

The article on Psychology in the 9th edition of the Ency- 
clopaedia Britannica, by James Ward, gives an admirable 
summary of the best current opinion on psychological mat- 
ters, save perhaps with too much leaning toward the widely 
doubted theories of apperception put forth by Prof. Wundt. 

Mr. Ward does not attempt metaphysically to go behind 
the data of psychology : " By pure Ego or Subject it is pro- 
posed to denote the simple fact that everything mental is re- 
ferred to self" (p. 39). Of the origin of this self he says : 
" The body becomes in fact the earliest datum for our later con- 
ceptions of permanence and individuality" (p. 56). He adopts 
the Laws of Association as stated by Dr. Bain (p. 61) whose 
classification of the elements of the mind he also accepts, 
namely: sense, feeling, will (p. 40). This, with the follow- 
ing remark of Mr. Ward regarding the traditional discus- 
sion of perception vs. sensation, will make his general psy- 
chological standpoint sufficiently clear for our purpose : "It 
has been usual to say that perception implies both memory 
and imagination ; but such a statement can be allowed only 
as long as these terms are vaguely used " (p. 61). 

Approaching the subject of time Mr. Ward says: "Thus 
as the joint effect of obliviscence and reduplication we are 
provided with a flow of ideas distinct from the memory- train, 
and thereby with the material, already more or less organized 
for intellectual and volitional manipulation" (p. 62). That 
is for thought in general in distinction from actual remem- 
brances. " Eetentiveness is both a biological and a psycho- 
logical fact ; memory is exclusively the latter. In memory 
there is necessarily some contrast of past and present ; in re- 
tentiveness nothing but the persistence of the old" (p. 47). 
" Memory includes recognition ; recognition as such does not 
include memory. . . . But of the two characteristics of 
memory proper — (a) concreteness of circumstantiality, and 
(&) localization in the past — the latter is the most essential " 
(p. 63). With the content of memory or time-percepts we 
are not at present concerned ; on how this content is localized 
in the past, Mr. Ward writes as follows : " To a being whose 



54 NICHOLS : 

presentations never passed through the transitions which 
ours undergo — first divested of the strength and vividness of 
impressions (original sensations), again reinvested with them 
and brought back from the faint world of ideas — the sharp 
contrasts of ' now ' and l . then, ' and all the manifold emotions 
they occasion, would be quite unknown. . . . Time-order, 
succession, antecedence and consequence, of course, there 
might be still ; but in that sense of events as l past and gone 
forever' . . there is much more than time- order. . . . 
We have not to ask how time itself comes to be ; but assum- 
ing it to be, we ask how the individual comes to know it. . 
. . . The present, though a point of time, is still such that 
we can and do in that moment attend to a plurality of pre- 
sentations, to which we might otherwise have attended sever- 
ally in successive moments. Granting this implication of 
similarity and succession, we may, if we represent succession 
as a line, represent simultaneity as a second line at right- 
angles to the first ; empty time — or time length without time 
breadth — we may say is a mere abstraction. Now it is with 
the former line that we have to do in treating of time as it is, 
and with the latter in treating of our intuition of time, where, 
just as in perspective representation of distance, we are con- 
fined to lines in a plane at right- angles to the actual line of 
depth. In a succession of events, say of sense impressions 

A, B, 0, D, E. . . . the presence of B means the 
absence of A and of C ; but the presentation of this succes- 
sion (as a whole) involves the simultaneous presence, in 
some mode or other, of two or more of the presentations A, 

B, C, D. In presentation, as we have seen, all that corre- 
sponds to the difference of past, present and future, is in 
consciousness simultaneously. This truism, or paradox, 
that all we know of succession is but an interpretation of 
what is really simultaneous or co- existent, we may then con- 
cisely express by saying, that we are aware of time only 
through time-perspective, and experience shows it is a long 
step from a succession of presentations, to such presentations 
of succession. The first condition is, that we should have 
represented together presentations that were in the first in- 
stance attended to successively, and this we have both in the 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 55 

persistence of primary memory-images, and in the simultane- 
ous reproduction of longer and shorter portions of the mem- 
ory-train. In a series thus secured there may be time-marks, 
though no time, and by these marks the series must be dis- 
tinguished from other simultaneous series. To ask which is 
first among a number of simultaneous presentations is un- 
meaning ; one might be logically prior to another, but in time 
they are together and priority is excluded. Nevertheless, 
after each distinct representation a, b, c, d, there probably 
follows, as has been supposed, some trace of that movement 
of attention of which we are aware in passing from one pre- 
sentation to another. In our present reminiscence, we have, 
it must be allowed, little direct proof of this interposition ; 
though there is strong indirect evidence of it in the tendency 
of the flow to follow the order in which the presentations 
were first attended to. With the movements themselves we 
are familiar enough, though the residua of such movements 
are not ordinarily conspicuous. These residua, then, are the 
temporal- signs, and together with the representations con- 
nected by them constitute the memory continuum. But tem- 
poral signs alone will not furnish all the pictorial exactions 
of the time perspective. They give us only a fixed series ; 
but the working of obliviscence, by insuring a progressive 
variation in intensity and distinctness as we pass from one 
member of the series to the other, yields the effect which we 
call time- distance. By themselves, such variations would 
leave us liable to confound more vivid representations in dis- 
tance, with fainter ones nearer the present, but from this mis- 
take the temporal- signs save us ; and as a matter of fact, 
when the memory-train is imperfect such mistakes continu- 
ally occur. On the other hand, where these variations are 
slight and imperceptible, though the memory continuum pre- 
serves the order of events intact, we have still no such dis- 
tinct appreciation of comparative distance in time, as we 
have nearer the present when these perspective effects are 
considerable." (pp. 64, 65.) 

Two points are to be observed in the above : First, Mr. 
Ward does not go outside of his three classes of mental ele- 
ments : Sense, Feeling and Will ; does not posit any hypo- 



56 NICHOLS : 

thetical special time-sense, feeling, intuition, concept, self or 
super- consciousness whatever ; and second, he conceives 
every time- concept to be a complex co- existent state, and not 
a series of states. 

Prof. William James devotes a chapter of his vigorous 
and suggestive Principles of Psychology to the perception of 
time. In general philosophical standpoint he confesses him- 
self a spiritualist, but he is far from abhorring mechanism in 
memory and time-perception. He says " objects fade out of 
consciousness slowly. If the present thought is of A, B, 0, D, 
E, F, G, the next one will be of B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and the 
one after that of 0, D, E, F, G, H, I, the lingerings of the 
past dropping successively away, and the incomings of the 
future making up the loss. These lingerings of old objects, 
these incomings of new, are the germs of memory and expec- 
tation, the retrospective, and the prospective sense of time. 
They give that continuity to consciousness without which 
it could not be called a stream." (I, p. 606.) "The strict 
present ... is in fact, an altogether ideal abstraction. Ee- 
nection leads us to the conclusion that it must exist, but that 
it does exist can never be a fact of our immediate experience. ' ' 
Prof. James then introduces Mr. Clay's " Specious Present" 
given above and proceeds — " In short the practically cog- 
nized present is no knife edge, but a saddle-back with a 
certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and from 
which we look in two directions into time. The unit of com- 
position of our perception of time is a duration, with a bow 
and a stern, as it were, a rearward and a forward-looking end. 
It is only as parts of this duration-block, that the relation 
of succession of one end to the other is perceived. We do 
not first feel one end and then feel the other after it, and from 
the perception of the succession infer an interval of time be- 
tween, but we seem to feel the interval of time as a whole, 
with its two ends imbedded in it. The experience is from the 
outset a synthetic datum, not a simple one ; and to sensible 
perception its elements are inseparable, although attention 
looking back may easily decompose the experience and dis- 
tinguish its beginning from its end. (pp. 608-610.) There 
is a certain emotional feeling accompanying the intervals of 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 57 

time " (p. 618). "The feeling of time and accent in music, 
of rhythm, is quite independent of that of melody." (p. 619.) 
11 All continuous sensations are named [counted] in beats. 
We notice that a certain finite < more ' of them is passing or 
already past . . . the sensation is the measuring tape, the 
perception the dividing engine which stamps its length. As 
we listen to a steady sound, we take it in in discreet pulses of 
recognition, calling it successively the same ! the same ! the 
same ! " " After a small number of beats our impression of the 
amount becomes quite vague. Our only way of knowing it 
accurately is by counting, or noticing the clock, or through 
some other symbolic conception. When the times exceed 
hours or days, the conception is absolutely symbolic. No one 
has anything like a perception of the greater length of the 
time between now and the first century than that between 
now and the tenth. There is properly no comparative time 
intuition in these cases at all. It is but dates and events rep- 
resenting time." (p. 622). "The feeling of past is a present 
feeling." u A succession of feelings, in and of itself is not a 
feeling of succession. And since, to our successive feelings, a 
feeling of their own succession is added, that must be treated as 
an additional fact requiring its own special elucidation" (p. 
628). He here introduces approvingly the time-theory of Mr. 
Ward given above. Then he proceeds " and since we saw a 
while ago that our maximum distinct intuition of duration 
[specious present] hardly covers more than a dozen seconds, 
we must suppose that this amount of duration is pictured fair- 
ly steadily in each passing instant of consciousness by virtue 
of some fairly constant feature in the brain process to which 
the consciousness is tied. This feature of the brain process, 
whatever it be, must be the cause of our perceiving the fact of 
time at all." " Please observe, however, that the reproduction 
of an event after it has once completely dropped out of the 
rear ward end of the specious present is an entirely different 
psychic fact from its direct perception in the specious 
present as a thing immediately past. A creature might be 
entirely devoid of reproductive memory and yet have the 
time- sense, but the latter would be limited in his case, 
to the few seconds immediately passing by. Thus 



58 NICHOLS : 

memory gets strewn with dated things dated in the 
sense of being before or after each other. The date of a thing 
is a mere relation of before or after the present thing, or some 
past or future thing. Some things we date simply by men- 
tally tossing them into the past or future direction. So in 
space we think of England as simply to the eastward, etc." 
"But the original paragon and prototype of all conceived 
times is the specious present, the short duration of which we 
are immediately and incessantly sensible." (pp. 630 sq.) 
"Now to what element in the brain- process may this sensibility 
be due ? It cannot, as we have seen, be due to the mere dura- 
tion itself of the process ; it must be due to an element 
present at every moment of the process, and this element 
must bear the same inscrutable sort of relation to its correla- 
tive feeling which all other elements of neural activity bear 
to their psychic products, be the latter what they may" (p. 
632). " To state it in neural terms there is at every moment 
a cumulation of brain processes overlapping each other, of 
which the fainter ones are the dying phases of processes 
which but shortly previous were active in a maximal degree. 
The amount of the overlapping determines the feeling of the 
duration occupied. What events shall appear to occupy 
the duration depends on just what processes the overlapping- 
processes are. 11 (p. 635.) "Why such an intuition should 
result from such a combination of brain-processes I do not 
pretend to say. All I aim at is to state the most elemental 
form of the psycho-physical conjunction." (p. 636.) " Longer 
times are conceived by adding, shorter ones by dividing por- 
tions of this vaguely bounded unit [specious present] and are 
habitually thought by us symbolically. Kant's notion of an 
intuition of objective time as an infinite necessary contin- 
uum has nothing to support it." (p. 642.) 

Prof. James then passes to the consideration of memory : 
"It is the knowledge of an event, or fact . . . with the 
additional consciousness that we have thought or expressed 
it before." " No memory is involved in the mere fact of re- 
currence. The successive editions of a feeling are so many 

independent events, each snug in its own skin 

Memory requires more than mere dating of a fact in the past. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 59 

It must be dated in my past " . . . " A general feeling 
of the past direction in time, then, a particular date conceived 
as lying along that direction, and denned by its name or phe- 
nomenal contents, an event imagined as located therein, and 
owned as part of my experience — such are the elements of 
every act of memory ,? (p. 650). " Memory is then the feel- 
ing of belief in a peculiar complex object ; but all the ele- 
ments of this object may be known to other states of belief ; 
nor is there in the particular combination of them as they 
appear in memory anything so peculiar as to lead us to op- 
pose the latter to other sorts of thought as something alto- 
gether sui generis needing a special faculty to account for it. 
When later we come to our chapter on belief we shall see that 
any represented object which is connected either mediately or 
immediately, with our present sensations or emotional activi- 
ties tends to be believed in as a reality. The sense of a pecu- 
liar active relation in it to ourselves is what gives to an object 
the characteristic quality of reality, and a merely imagined 
past event differs from a recollected one only in the absence 
of this peculiar feeling relation. The electric current, so to 
speak, between it and our present self does not close. But 
in their other determination the recollected past and the 
imaginary past may be much the same. In other words, 
there is nothing unique in the object of memory, and no 
special faculty is needed to account for its formation." 
(p. 652). 

Thus Prof. James' time- sense is a separate disparate feeling, 
like that of Horwicz, Czermak, et al. But do we have any 
such extra feelings ? How could any such extra feeling be 
other than just another feeling as separate as all the rest? 
How could it join these overlapped feelings any more than 
they could join themselves — or than merely successive feel- 
ings could join themselves? Who is it that sits in the saddle- 
back and looks both ways? How does this Jack-in-the- sad- 
dle know which way to look ; which way the overlapping 
feelings are overlapped? which way they are moving? How 
does this feeling knoiv or constitute anything regarding time 
direction, more or other than the passing sequence constitutes 
of itself? 



60 NICHOLS : 

Casting an eye backward, we can but be struck by the wide 
variety of explanations offered for the time- mystery. Time has 
been called an act of mind, of reason, of perception, of intui- 
tion, of sense, of memory, of will, of all possible compounds 
and compositions to be made up from all of them. It has 
been deemed a General Sense accompanying all mental con- 
tent in a manner similar to that conceived of pain and pleas- 
ure. It has been assigned as a separate, special, disparate 
sense, to nigh a dozen kinds of " feeling," some familiar, 
some strangely invented for the difficulty. It has been ex- 
plained by " relations," by " ear- marks," by " signs," by 
il remnants," by " struggles " and by "strifes," by " lumin- 
ous trains," by " blocks of specious-present," by " apper- 
ception." It has been declared d priori, innate, intuitive, em- 
pirical, mechanical. It has been deduced from within and from 
without, from heaven, and from earth, and from several things 
difficult to imagine as of either. Finally, one high modern 
authority has discovered that time is the long-sought-for fourth 
dimension of space. In one particular alone is there unifor- 
mity ; with the exception of Oondillac, James Mill, Herbart, 
and Horwicz, all have looked upon the mystery unqualifiedly 
and unmistakably as a single state. Among the best modern 
authorities the presentation of time- order and relation may 
be said to have worked itself out to what, though expressly 
declared to be otherwise, is really a sort of compromise 
position between a simple state and a simple process ; to be 
looked upon as a certain definite, particular, complex, though 
co-existent arrangement. It is the most striking feature of 
the whole time investigation, that of all the philosophers and 
psychologists who have touched upon the problem, only two 
of the whole number, Condillac obscurely, and James Mill 
definitely, have solved the mystery by letting the sequences 
themselves be the ultimate mystery — by letting their process, 
as process and of itself, show forth its own explanation. It 
would not be surprising if such diversity of failures should 
be explained by such unity of neglect of careful and exhaus- 
tive consideration of this seemingly most natural and cer- 
tainly most simple source of explanation. A further examin- 
ation of this point will constitute a later section of this paper. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 61 



II.— EXPEEIMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS. 

The earliest empirical observation which I find recorded is 
otherwise unimportant. The Scotch philosopher, Thomas 
Keid, says : "I have found by some experiments that a man 
may beat seconds for one minute without varying above one sec- 
ond in the whole sixty ; and I doubt not but by long practice he 
might do it still more accurately. From this I think it follows 
that the sixtieth part of a second of time is discernible by the 
human mind." 1 

As the philosophy of time has usually followed that of 
space, so experiments upon it were an outgrowth of those on 
space. 

In 1852 E. H. Weber published his famous discoveries re- 
garding our appreciation of distance and direction on the sur- 
face of the body. That this appreciation varied without pro- 
portion to our sensitiveness to pressure or temperature for 
the same regions, Weber held as proof that our space per- 
ceptions were made by a strictly disparate sense, which, coin- 
ing the phrase, he called the space-sense. 2 

Joh. Nep. CzePvMAK, professor of physiology at Leipzig, 
perceived that these views necessarily involved our concep- 
tions of time ; he was, therefore, led to believe in still another 
disparate sense, which he named the time-sense. 3 As this 
invariably accompanied all other sensations, he termed it a 
general sense in distinction from the special senses. Unable 
to carry out his intentions he recommended the following to be 
determined: (1) The shortest interval perceivable in each of 
the separate senses. (2) How the same interval is interpreted 
by the different senses. (3) How like rates of motion are in- 
terpreted by various regions of the skin, determined by 
Weber to be of different spatial sensibility. (4) The least change 

1 Complete Works (Edinburgh, 1872), p. 350. 

2 " Ueber d. Raumsinn u. d. Empfindungskreise in d. Haut u. d. Auge." 
D. konig. Sach. Gesell. d. Wiss. zu Leipzig. Sittung 18, Dee., 1852. Math. 
Phys. (Jlasse, 1-4, Jahrgang, 1849-52, S. 85. 

3 "Ideen zu einer Lehre von Zeitsinn." Complete works (Leipzig, 
1879) ; also Wiener akadem. Sitzungsberichte, 1857 ; Nat. CI. Bd. XXIV, 
p. 231 ; and Molesehott's Untersuch., Bd. V, Heft. 1, 1858. 



62 NICHOLS : 

in rate of motion perceivable for various dermal regions. (5) 
The relations between rates of motion and changes in the 
angle of convergence of the eyes. (6) To investigate the 

formula V= — for points of the retina or skin having differ- 

ent spatial sensibility (V, rate of motion; r, space; t, time)- 
Some of the suggestions of Czermak, by reason of his high 
standing as a physiologist, were immediately undertaken. 
Nearly at the same time Vierordt, assisted by Hbring and 
Camerer at Tubingen, and Mach at Graz, began the work. 1 

A. Horing. Versuche iXber das TJnterscheidnngsvermogen des 
Horsinnes filr die Zeitgrossen. Inaug. Dissertation, 
Tubingen, 1864. 

Experiments: Eight beats were given by a Malzel 
metronome ; then without appreciable loss of time the weight 
was moved up or down or left as before. Subject without hav- 
ing seen the pendulum, was to judge if the second set of beats 
be " longer," u shorter," or " same " in comparison with the 
first set ; the cases in which the subject was unable to decide 
were thrown out of the records. The experiments were made 
on Horing by Prof. Vierordt. A total of 1,885 sets of beats 
were taken, using intervals from .306 to 1.428 in length ; 2 an 
average of 10 trials was made for each interval, and 82 was 
the maximum for any interval. The experiments were de- 
layed through a half year to avoid fatigue and any unusual 
influences. The method used was that of Right and Wrong 
Cases. 

Results : A constant inclination to misjudge the second or 
compared set of intervals; intervals of .454-1.428 were esti- 
mated to be shorter, and those of .306 to .365 longer than they 
were. Sensibility or discrimination decreases with lengthen- 
ing of the interval. 

Comment: No ordinary metronome is sufficiently accurate 
for this purpose ; as it runs down, the strength of tick and 
length of beat varies ; alternate beats can not be maintained of 
equal length ; the weight can not be accurately adjusted with- 
out varying the interval between the first and second set of 

1 It has seemed best in what follows to vary from the continuous nar- 
rative form of presentation toward that employed in the review depart- 
ment of the Journal of Psychology. Abstracts of contributions to 
the subject will be distinguished from my own comment by a different 
typography. 

2 In all cases not otherwise specified the unit is a second. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 63 

beats, which is important. Too few trials were made on each 
interval to warrant the conclusion that the results were more 
than mathematically fortuitous. Only one person was experi- 
mented upon, while contradictory individual differences are 
the rule. The results regarding sensibility have been con- 
firmed ; those as to the constant error have been variously con- 
firmed and contradicted. 

Wilhelm Camerek. Versuche ilber den zeitlichen Verlauf 
der Willensbewegung ; Inaug. Diss. Tubingen, 1866. 
Zeitschrift fur Biologic, Bd. XYII ; S. 17. 

Results: It was found that movements made in 1.5 could be 
adjusted to cover the distances tested with greatest accuracy ; 
the hand attempting to measure off a given distance in a 
shorter or longer time, respectively, over-ran or fell short of 
the proper distance. 

Ernst Mach. Untersuchen ilber den Zeitsinn des Ohres. 
Moleschott's Untersuchungen, 1866, Bd. X ; S. 181 ; and 
Sitz. d. Wiener Akad. d. Wiss. Math. Kl. Bd. 51 ; Abth. 
2, 1865. 

Standpoint : Herbartian ; and the time- sense looked upon as 
disparate. Purpose: To test Weber's law. Apparatus: 
Finely adjusted metronome, beating alternately long and short 
beats or the reverse. For very short intervals a spring was 
used, snapping upon teeth cut at iambic intervals upon the 
edge of a wheel which was revolved by hand mechanism. For 
very long intervals the assistant held a watch to the ear and 
beat with a hammer. The method used was Least Perceivable 
Difference. Experiments extended from year 1860 to 1865 ; it 
is indefinitely stated that "a great number of trials" were 
made upon six persons, using intervals from .016 upward. 
Results: Weber's law not valid. Sensibility inverse to length 
of interval, and varies daily ; greatest sensibility shown for 
intervals of about .375. Threshold (for ear) about .016, and 
less for ear than for any other of the senses. When iambic 
intervals are repeated many times in same direction, we lose 
power to distinguish the longer from the shorter beat ; this 
effect is counteracted by alternating the directions. 

Comment : Turning a wheel, and beating with a hammer by 
the hand, can not give accurate results. The number of trials is 
not stated , and figures are given for but a few of the intervals 
tested. The paper is too indefinite to justify its results. The 
threshold found is far higher than subsequent experiments 
have established. 



64 NICHOLS: 

Karl Vierordt. Der Zeitsinn. Tubingen, 1868. 

Standpoint: Time perception is rather an act of judgment 
than of sense; " the soul is needed to explain many things.' 7 
Purpose: To investigate the time- sense in general and the 
constant error in particular. Apparatus : Same as used by 
Camerer and Horing ; also kymograph and a writing lever,, 
one arm of which wrote directly on the drum, the other arm 
being worked by the finger. Method : Chiefly that of Eight 
and Wrong Cases ; asserts it was used in his laboratory as 
early as 1853. Experiments: (1) Two ticks of the metronome, 
self-recorded on the kymograph, were given by the assistant ; 
the subject then pressed his finger to mark off on the drum an 
interval immediately following and equal to that given by the 
metronome. (2) Another set of experiments was like the 
above save that a pause, whose length was determined by the 
subject, was made between the normal or metronome interval 
and its reproduction. (3) Eight successive beats were given 
from the metronome, the subject immediately recording a like 
number of judgments. (4) Beats were given by touch on the 
back of the left-hand with a small steel point ; two beats, pause, 
followed by single reproduction with right-hand as in (2); 
eyes and ears closed. (5) Subject chose any interval at ran- 
dom, and tried to record three beats inclosing two equal inter- 
vals. (6) Four beats in place of three, a pause being intro- 
duced between first and last interval as in (2). (7) Interval 
chosen at will as in (5), then reproduced from 4 to 120 times 
(generally about 4 reproductions). (8) Seven classes of judg- 
ments were made, namely : Very long, long, tolerably long, 
indifferent, tolerably short, short, very short ; attendant then 
gave an interval repeating it 10 times, and the subject assigned 
it to one of the above rubrics. (9) Estimation of longer inter- 
vals, i. e., from 5 min. to an hour. (10) Experiments with 
intervals of sight. 

Results : 1 1 For all categories of time from seconds to years, 
the same law holds good, *, e., the relatively short intervals 
are lengthened by judgment and the relatively long intervals 
are shortened." Vierordt holds his experiments sufficient to 
determine the law definitely, though the constant error may 
vary for different persons, times of experiment, senses, and 
other conditions. He tested intervals usually ranging from 
.25 to about 8. The indifference point for himself was : ear, 3 
— 3.5; eye, 2.2 — 2.5, for H. (ear) 1.4; for N. 1.5. The 
indifference point fell on a longer interval when a pause was 
made between norm and reproduction. Morning hours, and 
good physical and mental condition were favorable to more 
accurate estimates of longer intervals ; intense mental strain 
led to under- valuation. Sensibility was found greatest at 
about 1 to 1.5, and was more exact when as in (1) no pause 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 65 

was made between norm and judgment. Judgment was more 
accurate after 8 beats as in (3), than when the norm was 
heard but once. Weber's law does not hold. Yierordt sug- 
gests that contrasts affect judgment ; that after several short 
beats, a longer interval seems unduly long. 

Comment : Only three persons were experimented upon ; 
most of the results are from two individuals ; 2147 single 
judgments were made in all ; these spread over the large 
number of intervals tested, under several different methods r 
and upon two men, leaves far too few trials on any one in- 
terval, for conclusive results. The same criticism of metro- 
nomes applies here as to Horing. The results are valuable 
as far as they go, but must be deemed inconclusive even on 
the points taken up. 

Wilhelm Wundt. Ueber psycJiologische Methoden. Wundt's 
Phil. Studien. Bd. I. 1882; S. 1. 

Wundt here complains that Yierordt' s experiments unwar- 
rantably complicate the time judgments with voluntary mus- 
cular movements ; that is those used in reproduction ; also 
that the indefinite pause introduced between the norm and the 
reproduction in many of the experiments causes an indefi- 
nite break in the rhythm, which must disturb judgment with 
great irregularity. Wundt claims that the time- sense is so 
extremely delicate that the apparatus used by Yierordt as 
well as his method of Eight and Wrong Cases, can give no re- 
liable results. Wundt recommends his own method of Least 
Perceivable Difference. 

Julius Kollert. Untersuchungen iiber den Zeitsinn. 
Wundt's Phil. Studien. Bd. I. 1882 ; S. 78. 

This work was done under the direction of Prof. Wundt 
at Leipzig. Purpose : To reinvestigate the Constant Error 
and Sensibility, with more accurate apparatus and method, 
and particularly without involving the time-reaction of re- 
production. Apparatus: Two finely adjusted metronomes, 
governed by electric current and magnets. Experiment: In 
all eases the norm was given by two beats from one metro- 
nome, then, after a pause invariably equal to the norm,, 
another interval was given by two beats from the other me- 
tronome ; these two intervals to be judged according to 
Wundt's method of Least Perceivable Difference, that is, the 
compared interval was first made equal to the norm, then 
gradually lengthened till it was just perceived to be longer 
than the norm ; next the compared interval was made marked- 



1>6 NICHOLS : 

ly longer then the norm, then gradually shorter till just indis- 
tinguishable from the norm ; the average was then taken of 
these two judgments just perceivably longer than the norm. 
An average is similarly determined for the two judgments 
just perceivably shorter than the norm. The Constant Error 
is then calculated by averaging the just perceivable shorter 
and longer judgments so determined. The norms used were 
.4, .5, .7, .8, 1.0, 1.2, and 1.836. Seven men were experi- 
mented on, and a total of 175 single determinations of the 
Constant Error made. 

Results: 42 or about 25% of the 175 determinations were 
classed apart as i i anomalies ' ' because in these the Constant 
Error appeared a maximum at the point where in the " regu- 
lar" cases it appeared a minimum. The remaining 133 
" regular " trials confirmed Yierordt's Law that for relatively 
long intervals the Constant Error is negative, and for rela- 
tively short ones positive ; but the Indifference Point as 
averaged from the seven persons was .755 in place of 3. — 3.5 
as given by that experimenter. The 42 anomalous trials 
were mostly overjudged. Sensibility was greatest at the 
Indifference Point, diminished rapidly with shortening inter- 
vals, and more slowly with lengthening intervals. No explan- 
ation was found for the " anomalies." 

Comment : Metronomes have never proved sufficiently accur- 
ate or reliable for time experiments ; to use two metronomes 
together is objectionable as the difference of their sound dis- 
turbs judgment. It is doubtful if Wundt's method of Least 
Perceivable Difference as used by Kollert is free from objec- 
tions, since the judgment of the subject is always biased ; he 
knows beforehand the direction and nearly the degree in 
which his judgment is to be made, i. e. which way the pendu- 
lum weight is to be moved and about how much, and soon 
expects to perceive no difference or the reverse. There seems 
no good reason for having culled out the 42 anomalies ; that 
they were different from what was expected is no ground for 
classifying them apart. The remaining 133 trials, when 
divided among seven persons, and again among the seven 
intervals used, leaves but an average of about 3 trials for 
each interval per man, which, in view of the great variation 
the time problem is now known to be susceptible to, is alto- 
gether insufficient to prove the results to be more than 
mathematically fortuitous. Kollert lumps his results leav- 
ing us entirely in the dark as to just how the trials were 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 67 

divided among men and intervals with reference to specific 
results. This is inexcusable and, besides detracting largely 
from the value of his own conclusions, renders impossible any 
revision of them by a closer analysis of the facts. Care does 
not seem to have been taken that the subject should remain 
ignorant both of the course and of the purpose of the experi- 
ments ; this is important, as otherwise subjective influences 
are inevitable to a degree that renders the results compara- 
tively worthless. On the whole Kollert's determinations are 
unsatisfactory and of doubtful value. They show intervals 
between .755 and 1.836 to be shortened while Yierordt found 
the same to be lengthened. 

Karl Yierordt. Psychophysiche Bemerkungen. Zeit- 
schrift fur Biologie, Bd. 18, 1882; S. 397. 

Yierordt here briefly defends his work against the attacks 
of Wundt and Kollert ; shows the reaction-time of repro- 
duction is too short to vitiate his results, and that in most of 
his experiments it was neutralized and not included at all. 
The pause between norm and reproduction made in some of 
the rubrics, he thinks most accurately adjusts itself when 
left to the inclination of the subject. In turn he criticises 
rather bitterly the method of Wundt, raising many of the 
objections we have stated above against Kollert. 

Yolkmar Estel. NeueVersuche ilber den Zeitsinn. Wundt's 
Phil. Studien, II. 1884; 37. 

This work was also from Prof. Wundt' s Laboratory. 
Purpose: To extend the investigations of Kollert, to the 
longest intervals that can be judged as a whole, and to settle 
the dispute with Yierordt as to the effect of a pause between 
norm and comparison. Apparatus: New electric machine 
designed by Prof. Wundt ; has horizontal metal wheel gradu- 
ated on the edge ; revolved by weight. Electric connections 
made at proper arcs of the revolving wheel regulate the de- 
sired lengths of norm, pause and comparison intervals ; the 
stroke was made by electric hammer, during some of the ex- 
periments, on a bell, during others on an iron anvil. Method : 
Least Perceivable Difference as described of Kollert. Experi- 
ments: Divided into two sets, one without and the other 
with a pause, equal to norm, between norm and comparison in- 
terval. The intervals investigated were about the same for 
both sets and ranged from 1.5 to 8. The longer intervals 
were practised over several times, till they seemed familiar, 



68 NICHOLS : 

and then judged ; the shorter intervals, as with all of Kol- 
lert's, were judged, each after a single hearing. Ten persons 
were experimented on, through a range of 18 intervals, with 
a total of 96 trials in the first set, and 293 trials in the second 
set. 

Results : No time difference appeared between use of stroke 
of bell and stroke of anvil. Twenty-seven of the ninety- six 
trials in the first set, and 182 of the 293 in the second set, were 
culled out as anomalous, on the ground that c i purely psychic' ' 
phenomena betrayed themselves in these ; claimed by Estel 
to be due to " contrast,'' that is — all these anomalies were 
asserted to have occurred in the later experiments of each day, 
and to vary according as the intervals used during the first 
part of the day were longer or shorter than those of the later 
part. Estel stated the Law of Contrasts to be that the hear- 
ing of any interval makes a subsequent shorter or longer 
interval to be judged respectively longer or shorter than it 
really is. The other important result claimed by Estel was, 
that while all intervals longer than Kollert's indifference 
point of .755 "were under- estimated, yet the increase of the 
Constant Error was not regularly progressive with the length- 
ening of the interval, but rhythmic ; relatively minimal values 
were asserted to appear at all multiples of the said indifference 
interval, i.e nearly at 1.5, 2.25, 3, 3.75, and 4.5." Sensibility 
also was rhythmically inverse to the constant error. Weber's 
Law was declared not to hold. Wundt and Estel incline to 
the belief that the multiple indifference point is governed by 
the pendulum- swing of the leg. 

Comment : After carefully studying the tables of Estel, we 
agree with the strictures of Fechner (below) upon the de- 
monstrations of a periodic course of the Constant Error. From 
the nature of the case irregularities are to be expected, and 
the assertion that these variations were in any sense rhythmic 
multiples of the indifference point seems to us entirely un- 
founded and forced. Also the Law of Contrasts, though 
perhaps true under very different conditions of quite other 
significance, seems quite unsupported by the data presented ; 
at least, sufficient of the protocol should have been given to 
establish the order of the length of intervals used for each 
day's work. As it is, nothing appears upon which a revision 
of the facts can be based definitely to disprove Estel' s claim — 
much less to support it. 

As a whole the work of Estel appears not only incon- 
clusive, but unscientific; too few trials were made in 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 69 

proportion to the great variability of the results ; only 389 
tests were made in all, these divided among ten persons and 
eighteen intervals each, leave an average of but about two 
trials for each interval per individual ; this is insufficient, 
particularly when as in the major rubric 209 out of 389 tests 
are classed apart as " anomalous." Again the " subjective" 
conditions were not sufficiently guarded. The controversy 
with Vierordt, under which the work was undertaken was 
spirited and unfortunate for unbiased psychological judg- 
ments ; yet no care seems to have been taken to provide 
subjects undoubtedly free from the subtle involuntary pre- 
possessions, which are so difficult to exclude in all psycho- 
logical investigations. For such results to be of any definite 
value, a sufficient number of persons must be experimented 
upon who know neither the purpose nor the results of their 
judgments — this in order to establish the testimony beyond 
even any possible involuntary prejudice. Finally it seems 
almost incredible in the face of the contradictory evidence 
of Mach, Horing and Yierordt, and solely upon the meagre 
and much criticised results of Kollert, reinforced alone by the 
yet entirely problematical " leg- swing" theory, 1 that Estel 
should have assumed the fundamental Indifference Point 
upon which he based his entire periodic deductions, with- 
out adequate experiment for any of his ten subjects and 
absolutely with none at all covering that important interval 
for seven out of the total ten persons. Such neglect can be 
more easily explained by subjective prepossessions for theo- 
ries than the results can be admitted to the rank of scientific 
facts. 

G. Theo. Fechker. JJeber die Frage des Weber'schen 
Gesetzes und Periodicitatsgesetzes im Gebiet des Zeit- 
sinns. Ab. d. k. S. G. d. Wis. XIII, S. 3. 

This paper subjects Estel' s work to long and minute 
criticism, finally characterizing it as unreliable and false. 
The variations claimed by Estel as rhythmic, Fechner shows 
to lie entirely within the probabilities of accidental irregu- 
larity. Fechner also considers that nothing is to be dis- 

1 Martin Trautscholdt, in W. and E. Weber, Mechanik d. Mensch. 
Gewerkzeuge, pp. 77-254 ; Wundt's Phil. Studien I, 213 (249; ; Ibid. II, 
286, 250. 



70 NICHOLS : 

covered irreconcilable with Weber's Law. Such high 
authority would have greater weight were the spirit displayed 
here less controversial, and less enthusiastic for the support 
of Weber's Law. 

Yolkmar Estel. Ueber die Frage des Weber' schen Geset- 
zes und Periodicitdtsgesetzes im Gebiet des Zeitsinns. 
In Wundt's Phil. Studien, II, 1884 ; S. 475. 

Estel makes a weak reply to Fechner's attack. In 
answer to a request for the precise order of each day's 
experiments, Estel says the results were unexpected, and 
the protocol had been designed for other ends, and there- 
fore data could not be given. He excuses the small number 
of his tests by declaring that he had looked upon them only 
as indicative, and needing confirmation — that he made as 
many and on as many persons as " he had time for. ' ' As to 
the charge that he had brought out his results to suit his own 
preconceptions, he declares they were entirely unsuspected 
until after the experiments had been performed. His counter 
criticism against Fechner's deductions from his (Estel' s) 
work in support of Weber's Law is effective. 

Max. Mehnee. Zur Lehre vom Zeitsinn. Wundt's Studien, 
II, 1884, 546. 

Purpose : The severe criticisms of Fechner compel a rein- 
vestigation of the work of Kollert and Estel. Apparatus and 
Method: The same as Estel' s. Experiments: The order of 
each day's work was arranged to be free of all influences of 
contrasts. No pause was ever permitted between norm and 
comparison intervals. Judgment was always made after each 
hearing of the two intervals. Ten determinations were made 
for each length of interval used ; twenty- eight intervals were 
tested ranging from .7 to 12.1. Mehner was himself subject 
for all experiments made. 

Results: Four Indifference Points were found, namely, .71, 
2.15, 3.55 and 5. All the odd multiples of the lowest Indif- 
ference Point, .71, were shown to be points of minimal worth 
of constant error, while even multiples showed maximal 
worth. All intervals between .71 and 5 were declared to be 
under- estimated ; all from 5 to 12.1 and ' ' probably far above" 
to be over-estimated. Sensibility was also a function of the 
odd multiples of the Indifference Point .71, (though inversely 
to the constant error) up to 7.1 above which it remained ap- 
proximately constant ; it was greatest at 2.15. Weber's Law 
did not hold below 7.1, i. e. so long as sensibility is rhythmic, 
but was approximately valid above 7.1, i. e. where sensibility 
is constant. He attributes individual differences and the 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 71 

great disparity of results obtained by different experimenters 
mainly to the insufficient and varying amounts of practice 
which they had in estimating time intervals ; he thinks the 
effect of practice is to lessen the constant error. Straining 
of the attention makes the interval seem longer ; the experi- 
enced subject judges with less strain, therefore makes a 
smaller error ; also familiar intervals being judged without a 
strain are shortened, while the longer ones, requiring great 
attention, are lengthened. Fatigue and low condition, mental 
or physical, require greater attention and therefore lengthen 
the interval ; all this accords with and explains his results. 
Upon these grounds he thinks the results of Estel and others 
may be reconciled with his own work and with his theory of 
odd multiple periods, or expressed differently he thinks most 
of the results previous to his own to be of comparatively 
little worth, as their experimenters had not attained sufficient 
experience and skill to bring their judgments up to a non- 
fortuitous or non-variable standard. Mehner found 12.1 to 
be the longest interval he could judge without division, in- 
stead of the limit of 5 — 6 determined by Estel; he also 
attributes this to his greater experience. Mehner determined, 
contrary to the expectations of Fechner, that it made no 
difference in the result whether, in comparing the intervals, 
the long or the short interval preceded the other. He found 
Estel' s Law of Contrasts was without validity for his judg- 
ments, where the norm was always heard only once, or at 
most only a few times ; and he even inclines to think that 
were the norm heard many times and deeply impressed upon 
the subject, the results would be opposite to Estel' s Law, for 
example, were the norm a short interval, a tendency to pre- 
serve this accustomed length would hold over and tend to 
make a new, subsequent, longer interval seem unduly short. 
He inclines to favor the method of Eight and Wrong Cases as 
the most accurate and direct. Mehner attributes the alleged 
phenomenon of Periodicity to a universal rhythmic law, to- 
wards which the membering or compounding of all our 
presentations and mental content tends in general. 

Comment : Mehner' s experiments were conducted upon a 
single subject, and that person himself ; they could not there- 
fore be held to be general, or even valid for most individuals, 
until corroborated by many other experiments ; also, for this 
reason they suffer greatly from the liability of subjective pre- 
possessions, as we have explained in the case of Estel. 
Otherwise his work seems to have been conducted with par- 
ticular care, and the number of his tests to have been suffi- 



72 NICHOLS : 

cient for establishing the general tendencies peculiar to a 
single individual. His deductions from these results regard- 
ing Periodicity seem, however, as forced and far-fetched as 
those of Estel, with which they conflict, and which have 
been severely criticized by Fechner. Ee-examining Mehner' s 
tables we believe his Law of Periodicity to be unwarranted by 
his own figures ; there are few columns of figures in which a 
prepossessed imagination cannot discover some sort of ap- 
proximate periodicity of equal validity asa a law " with that 
of Estel or Mehner. Eegarding Mehner' s opinion that experi- 
ence, practice and attention explain all the discrepancies in 
the results of time- experiments, there is so far no adequate 
information as to what the tendencies of any of these influ- 
ences are ; several investigations regarding mental fatigue, as 
those of Glass, Cattell, and others in the Physiological Lab- 
oratory of this University, fail to support Mehner' s view. 

G. Theo. Fechner. In Sachen des Zeitsinnes und der 
Methode der richtigtn und falschen Falle 1 gegen Estel 
und Lorenz. Wundt's Studien, III, (1884), 1. 

Still further criticism is here raised against Estel and Meh- 
ner ; though Fechner devotes more space to Estel, he seems to 
hold even weightier objection to the results of Mehner ; he 
thinks the probability of any Law of Periodicity to be nega- 
tived by the fact that the law claimed by one contradicts that 
of the other. 

Eichakd Glass. Kritisches und Experimentelles uoer den 
Zeitsinn. Wundt's Studien, IY, (1887), 423. 

Purpose: Glass assisted Mehner in most of his experi- 
ments ; his testimony regarding them is therefore of value ; 
he subjects Mehner' s figures to a searching scrutiny, and 
comes to a like conclusion with Fechner ; he thinks a prop- 
er interpretation of the tables of Mehner even contradicts 
the Law of Periodicity deduced from them by their author. 
Glass, therefore, proposes to give the entire matter ex- 
perimental revision. Method : The Method of Average Error 
is now chosen for the first time in Wundt's Laboratory. 
Apparatus : same as that used by Estel and Mehner, so mod- 
ified as to be instantly stopped by the operator. Experi- 
ments : All were made with single norm and single repro- 
ductions, and without pause between norm and reproduction. 
The subject recorded his reproductions or judgments directly 
by pressing a lever which stopped the revolution of the 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 73 

wheel ; the interval thus recorded was then read from the 
graduated arc of the wheel. One hundred trials were made 
on each interval tested ; the Constant Error was averaged 
from these ; the intervals asserted by Mehner to be periodic, 
were those chiefly investigated. Glass was the sole subject 
for all his work. 

Results: Table I comprises 100 trials each, upon twenty- 
three intervals ranging from .7 to 15. ; for all these the Con- 
stant Error was negative, with the exception of .7, for which 
it was slightly positive. Neither Estel's nor Mehner 7 s Perio- 
dicity held good, but a new law, based upon multiples of 1.25 
was thought to be observed. Therefore, a greater number of 
intervals, 42 in all, differing less from each other, but cover- 
ing the same range as the others, was next tested, with 100 
trials each. These form Table II, which shows the Constant 
Error positive for 1.8 and under ; negative for 5.4 and over, 
and variable between 1.8 and 5.4. Periodicity was again 
thought to be observed on intervals still 1.25 apart, but not 
falling on the same intervals as previously. Hence, the ex- 
periments given in Table III were undertaken, comprising 100 
trials each, on intervals regularly .25 different in length, 
through the range .75 — 9, making 34 intervals in all. These 
showed Constant Error positive for 2 and under, negative 
for 4 and over ; inconstant from 2 to 4. If for Table III, 
however, a reaction- time of .05 be deducted for the time oc- 
cupied in stopping the instrument, the Constant Error would 
be negative throughout except for the lowest interval, .75. 
Glass concludes that the Constant Error is normally negative 
for all intervals. Again, all multiples of 1.25 appear as points 
of relatively minimum values for the Constant Error. The ex- 
periments of Table IV were then undertaken to discover the 
variations in judgment of the same interval from day to day. 
Only one interval and two successive days were tested. Glass 
claims the results " agree pretty well ? ' with each other, and 
with those for the same interval in Table III. [According to 
his figures, however, the value from Table I is about 300 per 
cent, longer ; from Table II about 200 per cent, longer ; and 
from Table III about 60 per cent, shorter than those of Table 
IV.] He, therefore, concludes that in general the variations 
in his three main tables are not greater than those to be ex- 
pected from day to day ; and in view of their general agree- 
ment, so demonstrated, he asserts a new Law of Periodicity 
striking the multiples of 1.25, though the interval of 1.25 is 
not itself a point of least value of the Constant Error. 

Comment : All the objections which have been made against 
Mehner for testing his experiments solely upon himself are 



74 NICHOLS : 

applicable with greater force against Glass ; for, having as- 
sisted Mehner in the previous experiments, he was more liable 
to have formed prepossessing conceptions. Eegarding this 
third Law of Periodicity, which contradicts the two pre- 
viously published, a close examination of the tables seems to 
confirm the views of Fechner, twice maintained by him against 
the probability of such a law. The insufficiency of the evi- 
dence with the fact that each experimenter found a different 
law entirely irreconcilable with the others, and coupled with 
the tendency already mentioned, for all columns of figures to 
present variations more or less delusively or fortuitously 
rhythmic, ought to dispose of this subject until some very 
conclusive results shall newly establish such a Periodicity as 
a fact. 

Lewis T. Stevens. On the Time-Sense. Mind. Vol. XI. 
No. 43. 

These experiments were chiefly performed under the direc- 
tion of Pres. G. Stanley Hall, at Johns Hopkins University, 
and were confirmed by other experiments under Prof. Henry 
P. Bowditch of the Harvard Medical School. Purpose : To 
investigate the Constant Error with both norm and reproduc- 
tion many times successively repeated. Apparatus : Beats 
were given by a metronome, and recorded by electric circuit 
on a Marey kymograph ; the key of the circuit was extremely 
delicate, and worked by the finger with scarcely perceptible 
exertion ; the intervals were measured on the drum by a tu- 
ning-fork of known vibration rate. Method: Average Error. 
Experiments : " The individual under experiment tapped the 
lever synchronously with the beats of a metronome. When 
he had become perfectly familiar with the given interval, the 
drum of the kymograph was set in motion, and the first round 
of the tracing (the drum worked continuously on a spiral) 
was taken with the metronome still beating ; the latter was 
then stopped, while the person kept on tapping the lever at 
the same rate for a period of one minute." The tables show 
the averaged reproductions for each five seconds. The total 
number of experiments is uncertainly stated ; only one result 
1 ' showing an average amount of variation ' ' is published for 
each interval of each individual ; tests were made upon seven 
persons. 

Results: One hundred and fourteen out of 135 trials "point 
to the fundamental principle : That there is an interval of 
time, the value of which varies between .53 and .87, which 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 75 

can be reproduced with considerable accuracy ; but with all 
other intervals an error is made, which is plus for those 
above and minus for those below the so-called indifference 
point. " The average Indifference Point was .71. The Con- 
stant Error was found gradually to increase as the Indiffer- 
ence Point was moved away from, in either direction. Twenty- 
one out of the 135 experiments were classed apart as irregular. 
"The irregularities consist in reproducing accurately long, 
in shortening long, and in lengthening short intervals." 
"The examination of such experiments, however, revealed 
the fact that the effect of fatigue is to make the error for short 
intervals plus instead of minus, and to increase the amount 
of variation made in the reproduction of long intervals ; and 
that individuals under experiment are apt, when inattentive, 
to shorten long and prolong short intervals." "Diversion 
of attention and small experience are regarded as the cause 
of the great irregularities " shown in all the experiments. 

As to the Law of Periodicity, ' l two remarkable points are 
revealed in the manner of variation of the curves. (1) The 
constant zig zag of individual records ; only in nineteen cases 
out of 140 were two sequent variations in the same direction. 
This would seem to indicate that an interval is judged more 
correctly after it is completed than before, and that correction 
is made for its error in the next reproduction, according to a 
standard which the mind carries, but to which the hand (or 
perhaps the will during the interval) cannot be accurately true. 
The origin of this peculiarity, therefore, appears to lie not in 
the judgment, but in the execution. (2) In all of the curves 
plotted, there were observed more or less distinctly, still 
larger and more primary waves. The prominence of these 
varied greatly ; in some of the curves they were apparently 
absent, in others they were decidedly marked. These waves 
were no more prominent for one interval than for another — 
their length varies in the majority of cases between .6 and .9 
min. and averages .73 min. This rhythmical variation seems 
not to be in the execution, but rather to have its origin in a 
rhythmical variation of the standard carried in the mind. 
That this is connected with the rhythmical changes in the 
nutritive condition of the cerebral centres, or produced by the 
vaso-motor rhythmical constriction of arterioles, it would be 
rash to deny or affirm or perhaps even to suppose." 

Mr. Stevens refrains from any opinion as to the contradic- 
tions between his own and nearly all previous results, but 
suggest that these may be due to fundamental differences be- 
tween single and successive reproductions. 

Comment; As published, the number of experiments 
seems too few to establish conclusive results, as individual 



76 NICHOLS : 

differences and variations from general physical conditions 
are now known to be great. Also it is doubtful if the metro- 
nome used preserved alternate beats of equal lengths through 
the entire running down of its spring. On the whole, how- 
ever, this paper is of marked value and reliability. 

Michael Ejner. Experimentelle Studien iiber den Zeit- 
sinn. Inaugural Dissertation No. 137, Dorpat, April 18, 
1889, under Prof. Kraepelin. 

Purpose: To investigate (1) how we judge filled inter- 
vals of time. (2) What is the influence of fatigue and prac- 
tice; (3) pathological disturbances. Apparatus: Stop-watch 
measuring .2 sec. Method : Average Error. Experiments : 
Both single and multiple reproductions were investigated; 
the norm was never heard but once; the assistant called 
' ' now ' ' at the beginning and at the end of the norm ; 
the subject announced his judgment by a signal; the 
length of the norm and reproductions were read from the 
watch by the assistant ; reaction times of both subject and 
assistant were involved with other slight inaccuracies, but 
these compensated each other to a degree, and their sum was 
small in proportion to the unusually long intervals worked 
with. These were five in number, as follows: 30, 60, 120, 
180, 240 seconds. The experiments were extended from Aug. 
29th to December 13th, 1889, lasting one hour each day ; the 
single reproduction was always at the same hour of the day. 
Ejner was the sole subject for his chief tables. For the class 
of multiple reproductions the judgment was always repeated 
twenty- five successive times ; then the same norm was given 
again and another set of twenty- five reproductions made ; for 
very long intervals a rest of about a half-hour was made 
between these two sets. Ten double sets of twenty- five re- 
productions each, were made by Ejner for each of the five 
intervals ; these multiple reproductions were confined to no 
particular hour daily. To test individual .differences, ten 
double sets like the above were tested upon two commilitionen 
for the interval 5, and six double sets for 240. For the 
pathological experiments three patients were selected from 
the clinique, all of them students. To investigate the effects 
of attention, 200 single trials each were made upon Ejner for 
the intervals 30 and 240, under each of the following con- 
ditions: (1) Same as his single reproductions above, except 
that he listened closely to an extra metronome (beating 200 
strokes per minute) at the same time that he listened to the 
norm and made his judgments ; (2) While performing 
mathematical problems. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 77 

Results ; The tables are admirably arranged, particularly 
those which compare with each other the average progress of 
the double sets, for the purpose of showing the effects of 
fatigue and practice manifested between the two. The main 
results are as follows. (1) For single reproductions the 
Constant Error is always negative ; for the multiple repro- 
ductions it is positive; in both cases it is a maximum at 
about 120. (2) The Average Error is less for single than for 
multiple reproductions, in the proportion of 2 : 3. (3) The 
increase of the Average Error follows Weber's Law approxi- 
mately. (4) Practice decreases the Average Error. (5) 
Fatigue shortens the judgments ; the effect- of practice is to 
lengthen them. (6) The feeling of inner tension (Anstren- 
gung) or attention is proportionally indicative of the accuracy 
of the judgment. (7) Pathological individuals show dimin- 
ished sensibility and great irregularity of judgment, especially 
for long intervals, the Constant Error reaching wider extremes 
in both directions. (8) Distraction of attention by the 
metronome and arithmetical problems caused decrease of 
sensibility for long intervals and shortening of judgments, 
the latter especially for short intervals. 

Comment : The objections repeatedly raised against results 
chiefly obtained upon a single experimenter, apply here again. 
The manner in which the results are combined and mathe- 
matically analyzed with reference to the influences of practice 
and fatigue offers great opportunity for merely fortuitous 
results, when based on such limited investigations ; it may be 
doubted as of the similar calculations for the Law of Perio- 
dicity whether the same methods would again show like 
results with other experimenters. Otherwise the work is 
careful, thoughtful, and valuable. 

Hugo Munsterberg. Beitrage zur Experimentellen Psy- 
chologie. Heft, 2, Freiburg, 1889. 

This paper presents theoretical explanations, rather than 
experimental results. It aims to found all fcime phenomena on 
physiological processes ; unless experimental results are cor- 
related with their physiological causes, Miinsterberg esti- 
mates such as "mere heaps of pedantic figures," and he is 
inclined to look upon all previous time experiments from this 
point of view. Miinsterberg traces attention to feelings of 
muscular tension, and finds in our various rhythmic bodily 
processes, the indispensable measures and foundations of all 
time judgments. For short intervals, he thinks the rhythmic 
tensions of the sense organs themselves, are the basis of their 



78 NICHOLS : 

respective judgments, but the processes of respiration pre- 
ponderatingly determine our time measurements, though un- 
consciously. A gradual rise and fall of tension feeling 
accompanies each corresponding rise and fall of the equal 
inhalation and exhalation phases ; according as impressions 
fall into like or unlike phases of respiration tension, or endure 
through like or unlike periods or multiples of such, so are they 
associated with, that is, measured by these familiar and judg- 
ment-determining processes. 

The paper is one of the most thoughtful and suggestive yet 
contributed to the time problem, and a step in the right direc- 
tion whether we give full acceptance to the particular theories 
announced or to his experimental results. His manner of 
presenting the latter is unfortunate ; he tells us that 1 1 in cold 
blood ' ' he suppresses the full figures until he ' l can prove 
what each period in the process means ; ' ' yet he gives his 
main results, if we understand him, as confirmation of his 
explanations regarding these same " periods." 

Experiments: Wundt's time- sense apparatus as used by 
Glass, was arranged so that by an electric circuit, and a deli- 
cate key held in the hand, the subject could record his judg- 
ments while assuming any comfortable position, whether sit- 
ting or lying. Both the norm and reproduction were beat by 
the same electric hammer, enabling both the judgment of the 
norm and of the reproduction to be formed under the same 
conditions. The judgments were not, however, always 
fixedly recorded, but the position of the index each time the 
hammer fell was noted by two assistants, and averaged ; with 
single reproductions, the assistant stopped the wheel when he 
heard the hammer fall ; Miinsterberg thinks the reaction- times 
involved do not exceed .05 to .08, and are too small to need 
correction. The experiments were of two classes — with and 
without a pause between norm and reproduction. The sub- 
ject was never informed as to the character of the judgments 
he was making. The intervals tested ranged from 1 to 60 
seconds. The method of average error was used. The only 
experiments for which definite results are given were 400 
trials made upon Miinsterberg himself with intervals from 6 
to 60 seconds. The chief feature of these was, that two 
parallel series of tests were made ; in the first, no regard was 
paid to phases of breathing ; the second set was arranged so 
that the reproduction should begin in the like phase of breath- 
ing to that in which the norm had begun. This was accom- 
plished, when the reproduction followed the norm without 
pause, by the assistant ending the norm (and thus beginning 
the judgment) upon the same phase of the subject's breathing 
as it had begun in ; it will be noted that this always confined 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 79 

the length of the norm to the length of the breathing or multi- 
ples thereof. Where a pause was made between norm and judg- 
ment, the assistant gave the signal for the judgment to begin, 
in the same phase as that in which the norm had begun, thus 
making the pause of variable length. 

Results : No details are given. It is stated for experiments 
made without pause that when no regard was paid to breath- 
ing, the average error was 10% of the normal, and but 2.9% 
when the judgment and norm began in the like phase. For 
experiments with pause, the error was 13.3% when breathing 
was neglected, and 5.3% when like phases were maintained. 
When voluntary violent interruptions and variations were 
made by the subject during the tests, " judgment was entirely 
upset, 4 seconds appearing like 12, and 9 like 3." Munster- 
berg looks upon these results as evidence that there is no 
special function of consciousness to be called the time- sense, 
but that psycho-physically conditioned changes, which consti- 
tute the rise and fall of our bodily or muscular tensions, and 
chiefly those of breathing are the measures of our time pre- 
sentations. "It is not the physically unconditioned 
transcendental apperception which functionates in time per- 
ception, but our time perceptions are the results of those phy- 
siological excitations which underlie our periodic changes." 
No constant error appeared in Miinsterberg' s work ; the judg- 
ments were for all lengths about as frequently positive as 
negative. 

Comment: If Miinsterberg had asserted that one may 
measure off certain intervals of time by his breathings, no one 
would object; but that our functional rhythms unconsciously 
govern our time judgments, there is grave reason to doubt; if 
several such functions simultaneously formed our time meas- 
ures, what confusion would result ; yet what reason is there 
according to Miinsterberg that one function should influence, 
and another not? Why the breathing and not the heart? The 
latter expending more energy, why should its rhythms not pre- 
dominate over those of breathing? Why may not the peristal- 
tic movements of the intestines disturb the influences of 
both heart and lungs, if such unconscious functions may 
influence judgments at all? Again, were breathing the chief 
measure, we should expect that the ordinary person could 
more accurately indicate the length of the usual breath- 
ing interval than any other, whereas this is not at all 
the case. I incline to believe that the interval most fixedly 



80 NICHOLS : 

impressed upon the conscious memory is the one that 
may be most exactly reproduced. The workman who has 
closely tended a particular trip-hammer for a course of years, 
would be more able to judge the time- beat of that hammer 
than the length of his breathing. Most of us are more defi- 
nitely familiar with the tick of our clock than with our 
respiration rhythms which constantly vary ; I could not tell if 
my ordinary breathing was faster or slower than usual ; while 
having had unusual practice in second beats of a pendulum, I 
could instantly tell to a very small fraction, if a beat, newly 
heard, were longer or shorter than a second. I should judge 
correctly, it seems to me not by my breathing, but because the 
reproductive process of the higher centres constituting 
memory had acquired a fixed periodic habit of its own. 
Sufficient explanation of Miinsterberg' s experimental results 
may be found in the fact that his methods confined his tests to 
intervals of about one given length, or to the multiples of that 
length, namely, that of breathing. If the same number of 
experiments had been equally confined to any other interval, 
it may be suspected that a similar phenomenon, due to the 
practice or habit being thus limited while forming, would 
have been observed. Yet beside this, inasmuch as the pub- 
lished figures were only those tested upon Miinsterberg him- 
self, we must again re-iterate the great liability to the uncon- 
scious influence of prepossessing theories and conceptions. 

F. Schumann. Ueber Contrast- Erscheinungen in Folge von 
Einstellung . Preliminary communication to Philos. 
Seminary, University of Gottingen, Dec. 3, 1889. Nach- 
richten v. d. konig. Gesell. d. Wiss. No. 20. 

In certain memory experiments similar to those of Ebbing- 
haus, letters were pasted at regular intervals upon a revolv- 
ing drum and observed through a slit ; Schumann noticed, 
that when the eye or the attention had for a considerable 
time become adjusted to, or familiar with a definite rate, a, 
of presentation of the letters, any immediate change to some 
other rate, &, caused the latter to be differently estimated than 
if the previous adjustment upon a had not occurred; if a 
were shorter or longer than &, the judgment of the latter in 
consequence appeared respectively shortened or lengthened. 
When the physical and mental condition was good the atten- 
tion was better, and rapid intervals seemed shorter than 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 81 

when reverse conditions obtained. Similar results were ob- 
served when metronome beats were presented under like con- 
ditions to the ear ; when the attention had been adjusted to 
an interval of .7, one of .9 was judged longer than previously 
to such adjustment. Dr. Schumann thinks the sensory- 
centres are the seat of these phenomena ; that they adjust 
themselves to a given rhythm, and thus prepare themselves, 
as it were, to expect excitation at a given time. If the rate 
of excitation is changed, the expectation is unfulfilled, and 
the subject is surprised into a judgment longer or shorter by 
contrast. Experiments of a like nature were also made in 
measuring given distances; by drawing the finger along a 
scale by motion of the arm, similar results were obtained. 

Comment : The explanation offered by Dr. Schumann for 
the phenomena discovered by him seems, at least, inadequate ; 
to say that the sensory centre, after adjustment " expects" a 
certain rate of excitation is vague in the extreme ; but as this 
point is to be spoken of presently in detail the subject will be 
deferred. 1 

Georg Dietze. Untersuchungen iiber den Umfang des 
Bewusstseins bei regelmassig aufeinander folgenden 
Schalleindrucken. Wundt's Philos. Studien, II, 362. cf. 
also, Wundt's Phys. Psych. 3te Auf., II, 248. 

Another line of experiments begun by Georg Dietze in 
Wundt's laboratory with reference to the so called Compass 
of Consciousness, was brought by Dr. Schumann into correl- 
ation with his above theories in a later paper. 2 The experi- 
ments of Dietze were to determine the greatest number of 
metronome beats, that, given in a series, and then repeated, 
could be determined to be the same in the repeated series as 
in the original ; it was found that the larger series tended to 
group themselves into rhythmic multiples ; it was claimed that 
these rhythms could never be entirely suppressed ; the largest 
number of beats was found to be 40, and these were obtained 
by five groups of eight beats each. 

Wundt contended that these 40 beats were in consciousness 

1 Owing to the resemblance between the phenomena reported by the 
above author, and those forming the chief part of my own work, to be 
presented later in this paper, this is perhaps the place to state that Dr. 
Schumann's Preliminary Communication of Dec. 3, 1889, reached my 
notice Jan. 10, 1890, at which date my own experiments had been under 
way about three months, and the method already established according 
to which they were carried out to the end. 

2 F. Schumann. Ueber das Gedachtnis fur Komplexe regelmassig 
aufeinander f olgender, gleicher Schalleindrueke, Zeitschrif t fur Psychol. 
Band I, Heft I, S. 75. 



82 NICHOLS : 

simultaneously; that they expressed the limit compass of 
consciousness, and that the addition of another beat to the 
end of the series, drove out the first of the series ; Wundt 
explained this phenomenon by his well-known theory of Ap- 
perception. Dr. Schumann contends against this view, and 
believes that the hearing centres are capable of adjusting 
themselves to the reproducing of certain series which they 
had received with sufficient frequency ; that they can repeat 
these series with more or less accuracy according as the habit 
has been formed with more or less fixity, and also in propor- 
tion to the favorable or unfavorable length of the interval and 
of the series ; thus the 40 beats of Dietze express the extent 
of the habit- capacity of the hearing or memory centres, rather 
than any simultaneous compass of Consciousness or Apper- 
ception. 

G. Stanley Hall and Joseph J astro w : Studies in 
Rhythm. Mind. Vol. XI, No. 41, p. 55. 

A work which approaches closely to many of the most fun- 
damental processes of the time problem is the eight- page 
contribution of these experimenters. Two disks were fixed 
to the drum- shaft of a Ludwig kymograph ; and cogs were 
fitted in their periphery in such a manner that, the disks re- 
volving, and a quill pressing on the cogs, adjustable at vari- 
ous distances apart, intervals of different lengths and arrang- 
ment could be given as desired. 

Three sets of investigations were made : to determine (A) 
for given intervals, what is the largest number of beats that 
can be accurately counted ! The two intervals for which 
tables are given were .0895 and .0523. Of this set the authors 
say : " Counting objects and impressions is a very complex 
process, and slow, and hard to teach or learn. (1) The im- 
pressions in a series must of course be distinguished from 
each other. The ear, which does this most acutely of all the 
senses, unless it be touch, can discriminate t % 2 (Helmholtz) 
or even 5 J (Exner) of a sec. under exceptionally favorable 
conditions. These of course are extreme limits, but from 24 
to 40 beats per sec. can be distinguished by the average ear 
without fusing into a tone. The actual number of beats is 
also a function ; that is in order that their discontinuity may 
be clearly perceived, four or even three clicks or beats must 
be further apart than two need be. When two are easily dis- 
tinguished, three or four separated by the same interval ap- 
proach nearer to the above limit and are often confidently 
pronounced to be two or three respectively. . . . (2) 
Counting requires a series of innervations, if not of actual 
muscular contractions. . . . The most rapid contraction 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 83 

of antagonistic muscles in trilling by pianists who have given 
us their record, or the rapid lingual movements involved in 
aspirating the sounds t, Jc, recorded by a Marey tambour, we 
have never found to exceed and rarely to reach six double or 
twelve single contractions per sec, while few can make more 
than 4 or 5 double movements in that time. There is thus at 
any rate a wide interval between the most rapid innervations 
and the limit of discriminative audibility for successive 
sounds. Attention, in other words, discriminates sensation, 
more rapidly than the will can generate impulses How the 
fact is reconciled with any extreme form of the hypothesis of 
the identity of apperceptive and volitional processes is not 
easy to see. None would venture to assume that, because we 
can volitionally cut short the otherwise normal duration of a 
single innervation- impulse, by innervating an antagonistic 
muscle, the extreme limit of distinguishing elements in a 
series of noises marks really the limit of this abbreviation. 
(3) Counting involves the matching, pairing or approxima- 
tive synchronization of the terms in two series of events in 
consciousness. However familiar both series may be, this is 
difficult. Many school children find it hard to keep step with 
others or to keep time with a drum or piano in marching ; 
and savages have been reported to sight across each stick, 
used as a counter for animals they were selling, to keep the 
correct tale. . . . What now becomes of the lost clicks 
when we are constantly behind in counting, yet with great 
subjective assurance that we are right? It will hardly be suffi- 
cient to say that, when counting with great energy and con- 
centration, we cease to attend to the auditory series, stretch- 
ing the interval we caught the tempo of at the beginning of 
the series, as all short intervals are expanded when we come 
to perceive only our innervations. We may, however, con- 
ceive the earliest announcement of the impression of the first 
click in consciousness and the exit therefrom of the registry- 
innervation involved in counting it, as separated in time by 
some not inconsiderable proportion of the simple reaction 
time between ear and tongue. If the interval between the 
clicks is greater than or equal to this reduced reaction- inter- 
val, consciousness is done with the first click when the second 
arrives, and there is no error. If, however, the second click 
begins to be recognized in the foe as of consciousness before 
this has completely initiated the act of tallying the first, and 
if the fastest rate of doing so has already been attained, then 
the third click will come a little earlier in the process, until 
at length a click in the later afferent stage will cease to be 
distinguishable from the perhaps more widely irradiated pro- 
cess of the earlier efferent stage of tallying, and will drop out 



84 NICHOLS : 

of consciousness and be lost, possibly after the analogy of the 
second of two sub- maximal stimuli in myological work, which 
produces no summation if extremely near the first in time. 
. . . We do not realize how far the fastest counting falls 
short of the fastest hearing. In judging of small divisions 
of time, we seem, as Vierordt thought, to take relatively 
large periods, perhaps as great as our psychic constant (or 
the time we reproduce with least change) — so large at least 
that we can overlook it readily, and then pair or otherwise 
group the subdivisions which do not get into the field of 
direct time- sensibility themselves. The focus of appercep- 
tion is perhaps dominated by the rhythm of the largest and 
more slowly loading and discharging motor cells. Although 
we can discriminate a finer intermittency by means of the 
smaller sensory cells, this is prone to be done more in the 
direct field of consciousness, and these smaller movements of 
time speedily fall out of sense- memory into oblivion like 
knowledge or impressions not directly reacted on. If im- 
mediately known time be discrete, and temporal continuity be 
an inference, as seems likely, these finer temporal signs are 
somewhat analogous to the finer local signs discriminating 
motion and even its direction considerably within the ordin- 
ary limits of discriminative sensibility for stationary compass 
points." 

The (B) set of experiments investigated, " Just- observable 
Differences of Duration." Subjects D. and S. made each 20 
judgments when the middle interval was varied -^ of the 4.27 
sees, of the extremes, viz., ten times each way with no error. 
G. S. H. judged 90 times under the same conditions with no 
error, while J. J. made only 12 errors in 90 judgments. - 
When the variation of the mean was T ^ of the same time of 
the extremes, D. and S. made no errors in 10 judgments, J. 
J. made 3 errors in 40 judgments, and G. S. H. made 2 errors 
in 30 judgments." 

The (O) experiments concerned "Full and Vacant Inter- 
vals." " It is well known that if a horizontal line be bisected 
in the middle and one half untouched and the other half 
crossed by short regular perpendicular lines, the latter half 
will seem the longer. It was found that under certain condi- 
tions the same illusion held for the time- sense. . . . Full 
tables were constructed for four individuals. With 10 clicks 
the following vacant interval to be judged equal to it must be 
extended to the time of 14 to 18 clicks ; 15 clicks seemed 
equal to the time of from 16 to 19. Preliminary experiments 
upon other individuals indicate that these differences are ex- 
treme. If the absolute length of interval is increased beyond 
from 1 to 3 sees., the illusion is less. It is also less if the 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 85 

clicks are very near together. The illusion still holds, but is 
diminished if, instead of comparing clicks and a vacant time, 
more or less frequent series of clicks are compared. In these 
observations, also, the time between the two intervals became 
quite important. In general the illusion was less if this time 
was short ; but if less than about f of a sec. the illusion again 
became greater. Indeed, in a few cases an indifference time 
was found in which little or no illusion took place. This en- 
tire illusion, however, is reduced to a minimum, and with 
some persons vanishes, if the order of the terms be reversed, 
viz., if the vacant or less-filled interval precedes. " 

A. Binet. La concurrence des itats psychologiques. Eevue 
Philosophique, Fev., 1890. 

This paper deserves mention as an interesting study of the 
effects of attention upon time judgments. 

Many investigations have been made upon such questions 
as, The Least Perceivable Duration throughout the various 
senses ; The Least Perceivable Difference of Change for the 
same ; Complicated results from several like or disparate 
sensations received simultaneously or in series. But as these 
are not sufficiently pertinent to our main problem the reader 
is referred to a good review of them in Wundt's Phys. Psy- 
chol. 3te Auf., II, pp. 330-364. 

Casting an eye back over the experimental field of Time 
Psychology, the results are found scarcely more satisfactory 
or conclusive than were those of the preceding chapter on the 
theories of time perception. Most experimenters have con- 
fined themselves to the determination of the Constant Error, 
Sensibility and Weber's Law, yet with difficulty, if indeed at 
all, can the results of any two of such determinations be har- 
monized, as the following table shows : 



1 1 



'Si * 
1 ^ g £ 






is 



- 3 

- p. 
P 




1 

a 

-a 
& 



11 









o o o o o 

'O i3 id 'd >d 



8 



o o S 

. CO -5 

O f- bb 

£ p fi 



rH rH !>• t»^r-l 



*2§ 
III 



GO i— I rH I— I 



EH *""' 



3 § 

•O co 



lO BO «W 

o, On _ O 
^ o S 



°p 



CD 
CO 
00 

CO £ 




+ 



£<? 



1— I rH I 



t s 

ci 



3 


•o 


00 


(M 


•^ 


^ 


t>. 


OS 


OS 


«o 


QO 


00 


00 


GO 


00 


§8 


00 


ao 


00 


00 


oo 


00 


00 


00 


00 


rH 


rH 


IH 


T-i 


rH 


i— 1 


1—1 


T— 1 


rH 



% A © 

-© § .S 

W 8 l> 



m 



«8 S 

3 



s w 



Of) 

a> 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 87 

t 

As a summary of these experiments the most conclusive 
results may be said to be as follows : 

Nearly all persons, under nearly all conditions, find a par- 
ticular length of interval more easily and accurately to be 
judged than any other. 

This Indifference Point or interval of best judgment is very 
variable for different individuals and for different times and 
conditions. 

The sign of the Constant Error is usually constant in both 
directions from the Indifference Point. 

Where norm and reproduction are single the Constant 
Error is minus for intervals longer, and plus for intervals 
shorter than the Indifference Interval. 

Where norm and reproductions are multiple, the Constant 
Error is plus for intervals longer, and minus for those shorter 
than the Indifference Interval. 

The majority of evidence is strongly against the validity of 
Weber's Law ; also against any fixed or constant Periodicity. 

Later investigators look to physiological processes for ex- 
planation of time-judgments, and particularly to rhythmic 
habits of nerve centres. Whether such processes as breath- 
ing, pulse, leg-swing, etc., govern our perceptions, or whether 
the more general rhythmic functions of the higher cephalic 
centres are in themselves the basis of time- judgment is now 
the important question. The discussion of this question, to- 
gether with the author's experimental results, will occupy 
the following sections of this study. 



III.— EXPERIMENTS AT CLARK UNIVERSITY. 



In October, 1889, I was requested by the instructor in 
Psychology at Clark University to investigate the apparently 
contradictory results obtained by various experimenters re- 
garding the Constant Error of Time-judgments. As a pre- 
liminary, the methods of previous experimenters were tested, 
until after several weeks, a single, and perhaps crucial point 
seemed to stand out as the proper question upon which to 
concentrate investigation, namely, the effect upon our 
estimation of any particular interval of previous sustained 
exercise or practice upon some other interval. A long series 
of experiments was then regularly undertaken which lasted 
several hours daily, for a period of over nine months of 
actual experimental work. 27 persons were tested ; over 500 
" sittings," or series of reproductions were made, comprising 
a total of approximately 50000 single judgments recorded. 
Five lengths of interval were chiefly used, namely: .25, .50, 
.75, 1.25, 1.75, seconds. 1 

Apparatus : After trying different metronomes in various 
ways, these were abandoned as inaccurate. Previous 
to beginning our regular experiments a nearly perfect 
instrument for beating time was found in a pendulum con- 
structed as follows : A stiff bar, thin but wide, and five feet 
long, swung upon knife edges projecting from opposite sides 
a little above the middle of the length of the bar, and resting 
upon smooth metal plates, was supported by firm frame- work. 
Upon each end of the bar was a heavy l bob ? or weight which 
could be slid up or down and fastened with a spring and 
clamp -screw at any distance from the point of support. 
With the first pendulum made, any length of interval could 

1 As before, the unit throughout this section is one second, except 
where specifically stated to the contrary. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 89 

be obtained, by proper adjustment, from half a second to two 
seconds, beyond which, beats could be regularly omitted from 
the electric circuit to be described, thus securing intervals of 
any length desired. The lower end of the pendulum- rod bore 
a platinum needle that at each swing made electric connec- 
tion, at the centre of the pendulum arc, with a mercury me- 
niscus. This pendulum, once set in full swing by the hand, 
would, for medium-length intervals, preserve regular beats 
for a far longer time than any single set of experiments, with- 
out any discoverable variation whatever. Great care was 
taken at each change of the interval to adjust the ' bobs ' and 
mercury contact so as both to make the interval of exactly 
the stated length, and the back and forth swings precisely 
equal, these being the two matters needing the nicest adjust- 
ment in all pendulum motion. The pendulum was introduced 
into the same electric circuit with an ordinary telegraph key, a 
telegraph sounder, and a Deprez signal which wrote on the 
drum of a Ludwig kymograph with automatic spiral thread for 
the revolving drum. Another Deprez signal wrote the vibrations 
of a tuning fork upon the same drum, by means of a separate 
circuit and a Konig contact. For adjusting the intervals and 
beats for the first time, a fork of 100 double vibrations was 
used ; the adjustment was extended through one hour, until 
a beat was secured, the sum of whose error was indistinguish- 
able for that space of time, and therefore the error for any 
set of experiments practically zero. Two other pendulums 
were also made for shorter intervals, one of them giving 
quarter seconds. Any two of these pendulums could be in- 
troduced into different loops of the same circuit, and each 
being adjusted to a different interval, either of the intervals 
could by means of a bridge, be sent through the same sounder 
at the will of the operator and without stopping either pendu- 
lum ; or again at will both pendulums could be cut out of the 
circuit altogether. The reproductions or judgments of the 
person undergoing experimentation were expressed by a 
slight movement of the finger upon an electric key that, by 
another Deprez signal in a separate circuit, recorded the 
judgment upon the kymograph drum. Thus during each set 
of experiments three electric signals with points arranged 

7 



90 NICHOLS : 

over one another, precisely in the same line at right- angles to 
the motion of the drum, continuously wrote their separate 
records as follows : Number one recorded the vibrations of 
a tuning-fork ; number two, the beats of whichever length of 
interval the subject was hearing from the pendulum sounder ; 
and number three, the judgments of this interval expressed by 
the subject. The tracings on the drum were " fixed'' and 
preserved. 

As above stated the length of the reproduction was meas- 
ured by tuning-fork vibrations written upon the drum ; for 
all the experiments except those of table E, a fork was used 
making 50 double vibrations per second, thus recording 
hundredths of a second ; for table E, which concerns inter- 
vals longer than the others (1.75), a fork of 25 double vibra- 
tions, recording fiftieths of a second was used. Many meth- 
ods were tried for saving the enormous labor of counting 
these vibrations, which task, together with its strain upon 
the eyes for such a long series of experiments as the present, 
can only be appreciated by one who has tried it for several 
months. The slightly irregular motions of the kymograph 
make it entirely inaccurate merely to scale the intervals. 
The quickest and safest method of counting we discovered 
was as follows : When the paper is cut from the drum it 
presents on the sheet several parallel lines. Several scales 
were made fitting all the degrees of irregularity which the 
fork vibrations in these lines from time to time displayed ; 
one of these scales was then selected to fit each line, part of a 
line, or set of lines according to their variation; usually three, 
and often one scale would fit the fork-record of a whole sheet ; 
the eye quickly detects, after some experience, whether the 
scale fits or not, and thus enables the counting of the vibra- 
tions by using the scale as a tally, with comparative facility 
and absolute accuracy. 

It is an important feature that in all experiments to be 
reported, great pains was taken to keep the persons experi- 
mented upon, in entire ignorance of the character of their 
judgments, or of any of the l points ' or the nature of the ex- 
periments whatever, in order to secure absolute freedom from 
unconscious prepossessions or subjective influences; where 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 91 

this was not accomplished, as was necessarily the case in two 
instances, (subjects S. and L.), there was from the character 
of the men a minimum probability of subjective prepossess- 
ions. Moreover as by far the greater majority of the subjects 
were thus precluded from prepossession until their tests were 
completed, and as the records of the few who were not so pre- 
cluded, including those upon myself, entirely accord with 
those who were, we think the results are reasonably free from 
this too usually neglected source of vitiation. 

Method : The first class of experiments was conducted as fol- 
lows : The subject was always seated alone in a noiseless 
room ; the electric sounder and the recording key, both on a 
table before him, were the only apparatus within his sight or 
hearing ; the former brought him through one circuit the 
beats of the metronome in sharp metallic strokes of uniform 
strength ; with the latter he recorded his judgments upon the 
kymograph drum in another room. In the latter room with the 
kymograph was also the pendulum and remaining apparatus, 
presided over by an assistant. The precise method of these A 
experiments was invariably as follows : (1) The pendulum was 
started with full swing, giving beats .75 in length, the electric 
circuit remaining open. (2) " Beady" signals passed between 
assistant and subject. (3) Kymograph and tuning-fork were 
started. (4) The assistant closed the pendulum circuit long 
enough to send to the subject six beats, or five intervals of 
.75 each. (5) The assistant opened the pendulum circuit, 
silencing the sounder. (6) The subject meantime had sought 
to catch the beat of the sounder from the first beat of the 
norm and simultaneously to reproduce the beat upon his re- 
cording key during the 6 beats of the norm. After the 
sounder ceased, he continued to reproduce the interval, with- 
out breaking the continuity of the series, according to his 
closest judgment, these reproductions being recorded continu- 
ously by the proper circuit upon the drum. (7) The assis- 
tant permitted the subject to continue his reproductions until 
the drum had exhausted the full length of its spiral, when he 
signalled " stop." The drum was set to exhaust its spiral in 
two minutes ; thus through all classes of experiments to be 
reported, the reproductions were extended through approx- 



92 NICHOLS : 

imately the same space of time, though of course the number 
of reproductions varied according to the length of the inter- 
vals used and the judgments made. Frequently short portions 
of the spiral would be used in adjustments of the signals or 
by accidents, so that the time actually used was shortened 
more or less. (8) After a few moments of rest a new 
beat, .9 long, or 20% longer than the norm was sent in to the 
subject, which with closest possible attention and care he 
strove to reproduce simultaneously, stroke exactly with 
stroke, during three minutes. No record was made on the 
drum of this exercise or practice. (9) A fresh drum having 
been put in the kymograph by the assistant during the above 
exercise, immediately upon the expiration of the three min- 
utes, a signal was given to the subject to cease practicing. 
(10) A new series of 6 beats of the original norm of .75 was 
then given, and the above numbers (1) to (7) inclusive were 
repeated precisely as in their first order. In other words a 
new drum-full of reproductions of the .75 was obtained under 
precisely the same conditions as the first, with the exception 
that the first series was " Without practice" or exercise 
upon any particular interval, while the second set was under 
the immediate influence of 3 min. practice upon an interval 
20 per cent, longer, i. e. on .9 (11) After a proper rest, still 
a third series or drum-full was taken precisely as before, ex- 
cept this time after like practice upon an interval 20 per cent, 
shorter than the norm, that is on .6 

Thus was obtained at each " sitting," though with proper 
rest between each series, three sets of judgments, as follows : 
(a) without practice ; (&) after 3 min. exercise upon .9 inter- 
vals ; (c) after 3 min. exercise upon .6 intervals. Table A is 
arranged to show the comparative results of these three sets. 

TABLE A. 1 

Norm, .75 sec. Practice, 3 inin. each on .9 sec. and .6 sec. (20 per cent, 
longer and shorter;. Trials, 17. Persons, 6. 

(0), (+) and ( — ) indicate average reproductions made after hearing 
6 beats, separated by a normal interval of .75 sec. (0) indicates aver- 
ages made without practice; (+) after 3 min. practice on 9 sec. ; (— ) 
after 3 min. practice on .6. Where the (-f-) figure is greater than the 
corresponding (0) figure or the ( — ) less then the corresponding (0), 

1 The exigencies of space in the Journal require the withholding of 
still more detailed tables carefully prepared and in the author's posses- 
sion. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 



93 



the figures are printed heavy, to show that these figures follow the 
rule that practice on a longer interval lengthens the judgment and 
practice on a shorter interval shortens the judgment as expressed in 
a following effort to reproduce the standard interval. The letters 
heading the vertical columns are the initials of persons acting as sub- 
jects. The small figures under each initial give the number of experi- 
ments from which the averages are made. 



Set. 


S. 
5 


L. 
3 


C. 
3 


F. 
3 


A. 

2 


N. 

1 


General 

Averages 

17 


(0) 
(+) 
(-) 


.712 
.710 
.715 


.607 
.663 
.614 


.750 

.727 
•697 


.735 

.757 
.706 


.671 

.749 
.680 


.814 

.801 
•731 


.712 
.723 
.689 



Results: With normal interval of .75, the general average 
of 17 tests upon 6 persons shows that there is a very slight 
and uncertain tendency to follow the rule that three minutes 
previous close attention to, and simultaneous reproduction of, 
intervals respectively 20% longer or shorter than the norm, 
correspondingly lengthen or shorten the judgment ; that is, 
that the habit formed by the practice holds over to influence 
the succeeding judgments but slightly, if at all. 

Series A being deemed inconclusive, it was followed by 
Series B, the only changes made being first, that a norm of 
1.25 was used in place of .75, and second, that only two sets 
of reproductions were taken, namely : one without practice 
(0) and one after three minutes practice ( — ) on an interval 
of .25. 

TABLE B. 

Norm, 1.25 sec. Practice, 3 min. on .25 sec. Trials, 60. Persons, 12. 

At the head of each vertical double column is the initial of the sub- 
ject. In the left hand column are the numbers of the single experi- 
ments from which the averages in the other columns are computed. The 
columns headed (0) contain average judgments of the 1.25 norm made 
without practice ; those headed ( — ) similar judgments made after three 
minutes practice on a .25 beat. This table shows the average for each 
set of each individual, and also the general averages of each individual 
and of the total experiments of this table. The averages for this table 
are computed from the full number of reproductions of each drumful. 



94 



NICHOLS : 



No. of 


N. 


s. 


c. 


L. 


F. 


A. 


Trial. 


(0) 
1.423 


(-) 


(0) 


(-) 


(0) 


(-) 


(0) 


(-) 


(0) 


(-) 


(0) 


-;(-) 


1 


1.3281-3321.275 


1.244 


1.146 


1.245 


1.166 


1.597 


1.517 


1.138 


1.212 


2 


1.453 


1.303 1-470 1.403 1-229 1.169 


1.238 


1.091 1.437 


1-425 


1.379 


1319 


3 


1.530 


1.317 1.748|1.343 1.278 1.276 


1.222 


1.258 


1.4911.44 


1.368 


1349 


4 


1.321 


1.252 1.313'l 306 


1.316 


1-307 














5 


1.376 


1248 1.4931.176 


1.281 1.253 














6 

7 


1.333 

1.278 


1.287 1.519J1.328 
1.2521-62511.550 


1.33511.280 
1.3231.267 














8 


1.249 


1.1891.51511.522 


1.334I1.307 














9 


1.234 


1.2161-2821.156 


1.437J1.312 














10 


1.346 


1.277 1.226 


1.209 


















11 


1.285 


1229 






















12 


1.336 


1185 






















13 


1.245 


1-209 






















14 


1.350 


1-196 






















15 


1.396 


1.164 






















16 


1.337 


1.265 






















17 


1-278 


1198 






















18 


1.296 


1-186 






















19 


1.362 


1-257 






















20 


1.381 


1.287 






















Gen'l 


























Aver- 
age. 


1.335 


1.242 


1.435 


1.313 


1.306 


1253 


1.236 


1167 


1.506 


1.461 


1.291 


1-290 


Differ- 
ence. 


-.092 


-.121 


-.053 


-.068 


-.044 


-.001 



TABLE B.— Continued. 



No. of 
Trial. 



Gen'l 
.Aver- 
age. 



Differ- 
ence. 



W. 



(0) I (-) 



(0) 



1.137:1.201 1.169 
1.355 1.2841.239 
1.216 1.199 ' 

I ! 



1.246 1.226J1.203 

I 



-.020 



(-) 



1.189 
1.206 



Sh. 



(0) I (-) 



1.35211.275 
1.147il 216 



1.1921.242 



1-241 



-.011 I -.001 

I 



10) 



1.311 
1.256 



1.284 



(-) 



Ca,. 



(0) (-) 



1 280'1.138 
1.245 1.146 



1.261 



-.023 



1.142 



1-118 
.954 



1022 



.120 



i0) 



1.441 



1.441 



(-) 



1-233 



.534 



Results: Total General Average Without Practice, 1.3228" 
" " " After " 1.2533" 



Difference, .0695" 

These B experiments upon the 1.25 interval, show an 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 95 

almost universal shortening of those judgments which were 
preceded by three minutes close attention to, and simultane- 
ous reproduction of, beats .25 long, the average difference 
between the judgments of the two conditions being .0695. 
The average difference of no individual out of the 12 included 
in the table varied from the general rule, and only in 6 trials 
out of the 60 was the rule broken for single trials, and no 
person broke the rule more than once. In general, those most 
experienced in laboratory work conformed most strictly to 
the usual law ; the law was most frequently broken upon the 
first test made upon an individual, this happening 4 times 
out of the 6 ; and it may be remarked in relation herewith, 
that more variations should be looked for from nervousness 
or other disturbing causes under these conditions, and from 
those persons with whom they were actually found. In gen- 
eral, also, the amounts of the difference made between (0) 
and ( — ) was proportional to the amount of experience the 
subject had in psychophysical experiment; for instance, 
those for Dr. Donaldson, Dr. Sanford, Dr. Lombard and my- 
self are among the largest. Curves were drawn for each 
individual similar to those of the accompanying chart. Study 
of these discovers that the Constant Error, whether plus or 
minus, shows itself most frequently to a marked degree, 
from the very beginning of the reproductions, and nearly 
always so before the seventh to the ninth beat, or in other 
words, before the elapse of ten seconds. Also, the Constant 
Error tends to preserve a uniform course from the beginning, 
either the judgments growing gradually longer or gradually 
shorter throughout the drum, according as their value is 
greater or less than the normal ; in those individuals where 
the Constant Error is greatest and most marked, this gradual 
increase or decrease is most marked, as with Dr. Donaldson, 
where is the largest plus value, and with Dr. Lombard, where 
is next to the greatest minus value of the judgments. 

A beat .25 in length was now chosen for the norm, and 
being shorter and more difficult to catch was always given 10 
times as a sample for each set of reproductions, in place of 6 
beats, as in the previous experiments. The practice inter- 
val was also changed for this table to 1.25, and for a period 



96 NICHOLS : 

of 5 minutes in place of 3 minutes, as formerly. The rea- 
son for this increase in the length of the time of practice is 
manifest when we consider that two factors enter into the 
functions of practice, namely : first, the number of repeti- 
tions which the subject or central cells would be called upon 
to make during the practice ; and secondly the fatigue, nutri- 
tive, restorative, or other processes, which may depend some- 
what upon the mere length of time which the practice is 
continued. We know little or nothing of the effects of either 
factor, but as in the C experiments practice on 1.25" gave much 
fewer number of repetitions, the length of practice time was 
increased from 3 to 5 minutes, which was an indefinite com- 
promise between proportional length of time of practice, and 
proportional number of beats. 

The shortness of the interval would have given a great 
number of reproductions, since the same length of the drum's 
spiral was used as before ; and the labor of counting so many 
would have been excessive; therefore, although the subject 
made his reproductions for approximately the same length of 
time as in the previous experiments, records were taken upon 
the kymograph of only the first 40 reproductions, and of a sec- 
ond set of 40, taken after the lapse of one minute from the 
last beat of the norm. All the other conditions were the 
same as before, making the method for Table as follows : 
(1) Norm of .25 (10 beats given); a drumful of reproductions 
taken without practice. (2) Practice 5 minutes on 1.25 
beats. (3) Norm of .25, (10 beats given); a drumful of repro- 
ductions taken after practice. 

TABLE C. 

Norm, .25 sec. Practice, 5 min. on 1.25 sec. Trials, 30, Persons, 8. 

Shows averages of each set and trial, of each individual, and the 
general averages as before. Averages of the first 40 reproductions are 
marked a, of the second 40, b ; and the average of a and b is marked 
c; (0) without practice; (+) after 5 min. practice on 1.25. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 



97 



No. of 


s. 


N. 


H. 


Ma. 


Trial. 


(0) 

.259 
.245 
.252 

.254 
.239 
.246 

.249 
.244 

.246 

.261 
.243 
.252 

.263 

.258 
.260 

.259 
.254 
.256 

.249 
.236 
.242 

.253 
.256 
.255 

.249 
.234 
.242 

.245 
.234 
.239 


(+) 


(0) 


'+* 


(0) 


(+) 


(0) 


(+) 


il 

il 
il 
il 
5 {! 
il 

il 
il 
il 
io {l 


.289 
.288 
.288 

.255 
.250 
.253 

•251 
•244 

.247 

.260 

•255 
•257 

•265 
.255 

7260 

•263 
.253 

.258 

.265 
.262 
.264 

.247 
.248 
.244 

.246 

.245 
•246 

.251 
•254 
.252 


.238 
.230 
.234 

.247 
.243 
.245 

.256 
.245 
.251 

.237 
.234 
.235 

.242 
.234 

.238 

.246 
.238 
.242 

.254 
.254 
.254 

.242 
.217 
.230 

.237 

.208 
.222 

.243 
.231 
.227 


.241 
.243 
.242 

•248 
.247 
.247 

.24S 
.242 
.245 

.239 
•240 
.240 

.252 
.248 
.250 

.254 
•250 
.252 

• 261 
.259 
•260 

.248 
.234 
.241 

.246 

• 237 
•241 

.254 
.251 
•252 


.273 
.232 
.252 

.244 
.225 
.235 

.242 
.227 
.234 


.289 
•297 
.293 

•262 
.262 
.262 

•259 
•251 
.255 


.249 
.242 
.245 

.246 
.238 
.242 


•261 
•249 
.255 

.249 
•242 
.245 


rr. (a 

1\ b 


.254 
.254 
.249 


.259 
•255 
•257 


.244 
.233 
.239 


•249 | -253 
.245 ! -228 ! 
.247 i 2.40 ! 


.270 
• 270 
•270 


.248 
.240 
.244 


•255 
.246 
•250 




4 


•005 
•Oil 

-.008 1 


4 


.004 
•011 
■•008 1 


4 


.017 
.042 
••029 


4 


•006 
•006 
-.006 



98 



NICHOLS 



TABLE C— Continued. 



No. of 


Ca. 


B. 


McD. 


T. 


Trials. 


(0) 


(+) 


(0) 


(+) 


(0) 


(+) 


(0) 


+ 




.244 
.233 
.238 

.246 
.250 
.248 


.252 
.253 
.253 

.251 
.254 
.252 


.255 

.246 
.250 


.253 

.250 
.252 


.248 
.251 
.250 


.249 
.252 
.250 


.258 
.256 
.257 


.252 
.245 
.249 


Eh tC 


.245 
.241 
.243 


•251 
•253 
.252 


.255 

.246 
.250 


.253 

•250 
.252 


.248 
.251 
.250 


.249 
.252 

.250 


.258 
.256 
.257 


.252 
.245 
.249 


Differ- 
ences. 




•006 
.012 

+.009 




.001 

•004 
+.002 




•000 

.000 

+.000 




.006 

.011 

—.008 



Results: Total General Average Without Practice (a) 
.2500 ; (5) .2396 ; (c) .2448. 

Total General Average After Practice (a) ,2557; 
(&) .2525; (0,2542. 

Difference (a) ,0057 ) (&) ,0129 ; (c) .0093. 
These C Experiments seem to show that 5 minutes' practice 
upon a 1.25 beat, lengthens judgments of .25 intervals on an 
average .00935 ; the result is the more striking and conclu- 
sive when the smallness of the average lengthening is com- 
pared with its constancy, the * < after practice ' ' set of General 
Averages of the total 30 trials, exceeding the " without prac- 
tice" set in every instance, and even in averages of three 
trials, as those of H (a subject who at the time was entirely 
ignorant of the purpose of his experiments), the "after 
practice " judgments falling below the corresponding " with- 
outs" but twice out of the 240 recorded judgments. The 
Curves of the General Averages of the total thirty trials is 
shown in Fig. Ill of the Chart, and those of H in Fig. IY. 
The continuous line in the chart shows the judgments "with- 
out practice," and the dotted line "after practice" as 
previously in Figs. I and II. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 99 



TABLE D. 

Norm, .75 sec. Practice, 7 min. on 1.75 sec. and 5 min. on .25. Trials, 
30. Persons, 8. 

This table will be understood without other explanation than that its 
method was precisely that of Table A, except that the 'long ' practice 
w r as changed from 3 min. upon .9 to 7 min. upon 1.75, and the ' short' 
practice from 3 min. upon .6 to 5 min. upon .25 ; also, 7 beats of the 
norm were given for the copy from which the reproduction of each set 
was made. The table shows averages of each set and trial, of each indi- 
vidual, and the General Averages as before. Averages of the first 40 
reproductions are marked a, of the second 40 &, and the average of a 
plus b is marked c ; (0) = without practice ; (+) after 7 min. practice 
on 1.75 ; ( — )= after 5 min. practice on .25. 



LoFC. 



100 



NICHOLS : 





S. 


N. 


H. 


B. 


No. of 
Sittings. 


(0) 

.725 
.726 
.725 

.748 
.766 
.757 

.793 

.801 

.797 

.718 

.699 

.708 

.768 
.746 
.757 

.782 
.761 

.772 

.781 
.824 
.803 

.714 
.704 
.709 

.758 
.768 
.764 

.754 
.780 
.767 


(+) 


(-) 


CO) 


(+) 


(-; 


(0) 


(+. 


(-) 


(0) 


(+ 


(-) 


il 

il 
il 
il 
il 
il 

il 
il 

il 
w {l 


.786 
.788 
•787 

•835 
.882 
-859 

.795 
.803 
.799 

.795 
•809 
.802 

.924 

1-019 

•971 

•877 

1-120 

.999 

• 889 
1-118 
1.003 

.816 
.822 

•819 

.879 
•852 
-865 

.840 
.855 
.847 


.710 
.690 
.700 

.772 
.792 
.782 

.699 
.718 
.709 

.721 
.754 
.737 

.727 
.729 
.728 

.735 
.705 
.720 

.778 
.819 
.798 

.716 
.696 
.706 

.744 
.743 

.743 

l> 

.726 
.716 
.721 


.801 
.800 
.800 

.781 
.773 

.777 

.739 
.753 
.746 

.736 
.731 
.734 

.822 

.790 
.806 

.777 
.775 
.776 

.771 

.770 
.770 

.761 

.798 
.780 

.753 

.758 
.756 

.747 
.751 
.749 


.803 
.814 
.808 

.771 
.798 
.785 

.846 
•844 
•845 

.836 
.975 
.906 

.826 
•889 
.857 

-804 
.810 
.807 

.820 
.990 
.905 

•972 
.997 
•984 

.961 
.952 
•956 

.819 
.867 
.843 


.747 
.759 
.753 

.751 
•761 
.756 

.712 
.722 
.717 

•696 
.676 
.686 

•740 
.716 
.728 

.709 
•704 
.707 

.708 
.693 
.701 

.722 
.727 
.725 

.741 
.735 
.738 

.788 
.777 
.782 


.798 
.835 

.817 

.800 
.899 
.849 

.810 

.894 
.852 

.732 
.794 
.763 

.787 
.833 
.810 


.764 
.869 
.817 

.878 
.963 
.920 

.982 
1.148 
1.065 

•909 

1056 

.985 

1.003 
1.233 
1.118 


.666 
.670 
.668 

.744 
.794 
.769 

.774 
.900 
.837 

.732 
.779 
.755 

.736 
.794 
.765 


.705 
.629 
.667 


.685 
.621 
.653 

.685 
.621 
.653 


1 
•648 
•599 
•623 


jss (a 

iv 


.754 

.757 
.755 


•843 
•907 
.875 


.732 
.736 
.734 


.768 
.769 

.767 


.845 
•893 
•869 


.731 
.727 
.729 


.785 
.851 
.818 


.907 

1-053 

.980 


.730 
.787 
.758 


.705 
.629 
.667 


• 648 
.599 
.623 


Differ- 
ences. 

oca 




4-.089 
4--149 
+.119 


-.021 
—019 
-.021 




+.076 
+.123 
+.100 


-.037 
—042 
-.040 




+.121 
+.202 
+.162 


—055 
-.064 
-.059 




—.020 
—.008 
—.014 


—057 
—030 
-.044 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 



101 



TABLE D.— Continued. 





McA. 


Ma. Sh. 


Ca. 


No. of 
Sittings. 


(0) 


(+) 


(-) 


(0) 


(+) 


(-) 


(0) 


(+) 


(-) 


(0) 


(+) 


(-) 


(a 


.743 


.739 


.699 


.695 


.734 


.641 


.759 


•835 


.713 


.702 


.734 


.679 


lib 


.708 


.731 


•635 


.624 


.708 


.688 


.731 


.892 


.720 


.644 


.687 


.553 


u 


.725 


.735 


.667 


.659 


.721 


.665 


.740 


•863 


.716 
.713 


.673 


•711 


.616 


« (a 


.743 


.739 


.699 


.695 


.734 


.641 


.759 


.835 


.702 


.734 


.679 


! 6 


.708 


.731 


.635 


.624 


.708 


.688 


.731 


.892 


.720 


.644 


.687 


.553 


a (c 


.725 


".735 


.667 


.659 


.721 


.665 
—054 


.740 


.863 


.716 


.673 


.711 


•616 






—.004 


—044 


. 


+.039 




+.076 


—122 




+.032 


—023 


H8l 6 




+•023 


—073 


■ 


+.084 


+.064 




+.161 


-.011 




+.043 


—091 




.010 


.058 


■ 


+.062 


+.006 




+.123 


.024 




+.038 


.057 




1 f« 


.758 


.838 


.722 








l\ h 


.762 


.897 


.725 








H (C 


.760 


.867 


.724 






General Average of All. 














£* <£ ( a 




+.080 


-.035 








*1 \ b 




+.134 


-.036 








oS (c 




+.107 


—036 







Results: Total General Averages Without Practice (a) 
.7583 ; (6) .7621 ; (c) .7602, 
Total General Averages after practice on longer beat 

(a) .8385 ; (6) .8971 ; (c) .8678. 
Total General Averages after practice on shorter beat 

(a) .7225; (&) .7255; (c) .7240. 
Total General Average Difference after practice on 

longer beat (a) .0802 ; (6) .1349 ; (c) .1075. 

Total General Average Difference after practice on 

shorter beat (a) .0358 ; (b) .0366 ; (c) .0362. 

Comparison of experiments A and D shows that, for the 

same interval of .75, while in the former with a difference of 

20 per cent, between the norm and practice intervals the 

effect of habit or practice was so slight as to be uncertain if 

active at all, in the latter experiments, with a much greater 

difference between the norm and practice intervals, the effect 



102 



NICHOLS 



was strong and constant. Figure V of the chart shows the 
curve of the General Averages for the 30 trials and 8 per- 
sons ; figure VI shows the curve for Sh., and illustrates a 
single trial. 

TABLE E. 

Norm, .5 sec. Practice, 5 min. on 1.75 sec. Trials, 6. Persons, 2. 

The only other variation than those in the above line was for these 
experiments, that 10 beats of the norm were given for the sample 
from which each set of reproductions was made. Averages of the first 
40 reproductions are marked a, of the second 40, b ; the averages of a 
plus b are marked c ; (0) = Without Practice ; (+) = after 5 min. prac- 
tice on 1.75. 



No. of Trials. 


s. 


N. 


(0) 


(+) 


(0) 


<+) 


4! 


.517 
.503 
.510 

.491 
.505 

.498 

.497 
.504 

.500 


.541 
.518 
.530 

.528 
•559 
.544 

.535 
•551 
.543 


.491 
.484 

.487 

.503 
.483 
.493 

.489 

.484 
.487 


.521 
.515 
.519 

.523 
.515 
.520 

.498 

.477 

.437 


(a 

Totals J h 


.501 

.503 
.502 


.534 
•542 
.538 


.494 
.466 

.480 


.514 
•502 
.508 


Differences, 


+ 
+ 


033 
039 
036 


+ 
+ 


020 
035 
028 



Results: Total General Averages Without Practice (a) .4980; 
(6) .4852 ; (c) .4916. 
Total General Averages after practice on longer beat 

{a) .5246; (6) .5228; (c) .5237. 
Total General Average difference (a) .0266 ; (5) 
.0376 ; (c) .0321. 
Figure YII of the chart shows the curve for the general 
averages of the six tests of these experiments on the interval 
,5. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 



103 



TABLE F. 

Norm, 1.75. Practice 6 min. on .5. Trials, 6. Persons, 2. 
Seven beats of norm given for sample to be reproduced. (0) 
Without Practice ; (— ) = after 6 min. practice on, .5 sec. 



No. of Trials. 


S. 


N. 


10) 


(-) 


(0) 


(-) 


1 
2 
3 


2.03 
2.06 
2.31 


2.14 
2.36 
2.35 


2.19 
2.24 

1.88 


133 
1.79 
1.75 


Totals. 


2-136 


2.284 


2.049 


1.790 


Difference. 


+.048 


—.259 



Results: Total General Average Without Practice, 2.089 
" " " After " 2.010 



" " " Difference, — .079 

It will be observed that the three trials of S. for this inter- 
val are all contrary to the usual law ; whether this is acci- 
dental and due to the small number of the trials, or if practice 
is less efficient in its influence upon judgments of long inter- 
vals, is undetermined ; we incline to believe the former. 



At this point in the experiments it appeared conclusive 
that a certain amount of sustained exercise, with close atten- 
tion to the repetition of definite beats heard from a pendulum 
or sounder, and reproduced by motion of the finger upon a 
key, induces some sort of more or less permanent effect or 
habit, whose influence unconsciously modifies accordingly the 
judgments or reproductions of other beats heard and repro- 
duced immediately after such exercise or practice. The 
question now arose whether this effect was muscular or 
" central." To determine this, the following experiments 
were instituted ; their method was the same as the foregoing 
except that in place of hearing the beats of the sounder the 



104 NICHOLS : 

armature or stroke- bar of the latter was pressed lightly 
between the thumb and forefinger of the left hand ; the soft 
parts of the balls of the fingers were intruded slightly between 
the bar and the anvil or brasses between which the bar played, 
and, the circuit being closed, each time the pendulum made a 
stroke a " pulse-like " sensation was felt by the fingers. The 
left hand, thus holding the sounder, was then rolled in sev- 
eral thicknesses of cloth and folded with a woolen coat, and 
the ears closed with cotton or wax till no noise from the 
sounder could be heard with the closest possible attention. 
Also, the practice was now exercised or received in a purely 
afferent manner, without repeating the practice interval upon 
the key, simultaneously with the beats of the sounder as was 
done in the other experiments. By these means the effect of 
the practice was confined afferently to the left thumb and fore- 
finger, and to their respective nervous centres. The repro- 
ductions of the trial intervals, both the set previous to 
practice and the correlative set after practice, were made with 
the right hand or fingers, as in all previous experiments. 

It is evident that if similar effects from practice should 
manifest themselves under these conditions as in the former 
experiments, the cause could in no way be attributed to a 
muscular habit, because no muscles were at all concerned in 
the reproductions of the normal or trial intervals, which had 
been in any way influenced by the previous afferent exercise 
on the practice interval. Of course it is possible that every 
afferent impulse occasions some efferent discharge, although 
the same be actively ineffectual ; yet even if this did hap- 
pen, we think it would be fair to assume that the cause of 
the difference between the two sets of judgments was central 
and not muscular. 

TABLE G. 

Norm, 1.25. Practice, 6 min. on .25. Trials, 50. Persons, 16. 

Practice taken by touch alone in left thumb and finger, the beat being 
inaudible. Ten beats of norm given as sample for all reproductions. 
(A) = Averages without practice ; (B) = Averages after 6 min. prac- 
tice on .25 beats; D = difference between (A) and (B). 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 



105 









TABLE 


G. 








No. of 
Sitticgs- 


s. 


N. 


L. 


H. 


c. 


A. 


D. 


B. 


■{1 


1.276 

1215 

- .061 


1.200 

1.109 

- .091 


1.065 

.942 
- .123 


1.480 

1.530 

-f- .050 


1.339 1.146 

1.390 1.111 

+ .0511- .035 


1.433 

1.437 
-f .004 


1.442 

1.334 

- .108 


2\ B 


1.302 

1.202 


1.174 
1-033 


1.025 

1.238 


1.443 

1.410 


1.564 

1.475 


1.396 

| 1-393 






u 


- -100 


— .141 


.203 


.033 


- .089 


- .003 






z\b 


1.247 

1.195 


1.140 

1.029 


, 1.358 
1-159 


1.447 

1.282 


1.289 

1.438 


1.446 

1 1.480 






U 


- -052 


-.111 


— -199 


- .165 


-f .349 


+ -034 






if* 


1.207 

1.350 


1.082 

1-058 


.883 
.882 


1.388 

1.223 


1.307 

1.255 


1.493 

1.420 






u 


-f .043 


- .024 


- .001 


- .165 


- .052 


- -073 






{ A 

5\B 


1.390 

1-281 
- .109 


1.245 

1-071 

- .174 


1.093 

1-012 
- .081 


1.333 

1.233 
- .100 


1.277 

1.284 


1.553 

1369 

— .184 






\d 


-h -007 




\ A 
%\B 


1.174 

1.109 


1.179 

1.085 














\d 


- .065 


•094 














\ A 

l\ B 

U 


1.350 

1.353 

+ .003 


1.326 

1.202 
- .124 














s\b 


1.322 

1.289 

- .033 


1.261 

1.089 

- .172 














\ A 

§\B 


1.583 
1.335 


1.271 

1.154 














\b 


- -248 


- -117 














io\b 


1.334 
1.361 


1.213 

1.031 














\d 


-f- .027 


- .182 














2. (A 

h Id 


1.310 

1.262 
- .048' 


1.210 
1.083 

- .126, 

l 


1.061 

1.0291 

- .032! 


1.416 

1.326 

- -090 


1.347 

1.363 

-j- .016| 


1.389 1.433 

1312 1.437 

.077 1+ -004 


1.442 

1.334 
- .108 



106 



NICHOLS : 



TABLE G.— Continued. 



No. of 
Sittings. 


McM. 


w. 


Ha. 


M. 


Mi. 


Ma. 


Hn. 


Oa. 


Average 
of last 10. 


2 ff. 


1.301 

1.163 

— .138 


1.350 

1.210 
- .HO 


1.408 
1.397 


1.372 

1.474 

-f .102 


1.425 

1-322 
- .103 


1.029 

•906 
- .123 


1.183 

1.194 

-f- .011 


1.268 
1.161 

- .107 


1.306 

1.245 


(•D 


- .011 


- .061 


if* 


1.301 

1.163 

.138 


1.350 

1.210 
- .140 


1.408 
1.397 

- -on 


1.372 

1.474 

+ .102 


1.425 

1.322 

- .103 


1.029 

.906 

- .123 


1.183 

1.194 

.011 


1.268 

1.161 

- .107 


1.306 

1.245 

- .061 



General Average, 



f 1.277 
J 1.213 

I- .064 



Results: Total general average without practice, 1.2776 
Total general average after 6 min. practice on,"! 

.25, received only through left thumb and V 1.2137 
finger, J 



Total general average difference, — .0639 

The results of these G experiments are particularly to be 
compared with those of Table B, both having had the same 
norm and same practice intervals. The length of time which 
practice was undergone, however, was in G double that in B, 
which probably should be counted as a reason why the 
difference between the " without practice" and the "with 
practice" results should have been greater in G than 
in B. An offset to this influence, however, lies probably 
in the fact that in the B practice the intervals were not 
only afferently received, but also efferently executed, bring- 
ing into play the whole psychophysical arc of sensory 
centers, motor centers, and muscles of the fore-arm, hand 
and fingers ; under these circumstances this arc soon takes 
on, as a whole, a simultaneous function of a strongly reflex 
nature, the reproductions not following the beats of the 
norm, but precisely and spontaneously coinciding with them, 
beat on beat; the whole process of reproducing here is 
itself of the nature of an induced habit, and it is natural to 
suspect that the continuation of the habit, sustained through 
the term of practice, would have a stronger and more lasting 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 107 

effect than where the sensory centers alone were exercised, as 
in the G experiments. What the precise results of these 
countervailing conditions may have been we cannot determine, 
but the very close equivalence of the total differences of the 
two tables (— .0695 for B, — .0639 for G), is very likely to 
have been within certain limits accidental. 

It is not likely that the same experiments repeated under 
conditions as nearly as possible like these, and upon the same 
individuals, would produce precisely the same results, for 
the human organism, mental and physical, is so complex, its 
environment so variable, the entire conditions of the problem 
so multifariously changeable, that the mathematical proba- 
bilities are almost infinitely against identical combinations. 
But results constantly like in nature and approximately like 
in degree, should, we think, be deemed scientifically acceptable. 
Even with these, the time-problem is so difficult and so 
liable to subjective and delusive complications, that we can- 
not look upon the experiments here reported, (as extensive, 
careful and conclusive as we have endeavored to make them,) 
as being entirely conclusive until they shall have been con- 
firmed by similar work of other experimenters. With these 
provisions, however, we think the results of the foregoing 
experiments indicate that, sustained attention to a rythmi- 
cally repeated impulse induces in the corresponding nervous 
centre a habit or tendency to continue that impulse, which 
habit influences , or modifies succeeding time-judgments. 

The following table summarizes our results with reference 
to the Constant Error. We have thought best to give the 
length of the judgments rather than the amount of the error ; 
the plus sign is prefixed to those judgments which are greater, 
and the minus signs to those which are less than their corre- 
sponding norm ; also, the table shows the number of trials 
from which each average is calculated, and the table from 
which the same are taken. The judgments of Table H are 
alone the first series of each set or trial, that is, those made 
without practice or normally. 



108 NICHOLS : 

TABLE H.— CONSTANT ERROR. 





Norm .25 


Norm .50 


Norm .75 


Norm 1.25 


Norm 1.75 


Persons. 


No. 
Trials 

and 
Table. 


Average 
Judg- 
ment. 


No. 
Trials 

and 
Table. 


Average 
Judg- 
ment. 


No. 

Trials 

and 

Table. 


Average 
Judg- 
ment. 

— .712 


No. 
Trials 

and 
Table. 


Average 
Judg- 
ment. 


No. 
Trials 

and 
Table. 


Average 
Judg- 
ment. 












5 A 


10 B 


+ 1.435 






s. 


IOC 


— .249 


3E 


-f .502 


10 D 


+ .755 


10 G 


+ 1.310 


3F 


+ 2.136 




Average 


l — .741 


Average 


+ 1.373 














1 A 


+ .814 


20 B 


+ 1.335 






N. 


IOC 


— .239 


3E 


— .480 


10 D 


+ .769 


10 G 


—1.210 


3F 


+2.049 




Average 


+ .773 


Average 


+ 1.293 


















3B 


—1.236 






L. 










3 A 


— .607 


5G 


—1.061 
—1.126 








Average 


















9B 


+ 1.30b 






C. 










3 A 


+ .750 


5G 


+ 1.347 








Average 


+ 1.321 




H. 


3C 


— .240 






5D 


+ .818 


5G 
3B 


+ 1.416 
+ 1.291 






A. 










2 A 


— .671 


5G 


+ 1.389 








Average 


+ 1.353 


















2B 


—1.142 






Ca. 


2C 


— .243 






ID 


— .673 


1G 


+ 1.268 








Average 


—1.184 




Ma. 


2C 


— .244 






ID 


— .659 


1G 


—1.029 






Sh. 










ID 


— .740 


2B 
2B 


—1.242 
—1.203 






Mi. 














1G 


+ 1.425 








Average 


+ 1.277 




F. 










A 


— .735 


3B 


+ 1.506 






W. 














3B 
IB 


—1.246 
+ 1.441 






D. 














1G 


+ 1.433 








Average 


+ 1.437 




B. 


1C 


+ .250 










1G 


+1.442 






K. 














2B 


+ 1.284 






McD. 


1C 


+ .250 


















T. 


1C 


+ .257 


















Bl. 










ID 


— .667 










McM. 














1G 


+ 1.301 






W. 














1G 


+ 1.350 






Ha. 














1G 


+ 1.408 






M. 














1G 


+ 1.372 






McA. 










ID 


— .725 










Hn. 














1G 


—1.183 
















17 A 


— .712 


60 B 


+ 1.322 






General 
Averages. 


30 C 


— .244 


6E 


— .491 


30 D 


+ .760 


50 G 


+ 1.277 


6F 


+ 2.089 




Average 


— .742 


Average 


-f-1.302 





THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 109 

Results: With the method used, the experiments, on the 
whole, indicate that the judgments of intervals of .75, .50 
and .25 are very slightly shortened, while those of 1.25 and 
1.75 are considerably lengthened. Too few intervals were 
used to determine the Indifference Point accurately, yet in 
view of the great variations displayed, we may perhaps come 
as near the truth as can be well attained, if we calculate this 
point, for these experiments, from the General Average of the 
intervals used ; according to such computation the Indiffer- 
ence Point would appear to be about .81. Yet so great are 
the individual differences and even the variations of the Con- 
stant Error from time to time for the same individual, that 
this error should be termed Inconstant rather than Constant, 
and as calculated from any number of persons yet experi- 
mented upon, must be considered as extremely problematical 
and uncertain. Particularly so, as we entirely lack any sure 
clue to its probable cause. In view of the indication arrived 
at, that the phenomenon is central, we might infer that the 
lengthening of the judgment was due to an inertia or tardiness 
of the centres to repeat the proper rhythm, and that this 
might be based upon a failure of response in nutritive pro- 
cesses ; but this would be difficult to reconcile with the fact that 
the more rapid intervals, which would be supposed to exhaust 
the centres most quickly, display the opposite tendency and 
act more quickly than they ought. Or perhaps the relations 
between the nutritive and active functions of the centres, are 
an automatically compensating mechanism, wherein the sup- 
ply is sometimes " over corrected" and again " under cor- 
rected" with reference to the exhaust, just as the bal- 
ance wheel of a watch is often at fault with reference to 
temperature, and the watch varies with the season and with 
the pocket it is carried in ; so the time- mechanism of the 
nervous centre may vary with individual and physical condi- 
tions, and with the coat we wear ; surely the psychical time- 
piece is not less delicate or complex than its horological 
rival of human skill. 

Comparing our own results with those of former experi- 
menters, though we learn next to nothing of the cause of the 
Constant Error and too little of its course to predict 



110 NICHOLS : 

diet the same with any great probability, for any certain 
person or number of persons ; yet study of our tables, and still 
better of the original curves and charts too numerous to 
publish, reveals a few points of considerable certainty. 
Those individuals who make the largest constant error, make 
the error most constantly in one direction ; such persons, 
also, are apt to make a constantly increasing error through- 
out the series of reproductions of each drumful ; this phe- 
nomenon betrays itself even more conspicuously in the ' l after 
practice ' ' series than in the ' l without practice ' ' series ; 
the phenomenon is illustrated in the judgments of L and of H 
in Table G, and in their respective curves, Figures X and XI 
of the chart ; judgments of the former are unusually short 
throughout the experiments, and in the curves, show them- 
selves growing rapidly shorter and shorter to the end of the 
drum ; the judgments of H are unusually long throughout all 
his trials, and his curves go rapidly up throughout each 
drum. This raises a serious question as to what the magni- 
tude of the Constant Error would be for a longer and different 
period of reproduction. Possibly, also, this point has rela- 
tion to the fact that contrary signs are found for the Constant 
Error by the German experimenters who used single repro- 
ductions, and by Mr. Stevens (with whom my results pretty 
closely agree) and myself, who used multiple reproductions. 
Examination of the first reproduction of each drumful of my 
work, does not discover the contrariness of sign for Constant 
Error, between the first and the subsequent judgments of the 
series, which would correspond to the contrariness of results 
between the above mentioned experiments with single and 
with multiple reproductions. New experiments seem needed 
for the tripartite relations between the sign of Constant Error, 
the number or length of time the norm is given as a sample, 
and the number of the reproduced judgments. 

Another feature of interest is, that any slight nervousness 
or excitement of the subject shortens the judgments. Often 
the subject who sits for the first time, looks upon any psycho- 
logical experiment as in some way a test of mental caliber ; 
this, together with fresh interest in the experiment, occasions 
a slight eagerness, excitement, or mental tension for the first 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. Ill 

trial, which is not so much, if at all, present in future ones. 
Examination of results taken under such conditions, convinced 
me while the experiments were in progress that they were 
shorter than the ordinary ones. It is evident that this, if true, 
would have bearing upon the method of our experiments ; for 
instance, if in first sittings the average judgments of the first 
or u without practice" trial be for the above reason shortened 
more than the following ' i after practice ' ' set, allowance ought 
to be made for this in estimating the shortening or lengthen- 
ing effect of the practice upon the later set ; otherwise, in those 
cases where the practice interval was shorter than the norm, 
the shortening effect of the practice in the i i after practice ' ? set 
would be negatived to the extent of the shortening due to 
excitement in the ' ' without practice ' ' set, and the reverse for 
practice intervals longer than the norm. Examination of the 
tables shows that the law, that the " after practice" sets are 
longer or shorter than the " without practice " sets, according 
as the practice interval is longer or shorter than the norm, 
is broken to a more or less degree in 48 out of 246 times ; 17 
out of these 48 digressions occurred in first sittings, and 11 
out of these 17 occurred in those experiments where the 
practice interval was shorter than the norm. This is in* 
accordance with what has been said regarding excitement, 
yet a more detailed scrutiny of the results than is possible to 
give here, is chiefly the ground for what we have stated on 
this point. 

Much has been said by previous experimenters concerning 
the effects of attention. Undoubtedly with single reproduc- 
tions sensibility and accuracy are directly proportional to the 
attention given ; with multiple reproductions it is doubtful if 
this is the case for the expert and experienced subject. For 
myself, who have had very unusual experience, my best judg- 
ments are made by paying the greatest possible attention to 
the norm during the sample beats, and then, when the rhythm 
is once caught, abandoning myself to as near an unconscious 
or reflex condition as possible, letting the idea or habit of 
the rhythm run its own course undisturbed, as near as may 
be, by attention, volition, or any kind of thinking whatever. 

Subjective opinions of one's own judgments; After finish- 



112 NICHOLS : 

ing each drumful the subject throughout the experiments was 
usually asked his opinion of how well he had kept his copy 
or norm ; only in a small and uncertain number of cases were 
these opinions found to agree with the truth, and frequently 
were directly contrary. 

How long before the effect of practice shows itself as 
against the immediate memory of the norm ? The results 
are so variable that this question cannot be answered with 
precision ; nearly always the effect of the practice is exhib- 
ited in the very first reproduction to a marked degree ; before 
the expiration of 8 or 10 seconds the effect would seem to be 
in full force or tendency, from which time forth, the judgments 
where the Constant Error was well marked, gradually grew 
longer or shorter to the end of the drum, as we have before 
stated. 

How long does the effect of practice last? Our method did 
not permit us to observe a longer period than from 1.5 to 2 
minutes ; the practice seemed to preserve its effect with 
nearly, if not entirely, its full force for that length of time. 

Fatigue : A few experiments were made preserving closest 
possible attention to the beats and judgments for several 
hours at a sitting ; sample tests of the judgments were taken 
from time to time. So far as these go, fatigue could not be 
discovered to have any effect whatever. 

Long Experience in making time judgments has been 
thought by Mehner and others to lessen the Constant Error. 
Study of the above experiments according to their dates on 
the protocol, which also agree with the order of the tables as 
published, discovers very uncertain evidence for this opinion, 
a slight probability perhaps inclining in its favor. 

Mr. Stevens noticed in his work, that judgments of unusual 
length or shortness are apt to be corrected in the following 
judgment, " according to a standard which the mind carries, 
but to which the hand (or perhaps the will during the inter- 
val) cannot be accurately true." To a certain degree the 
same phenomenon is observed in my charts and curves, though 
I am rather inclined to carry back the cause to some auto- 
matically compensating adjustment of the rhythmic habit or 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 113 

function of the nerve centres, than to the vague phrase " a 
standard carried by the mind." 

Anomalies: Seeing no just reason for the culling out of 
anomalies in former experiments, I have permitted none in 
my own. Every test taken in the course of any regular ex- 
periment has been reported in its proper place, with the 
exception of a single trial each, for three persons, who, from 
nervousness (one was a young woman) or lack of ryth- 
mic sense, were entirely unable to catch the beat of the 
norm in a way that would enable them to repeat it with any 
sort of regularity or likeness to the original. 

Sensibility : Owing to the enormous labor that would be 
involved in computing the Average Error for so many 
judgments, no investigation was made by me of this factor. 
On the whole, however, I should say the nearly uniform re- 
sults regarding sensibility of all former experimenters, which 
constitute almost their sole point of agreement, are entirely 
confirmed by the experiments here reported. 

In closing this account of my experiments I have pleasure 
in thanking those who have given me so much valuable time, 
taken from their own University work, in acting as subjects 
for such a tedious and time-robbing investigation, and those 
also who have assisted me by suggestion, counsel and inspira- 
tion. 

IV.—CONCLTJSIONS. 

Sensations and their images or reproductions have various 
attributes ; qualitatively they are blue, or warm, or painful 
etc. ; intensively they are strong or weak, bright or faint, etc. 
Duration, or continuation, is another attribute or character- 
istic of every sensation and of every image. This attribute is 
the ultimate and essential datum of time. Besides sensations 
and images, science infers and assumes the real and separate 
existence of certain physical elements, having fixed correla- 
tions with each other, and with sensations and images. 
Whether the grounds for this assumption are acceptable or 
not we need not here discuss ; but according to this assump- 
tion, duration or continuing is also an attribute or character- 
istic of these physical elements, and therein forms a further 



114 NICHOLS : 

field of this ultimate and essential time datum. Again most 
philosophies, and, I think, all religions and all science, as- 
sert, infer, or assume the existence of some soul or super-psy- 
chical cause, as an ultimate element separate from, or as a 
further attribute additional to, the physical elements and the 
sensations and images ; according to these grounds there is 
thus another field of this characteristic time datum. Thus 
our time datum is seen to be an attribute belonging to, and 
inherent in, everything that is conceived to exist. As such, 
also it is seen to be an ultimate datum ; as much so as the 
blueness, the chilliness, or the painfulness of any sensation, 
or the existence of anything at all. Why things exist at all, 
or why their inherent nature is what it is, we think to be at 
present beyond human explanation. The fundamental datum 
of our present explanations, then, we shall state to be that 
time is this attribute of duration wherever it exists. 

This being the nature of time, what constitutes a percep- 
tion of time! Hoping the results will justify the use, we 
shall accept that nomenclature according to which it is said 
that every elementary sensation or image is perceived which 
presents itself in consciousness at all. When a sensation or 
image properly occupies the focus of attention, we shall say 
it is apperceived. According to this terminology, time is per- 
ceived whenever any sensation or image durates 1 in conscious- 
ness at all ; it is apperceived when the duration properly oc- 
cupies the focus of attention. Thus if we suppose a creature 
so simple as to be without memory, and capable from time to 
time of but a single elementary sensation of constant quality, 
say a pain, (such perhaps are some infusoria) we should say 
that pain was perceived whenever it occurred ; we should not 
say it was apperceived. We should also say such a creature 
perceived time. 

Why sensations ultimately differ at all, why some are red 
and some blue, some bright and some faint, or why some are 
long in duration and some short, is beyond explanation. That 
some are long and some short is an ultimate datum, and no 
more wonderful than that sensations are diverse in any other 

1 1 have coined this word, finding no other sufficiently simple in mean- 
ing. 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 115 

way. But in the same way as we shall say of our simple crea- 
ture that he perceives his sensation when it exists at all, and 
that he perceives time when it (the sensation) durates at all, 
so we shall say he perceives a certain definite time when it 
durates in that certain definite manner. Its perception is its 
occurrence ; the ultimate nature of its occurrence, constitutes 
the ultimate nature of the perception ; the definiteness of its 
occurrence, of its inherent nature, constitutes the definiteness 
of that certain perception. We know nothing of the percep- 
tion of such a creature except by inference and analogy ; but 
in the same way that we should say his sensation is painful, 
in that same way we should say one of his perceptions was five 
seconds long. And in the same way that we have said he 
perceives time when his sensation durates at all, so we shall 
say he perceives five seconds when it durates five seconds, 
and perceives one second when it durates one second. But 
according to this, one thing above all else must be care- 
fully noted, perception or perception of time duration is 
always a process and never a state ; a certain definite time is 
a certain definite process. We can no more discover an ex- 
planation of our perception of the duration of five seconds 
alone in some mysterious momentary mental arrangement or 
11 temporal sign,' 7 or other instantaneous characteristic, than 
we can discover redness in blueness ; for us to perceive blue, 
there must be blue ; for us to perceive duration, something 
must durate ; for us to perceive a definite blue, there must be 
a definite blue ; for us to perceive five seconds, something 
must durate five seconds ; for us really to perceive a year, 
some definite sensation would have to durate a year. What 
takes place when we say we have an idea of a year is another 
matter which we shall discuss in its place. 

So also of series of sensations. That series occur at all is 
an ultimate fact or datum. What actually occurs when a se- 
ries occurs we shall call a perception of a series. And in the 
same way as we can never perceive a half- second except 
something durate a half- second, so we can never perceive a 
series of five half seconds with intervals of half seconds be- 
tween the terms, unless such a series occurs. When it occurs 
its entire occurrence will constitute its perception. Actually 



116 NICHOLS : 

to perceive such a series a year long, such a series would act- 
ually have to occur throughout a full year. What takes place 
when we have an idea of such a series we shall also discuss 
in its turn. 

Neglecting for the present any consideration of the corre- 
lation between them, or of any perception of such a correla- 
tion, all that we have said regarding sensations applies as 
well to images or reproduced sensations ; really to imagine 
five seconds, some image must last five seconds ; fully to im- 
agine a thousand clock-ticks, a thousand clock-tick images 
must pass through the mind. So also, fully to remember a 
thousand second-beats, a thousand second-beat images must 
pass in full mental review. 

And as of pains, and clock-ticks, and second-beats, so of 
all other mental content whatsoever and however disparate. 
Mental process is mental perception ; every definite or certain 
process or procession is a definite and certain perception ; and 
every definite perception is also a definite time perception. 
Tet we must not forget that according to the nomenclature 
we are now using, perception is not apperception, and a def- 
inite time perception is by no means an apperception of a def- 
inite time ; this we shall come to later. 

What we have said of perception applies as well to mem- 
ory. But when we say we remember an occurrence, we sel- 
dom, and indeed never, except the occurrence is short, simple 
and of recent happening, remember it as accurately and fully 
as it actually transpired. That is, in its re-presentation in 
memory, some of the items drop out of the process, or rather 
fail to drop into it ; and the remainder stand unsuspected for 
the former whole — do so for the very reason that the former 
whole now is not, nor can be suspected at all, except in and 
through so much as is re-presented. I may have spent the 
whole of yesterday listening to the second beats of a clock, 
yet I may quickly remember that I did so, without the entire 
day and each tick repeating itself in full or in any instanta- 
neous miniature of fullness in that quick remembrance. But in 
this quick remembrance, it is probable the entire mental pro- 
cession of the previous day was re-presented alone by some 
momentary flash-picture, as it were, of myself as I was seated 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 117 

at some particularly striking moment of yesterday, listening 
to the clock ; perhaps this flash-picture or remembrance 
lasted long enough to take in no more than two repre- 
sented ticks of the clock ; perhaps to take in but one ; or it 
may be that all the image-ticks were left out entirely and 
only the word ' < tick " or " clock ' ' occupied their place in 
the quick remembrance ; for such, it seems quite certain, is the 
nature of much of our thinking. If that in the above quick 
remembrance which occupies the place of, stands for, in- 
dicates, or symbolizes the original series be named the idea 
of that series, then the idea of that series is not a full repre- 
sentation of that series in any way. And it is plain also that 
we have in such an idea no such occurrence as that described 
by Herbart, or Mr. Ward, or any of those who conceive that 
an idea of a series, or of succession, or of time, must be some 
sort of instantaneously painted picture presenting the whole 
length of the time or of the series in a simultaneous perspec- 
tive. Indeed if needed at all, there would seem fco be needed 
as much such an instantaneous sidewise view of the duration 
of the simplest sensation and of the briefest part of time in 
order to perceive that it durate at all, as to perceive that it 
durates for, say, five seconds. The classic question therefore 
whether the idea of succession is or is not a succession of 
ideas, in so far as the question is one as to whether the idea is 
a longitudinally passing process, or a sidewise presented state, 
may as well be fought out with reference to the nature of any 
original sensation and for the briefest temporal portion of it, 
as with reference to any train or series of such sensations. 
Whether a sensation, an image, or a series of such, it does not 
matter ; the pertinent question is, do we perceive the length 
of any duration, however long, by the process of that duration 
itself, or by some non-processional representative state? The 
chief arguments or suggestions I have been able to formulate 
or to find formulated for the 1 1 state ' ' theory, all root, it 
seems to me, in the delusive catch-phrase, ' ' We can not now 
perceive something that is really past, therefore our percep- 
tion of past must be & present perception, i. e. a state." But 
this phrase is a series of verbal mis-statements and bad logic 
from beginning to end ; we do not " now'''' perceive this some- 



118 NICHOLS : 

thing, whatever it is, but so far as I can discover we ' ' now- 
now-now-now ' ' perceive it ; we do not stand still and look 
along the line to measure this past in a perspective view, but 
run along the line as it were (a new line representing the old) 
to measure it inch by inch, or present by present, by a moving 
process over again ; nor is this something that we re- measure 
a " really past," nor in the absolute sense do we re-measure 
at all ; but the l ' really past ' ' and the original measuring 
both gone forever, a new representation of the gone past and 
a new measuring of the new representation happen "brand- 
new ; " happen in original representation of them, though not 
in -^^-presentation of them. All this being so, our phrase 
carried out in good logic should read " We can not l now ' per- 
ceive something that is really past, therefore our ' perception 
of past' must not be a present perception, i. e. must be a pro- 
cess. On the other hand, the evidence for the opposite or ' l pro 
cess" explanation seems to me consistent and even positive. 
I think that every one who will observe his own mental pro 
cess when he seeks to measure or to realize the length of any 
durating sensation or its representation in memory, will easily 
observe that he never fully perceives or remembers the 
length instantly or even approximately so ; unless, of course, 
the duration is itself instantaneous or approximately so. On 
the other hand I think any one will easily convince himself that 
fully to perceive or to remember the length of its representa- 
tions, these representations must stretch themselves out 
through an equal process and lapse of time as did their orig- 
inal occurrence. ' Quick ideas ' of the nature described above 
may delusively flash upon us with approximate instantaneous - 
ness, but never a full and complete idea, and the time occu- 
pied by the idea will be proportional to its completeness. 

Another evidence in favor of the process and against the 
" state" explanation lies, we think, in the following facts. 
The items of a long series, say the detailed events of a past 
hour, never are fully represented to us. It is easy to account 
for this according to the process theory ; many of these de- 
tails fail to reappear, and as the serial reappearance of those 
which do reappear is our sole suspicion of their presence, or 
of their order of appearance past or present, so of those which 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 119 

fail to appear, we at the time have no suspicion of their ab- 
sence or of the fact that they ever existed. At some other 
time we may remember further details, and also remember 
this abbreviated memory, and so become aware that we have 
dropped items from the latter. But according to the " state " 
theory, it is difficult to conceive why those causes which give 
the proper perspective to any part of a series where no items 
are gone, should not give the proper perspective to those 
items which do appear in a series when some items do not ap- 
pear, and why such a perspective state would not have much 
such an aspect as the perspective of a picket-fence where 
some of the pickets are on and some off. Nor must we im- 
agine such a conscious running-over of yesterday's incidents, 
as one in which we skip or jump from one incident to the other 
and almost feel the shocks occasioned by gaping items, to be 
just such a broken-fence perspective as we above describe. 
Surely such a series of shocks are a process and not a simul- 
taneous state, even if we are conscious of the gaps ; but how 
we come to be conscious of the gaps in this running perspec- 
tive, is a complex question entirely separate from the one un- 
der present consideration, and one we shall hope to throw 
light upon later. That we do not have simultaneous picket- 
fence perspective with pickets visibly off, that is with perspec- 
tive gaps belonging to lost items, is quite evident in our at- 
tempts to recall the precise number of ticks in a given series 
just heard ; where as those who have had much experience 
must observe, they frequently with confidence think they 
recall the whole series perfectly and with no consciousness 
of gaps, though there are gaps. 

We are inclined to conclude therefore that by the same pro- 
cess that we perceive the duration of any smallest part of any 
single sensation, by precisely the same nature of process we 
perceive the duration of any sensation however long and of 
any series however long ; that the duration of the sensation 
or series, the perception of the duration, and the perception 
of the length of the duration are one and identical ; that the 
duration is an ultimate datum, and no more capable or need- 
ful of other explanation or of further analysis than the blue- 
ness of a blue spot. 



120 NICHOLS : 

But perception of the length of a sensation, the appercep- 
tion of its length, and the perception and apperception of its 
length as measured by some other sensation, are different 
matters altogether, as also are so-called perceptions of past, 
present, and future, and of other definite time relations, and 
of dates ; all of which we must now consider. 

More often than otherwise those definite sensations which 
come through the focus of the eye are those which determine 
the immediately following ideas ; with great frequency these 
sensations definitely persist long enough to associate for 
some time with the ideas which they call up. With less fre- 
quency the definite sensations of hearing, touch, smell, and 
so on down the scale, determine the immediately following as- 
sociations. Frequently very obscure sensations such as a red 
spot at the very edge of the field of vision, or the temperature 
of our teeth direct the association. Or perhaps as often as 
otherwise the particular mental group which determines the 
association is not a sensation or procession of sensations, but a 
definite group of images or procession of images which we may- 
call an idea. Whatever group it is that determines the succeed- 
ing association, that group we say occupies the focus of atten- 
tion, the terminology being evidently derived from the fact that 
the focus of vision is so frequently also the focus of appercep- 
tion. Apperception is complete association ; the object of asso- 
ciation is always the object of apperception, and the object of 
attention. The focus and the object are always identical. 
When we apperceive anything we couple it with its most 
usual associations, that is, memories of its own attributes, 
qualities, and characteristics. This kind of association is ap- 
perception. Time is apperceived when any process of dura- 
tion occupies the focus of attention, is the object of associa- 
tion, and calls up durative associations ; that is, memories 
whose characteristics are particularly of the duration quality 
or nature. 

We must with greatest care distinguish oetween perceiv- 
ing time and apperceiving time relation. 

Perceptions of relation are commonly supposed to be in- 
volved in the very core of the indissoluble mystery of the 
unity of the mind. We are deeply aware of the importance 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 121 

of the subject, yet we have been driven to suspect that the 
secret of perceived relations is to be found in that they are 
associative processes of the apperceptive degree or nature 
and not simultaneous states. This subject is not our main 
question and we shall discuss it but in so far as is necessary 
for our explanation of time relations. If two tones precisely 
alike in quality, intensity, and length, begin precisely together 
and end together, no relation will be perceived between them. 
If one begins perceptibly before the other, relations will ap- 
pear. Without some qualitative or some intensive change 
there can be no temporal relation. The occurrence of the 
change in the qualitative or intensive nature of the perception 
is the perception of the relation ; and in the same way as it is 
not some necessary sidewise simultaneous perspective that 
constitutes perception of homogeneous duration, but the ever 
flowing attribute of duration itself, therefore we suspect, that 
every perception of temporal relation is fundamentally the 
actual procession of one term of definite quality or intensity 
followed without gap by another term of different quality or 
intensity ; that actually to perceive any definite time relation 
or change, such must actually transpire ; andfully to imagine 
or to remember such, the corresponding representation of it 
must again pass through the mind in full review. Without 
qualitative or intensive change no series could occur ; such 
change is the essential characteristic of a series ; the change 
makes the series. Fully to perceive the relations of the terms 
of a series the full series must be experienced either in orig- 
inal occurrence or in representation. To perceive that ABO 
D occurs in the relations a b c d it must occur in these rela- 
tions. To perceive that B is after A, A must happen, then B. 
To perceive that A is before D, A must happen before D. 
To apperceive these relations is something quite different. 
To perceive that D is present and that ABC are gone, A B 
C must come and go and D must come ; the apperceiving of 
the presence of D, or of the goneness of A B C, or of the rela- 
tion of the presence of D to the goneness of A are other mat- 
ters that need much elucidation. 

To apperceive D it must occur, stand in the focus of the 
mind and call up images representing its qualities and usual 



122 NICHOLS : 

associations ; to apperceive it as present, it must call up the 
idea ' present ' ; the apperceived relation of D to the Present 
is the occurrence of D followed by some idea of ' ' the Present. ' 7 
For us to understand this relation we must understand ' < the 
idea of the Present." The word " present" is one that we as- 
sociate with the continued presence of any mental content, 
or more strictly speaking with the durative procession of that 
content through the mind ; thus we can associate the word 
with a passing image as well as with a passing sensation ; 
but most commonly the word Present associates itself with 
the bodily group of sensations which we call self and with the 
environmental sensations which happen to be present at the 
moment that we are so apperceiving l the Present. ' Thus 
when we apperceive D as present the process that nearly al- 
ways occurs is something as follows : first D itself, then the 
word " present, " then some durating procession, most prob- 
ably some sensation procession of our body or our surround- 
ings at the particular moment. The length of this last asso- 
ciated durative procession is variable ; in quick apperceiving, 
as in quick remembering it may be little more than the word 
1 present ' alone ; or it may be the quick flash of some mental 
duration even without the word ' ' present. ' ' 

But while on this subject we must not let words confuse 
several distinct data. Strictly the perceived Present is the 
content of any perception at the time of its occurrence ; is 
that occurrence itself. Similarly the apperceived Present is 
the occurring object of apperception ; that which directs the 
association. But to apperceive the Present that is, to apper- 
ceive the mental content actually occurring as the Present, 
that is again to perceive its relation to the Present, this occur- 
ring content must call up, and be associated with, the idea 
1 ' Present ' ' ; that is very likely with the word * * present ' ' fol- 
lowed by some durating procession very probable to be a con- 
tinuation of the surrounding stream which was the object of 
apperception from the beginning ; in other words the apper- 
ception of the Present as the Present is usually but a sustain- 
ed association of the word " present" with the progressive 
flow of the sensations within us or from around us. The 
change which reveals the relation, that is, the change which 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 123 

constitutes the relation, in so far as a relation is a psychologi- 
cal occurrence, is the change occasioned by the dawning 
appearance of the associated idea. 

So much for the Present, for apperceiving the Present as the 
Present, and for apperceiving D as present ; now for the 
1 goneness ' of A, B or C — the Past. Strictly speaking, men- 
tal content has no Past and no Future; they are only whi]e 
they are, and their existence is like a mathematically moving 
point, or speaking of the total content, is like a plane moving 
at right angles to itself. What then is this moving proces- 
sion by which, as we say, we have knowledge of the Past? 

From what we have discovered regarding Present, we may 
suspect that perception of Past, perception of past relation 
or relationship, apperception of Past, and apperception of 
past relationship are all different matters. As the existence 
of any temporal portion of any mental content constitutes a 
perception of Present, so the cessation of its existence, consti- 
tutes a perception of Past. In order to perceive Past, some 
sensation or image must cease ; whenever any such ceases, we 
perceive Past ; the ceasing of the perception is the perception 
of Past ; did no perception ever cease we should never per- 
ceive or know anything whatever regarding Past, or past- 
ness, or about the Past. 

To have a perception of past relation, a relation, that is, as 
we have explained, a change, must occur. To perceive a tem- 
poral relation between A and B, B must be different from A, 
and to perceive the relationship the relationship must occur ; 
and we shall perceive whatever occurs, and we shall perceive 
it as it occurs, while it occurs, and in its occurrence ; and we 
shall only perceive what occurs and while it occurs, and in its 
occurrence. To perceive A before B, A must occur and B 
succeed. To perceive B after A, A must occur and B succeed. 
The perceptions of the relation, A before B and B after A, are 
identical because the relationship A before B is the relation- 
ship B after A. The apperceptions described by these two 
phrases we shall discover may be quite different. 

For an apperception of Past, the cessation of some sensa- 
tion or image must call up some idea of Past, of something 
ceasing ; striking or familiar examples, those which most for- 



124 NICHOLS : 

cibly impress memory, are those most likely to be called up ; 
yet the least possible flitting perception of something ceas- 
ing would suffice for the associated idea ; or even merely 
some word, sucji as " past," " gone," etc. 

When we come to apperception of past relationships, we 
arrive upon confusing and difficult ground ; not because the 
essential and typical process is different from all other apper- 
ception, but because the associated ideas are so varied in 
number and kind, and our uses of language so loose and delu- 
sive. First we must note that an apperception of Past is not 
an apperception of past relationship. For example, A may 
occupy the focus of attention and its cessation call up asso- 
ciations of ideas of pastness. In this case B did not occur at 
all, and in the associations brought up, the pictures are of 
single terms ceasing. This is apperception of Past. But to 
apperceive any temporal relation A B, the change A B must 
occupy the focus of attention and its occurrence call up by 
association some idea of relation ; that is, some mental pict- 
ure of change, some a followed by some b. 

Our space will not allow us to analyse all the apperceptions 
of temporal relationships of past, nor is it necessary to do so ; 
a few important types will give the key to all. Perhaps the most 
crucial in the whole time problem is that which takes place, 
when, as we say, we perceive that something is of the Past ; 
a moment ago I knocked on my table so hard that it hurt ; 
I heard the knock and then felt the pain. What in my men- 
tal process constitutes this " ago " ? Clearly the " ago " is a 
relationship with some present. But what sort of relation- 
ship? a perceived or an apperceived one? And with what 
present? Is it with " now-now-now-now " ? Or are we to 
speak of some particular " now," that " now " is not "now" 
at all, but as we shall see a mere idea of ' l now. ' ' When I felt 
the pain, I was not thinking about its time relations, that is I 
was not apperceiving such. I did perceive the time relation 
of the sound to the pain ; I did not apperceive it. It is quite 
possible that a representation of that sound may pop into my 
head again immediately after actually hearing a similar 
sound ; I shall then perceive a time relation between that re- 
presentation and that sound, but I shall not necessarily ap- 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 125 

"perceive any time relation between them ; whether I do or 
not will depend on whether the occurrence determines the sub- 
sequent current of association ; and the kind of relation that 
may be apperceived will depend upon the kind of associations 
that are called up. Suppose I do hear a similar sound at 
some future time of my life, and by some favorable condition 
determined by my surroundings or thoughts at that time, a 
representation of the former sound and of all its surroundings 
at its time of occurrence.be by association again brought into 
the focus of apperception ; that having thus sprung into mind 
by association they should then dominate and determine by 
association the next and following course of apperception and 
so on. What takes place here is a present sound like a for- 
mer sound, followed by a representation that is like it and 
also like a former sound, followed in turn by a panoramic re- 
presentation of that certain stretch of my past life that hap- 
pened when I struck the table, heard the original sound, felt 
the pain and so on. Thus far there is in all this no apper- 
ceived "ago," no apperceived time relation, merely this pan- 
oramic representation of the Past is passing through my 
mind ; I have not yet apperceived or, as we say in ordinary 
language, I have not yet recognized that it is the Past ; no least 
thought of the temporal relation of all this panorama nor of 
any part of it, not even of the represented knock, to the Pres- 
ent may have yet occurred to me. What shall we say so long 
as this panorama goes on and no direct time-relation to the 
Present is thought of? Shall we say all this is nothing but 
imagination? This question I think brings us to one of the 
most usual sources of confusion for our entire subject. Usual- 
ly we do call just such panoramas as this memories, and re- 
membrance, whether we do actually stamp their date upon 
them and think their "ago," or their " how long ago " or 
not. The vast majority of the representations of those things 
iriiich have happened but a moment or a few moments before, 
we have no need to date and do not date. The stream of 
thought or apperception into which they rise is not one re- 
garding time relations or time characteristics, or time recog- 
nition. For instance, had I been writing an explanation of 
pain instead of time, the same panorama of the table, my 



126 NICHOLS : 

hand moving toward it, the thump, the pain, would have oc- 
curred as now when I write of time ; but from this point 
instead of a train of associations of time nature being set go- 
ing, a train of pain relations would have been set going ; that 
is I should have apperceived pain and not time. The mere pas- 
sage of past panoramas through the mind in no way consti- 
tutes a recognition that they are of the Past, or of how long 
they are past. Presently I shall show the difference between 
imagination and this sort of undated, unrecognized memory ; 
we are now examining dated memories, and we wish to know 
in what this dating consists over and above the mere passing 
picture. From what we have discovered, this should be com- 
paratively well understood. First regarding the knock we 
may merely think of it past, without bringing in the Present 
or any particular time relation ; that is we may merely apper- 
ceive it past : in this case its image or representation will 
merely bring up in apperceptive process, ideas of Past: the 
image of the thump will cease and ceasing images will follow ; 
perhaps the representation of the knock will continue to 
occupy the centre of the stage for some time, will continually 
go through the process of ceasing and of setting associated 
images to ceasing ; and for the time the whole play will be a 
regular variety performance of ceasing, while we may or may 
not be saying all the time or repeating all the while to our- 
selves the words l past, past, past '; or ' thump past,' ' thump- 
past ' ; or if we had been less engrossed with the particular per- 
formers, any portion of it might have sufficed ; a single " tum- 
ble ' ' or cessation of the first comedian Thump himself, fol- 
lowed by a tumble or two of the associated company; or if even 
less engrossed, a mere glimpse of Thump followed by the word 
"past " would have completed the theatrical bill. This is the 
simplest form of apperception of the relation Past; the 
change is that from the ceasing thump representation, to the 
associated ceasing representations ; the pastness lies in the 
relational change to the associated idea of ceasing, and this 
idea is composed of the associated ceasing representations. 

Next we may apperceive that the thump happened before 
the pain ; here l Thump then Pain,' ' Thump then Pain ' will 
be the chief theatrical performance, in imitation of the origi- 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 127 

nal actual occurrence ; if we are not in a critical mood this 
pantomime may suffice even without the word i l before ' ' ; 
the repetition of the main performance may constitute the 
idea ; or if we are more reflective and exacting, the whole 
company may be called out, and the whole stage be set 
whirling with mimic and peek-a-boo representations of 
'beforeness.' 

The u show," for apperception of the fact that the pain hap- 
pened after the thump, would differ little from the last above. 
Pain here would come on to the stage first, making the bow, as 
it were, that introduces the " show," instead of Thump, as pre- 
viously, and he will probably make an extra bow between 
each alternating bout between him and Thump, just to make 
sure that we keep our eye mainly on him ; and every time he 
makes such a bow he (or we) will say " after," or to speak 
more soberly, the word u after" will say itself by asso- 
ciation, instead of the word " before " saying itself. 

The play by which this Thump -Pain representation is apper- 
ceived, i. e. thought of in relation to the moving Present, may 
now be easily understood ; we here no longer look alone at 
the stage, but we take in the whole view around us, from our 
body outward and, as well, from our body inward. Thump- 
Pain are the chief actors on the inner stage as before; they 
are the first objects of apperception from which the course of 
thoughts wanders momentarily down among the audience, 
that is to our actual ' now-now-now ' surroundings, and in- 
ward to our own bodily sensations and even to attention to our 
own thoughts ; but now and anon our focus of attention flits 
back from these actual Presents to the show 'Thump-Pain,' 
again viewed on the mimic stage of memory. And as we have 
said of simple apperception of Past, so of this process of apper- 
ception of l having happened before the Present.' Here the 
play may be longer or shorter according as we are more or less 
reflective ; a twinge of neuralgia may suffice for the moving 
Present, with or even without the word ' ' present " or " now ' ' ; 
and a single bow from Thump or Pain, that is a single memory 
image of these may suffice for their remembrance, or there 
may follow a full apperception of l Thump-Pain past,' that is 
of the ceasing of the thump and of the pain, as described 
above. 



128 NICHOLS : 

We have now described what takes place when, as we 
say, we think of a thing or event as past, and when, 
as we say, we think of something as of the Past ; that 
is, past with reference to the moving present. But 
particular time- relations, such as yesterday, last week, a year 
ago, ten minutes since, remain to be discussed. But as this 
brings up the subject of measured time, let us postpone these 
for a word concerning so-called perceptions of Future. As the 
fundamental sign of every idea of Present is the continuation, 
and that of every idea of Past is the cessation of some represent- 
ing image, so the fundamental sign or characteristic of every 
idea of the Future is the beginning of the representing asso- 
ciated images. When I think of the Future of things, I think 
of them as beginning. As I go over a familiar way, memories 
of the path ahead of me beyond my view keep rising in my 
mind and constitute the foundation of expectation. If I ap- 
perceive these expectations, as expectations, the associations 
are those of the act of expectation, plus the panoramas of the 
path. In this case, I enter into the ' l show, ' ' the whole moving 
action of my bodily feelings while I sit here or walk there and 
expect ; that is, certain holdings of the head, wrinkling of the 
brows, laying my finger to my chin, or the like ; meanwhile 
the stage show goes on, the performances now being emphati- 
cally those of the "beginning" nature or plot, together with 
little mimic side pantomimes of myself in the acts and experi- 
ences of expecting ; also the orchestra plays i l future ' ' 
" future" the while, or anon, plays " expectation" " expecta- 
tion," and the panorama of the path ahead of me moves on in 
ever beginning glimpses. Apperception of Future, and ap- 
perception of the future, are similar to the apperception of 
expectation, and, I think, need no further explanation than 
may be derived from the above. 

But how do we measure time length, and measure "how 
long ago," and "how long until? " When speaking of our 
simple creature capable of but a single constant sensation, we 
said that when his pain lasted five seconds, he perceived the 
length of five seconds, and when it lasted one second, he per- 
ceived the length of one second. We distinctly declared he 
did not apperceive either length, and from what we have said 






THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TEtfE. 129 

of change and relations it is clear that I have not conceived 
that this creature perceived relations of any kind ; neither re- 
lation of difference nor of number. Here we must be most 
careful not to let our customary use of language and our com- 
mon processes of thought designated by common language, 
confuse us as to the actual elementary processes of mind which 
we never experience singly, and for which consequently we 
have no common or definite designations ; and, what is more 
usual, have no definite or apperceived conceptions. Until 
some one opened our understanding to the matter, we went on 
deludedly imagining that we saw distance through rod-and- 
cone processes, the same as we did bluer, ess ; now we discover 
that what we call seeing distance is chiefly not seeing at all. 
It is probably the same with all the ultimate elements of 
sensation ; Prof. Wundt reminds us that we never experience 
them singly, and so with great difficulty arrive at any concep- 
tion of what each or any one element singly of itself is like, or 
what its various attributes are like. We should be prepared 
therefore to comprehend, since apperception of length and of 
number is not perception of length or of number, and again 
since perception of difference of length, and difference of 
number, (these all involving changes and relations) are not 
mere plain perception of length and perception of number, we 
should, we repeat, yet be prepared to comprehend that 
perception of five- seconds length is not in ultimate na- 
ture the same as perception of one second length. That 
there is a difference here, we think it comparatively easy 
to demonstrate, though it is quite certain that we do not 
ordinarily apperceive the difference, that is, do not form 
and associate ideas of it with its occurrence. It is prob- 
able, in our ordinary apperceptions of time length, that the 
associated ideas of length, which make up the apperception, 
are those representations or memories of muscular tensions, 
dermal stretchings or joint pullings, which fundamentally are 
the components of our ideas of motion ; consequently has per- 
ception of time been so commonly founded on perception of 
motion, from Aristotle down to present psychology. There is 
little doubt that the intensive changes, which are the charac- 
acteristics of these motion sensations, are the striking and 



130 NICHOLS : 

characteristic components of those associated ideas which enter 
into onr ordinary apperceptions of time length. But we must 
not fail to note that these changes are not the only components 
of these ideas, and that these image processions, and also their 
prototype original processions, are not all change ; there must 
be duration without change in order for duration with change 
to be possible. And in the same way that we continually 
perceive changes different in degree of change, without apper- 
ceiving any difference, so it is probable, and I think certain, 
that we continually perceive durations of different lengths 
without apperceiving their difference. For example, of our 
simple creature I think one should now have no difficulty in 
conceiving how there might and would be a difference between 
his perception of a five- second pain and his subsequent per- 
ception of a one- second pain, and yet this creature never per- 
ceive the difference ; that is, might not have any relational idea 
of such a change, as we might find to constitute the process 
of perceiving or apperceiving difference. 

Prepared, therefore, not to confound actual difference with 
perception of difference, let us examine these matters more 
closely. We found that duration and change are ulti- 
mate data ; we shall also discover that differences of duration 
are also ultimate facts. We shall never discover why ulti- 
mately these differences are differences, but given these dif- 
ferences, we shall discover, I think, how we come to perceive, 
and finally to apperceive, these differences, and in what these 
processes consist. Carefully considering the matter in the 
light of the experiments reported in Chapter III, I have been 
led to suspect that this perception and apperception of dura- 
tive differences may rise in two ways, which, for convenience, 
I shall here designate as the single method, and as the multi- 
ple method. These experiments emphasized the fact long be- 
fore determined, that our so-called memory images are depend- 
ent upon certain reproductive habit processes of our nervous 
and bodily organism. Were it not for these " habits " we 
should have no memory. My experiments emphasized the 
degree to which the validity of correlation between these so- 
called memories and their originals, depends upon the validity 
of these organic habit processes. If the habit is not accurate, 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TME. 131 

the memory will not be faithful, although ive shall not have the 
least suspicion that it is not faithful. The truth is, the 
memory may be altogether different in temporal length from 
the original temporal length without our perceiving or recog- 
nizing their difference, or suspecting anything about such a 
difference whatever. Nothing can bring out more clearly than 
this, that actual difference does not constitute recognition of 
difference, and that perception and apperception and recogni- 
tion of difference are all some sort of processes quite different 
from and additional to mere actual difference of occurrence. 
To apperceive these differences, they must, by association, bring 
up certain qualitative ideas and ideas of difference. 

We do not yet know positively the particular portion of the 
brain organism, whose rhythmic reiterative habits are chiefly 
responsible for memory ; it is sufficient, however, for our pres- 
ent purposes that it is some particular portion of nerve organ- 
ization, which, for convenience, I shall here designate in ac- 
cordance with present probabilities, as the central nerve cells. 
My experiments demonstrate that when these cells functionate 
with reiterative temporal accuracy, our time judgments tire 
accurate, and as their habit varies or is disturbed, our judg- 
ments vary correspondingly. We have also to observe how 
frequency and lateness of original occurrence form and 
influence this iterative habit. We have then to note, that 
immediately after the occurrence of a definite sensation, 
which previously has been frequently repeated, say the tick 
of a metronome, two forces, or to speak more accurately, the 
tendencies of two processes, are contending against each other 
in the production of the succeeding memories ; and, indeed, as 
well in the production of the succeeding sensations themselves. 
The cells, both those which functionate the memories and 
those which functionate the tick sensation, (be they the same 
or not, we do not know) tend on the one hand to follow the 
rhythm to which they have previously been trained, tuned or 
accustomed, and on the other hand, to adopt a new rhythm in 
correspondence to the rythmic impulse then and there received 
from the metronome. Not only, therefore, is the result likely 
to be ever a compromise between the two, and our sensations 
at different times and under various conditions, likely to vary 



132 NICHOLS : 

from the actual metronome rhythm and from each other, but 
quite possibly another result of more peculiar nature may alsa 
happen from and during this contention of tendencies. For 
instance, suppose the metronome to be beating quarter sec- 
onds and the cells to have been tuned or adjusted by preced- 
ing practice according to the method of our experiments to sec- 
ond beats. Plainly by the law of association and habit, the 
first stroke of the metronome sets going the tendency of the 
cells to perform their second-beat representations ; and conse- 
quently the impulses sent in from the succeeding second, third 
and fourth beats of the metronome will find the cells in a dif- 
ferent condition than did the first beat. Precisely what would 
be the nature of the result of this contention or disturbance of 
the regular order of things, or what the difference between this 
and the case where the old habits of the cells should be entirely 
overcome by the new influence, or where the cells from the be- 
ginning were accurately adjusted to the beat coming from the 
metronome, is difficult to say. It is well to note, however, 
that this condition of contention between new and old influ- 
ences or habits is the usual condition rather than the excep- 
tion ; and that any peculiarity of sensation or feeling which 
should result, as is very likely to result from such a struggle, 
might be a very important factor in time measurement. Not 
that such a peculiarity or temporal sign would of itself alone 
constitute apperception of time length, but reproduced rep- 
resentations, or repetitions of these different temporal signs 
among the associations constituting the apperceptive after- 
train of ideas called up by actual time differences, may be 
definite and determining data in such apperceptions of differ- 
ent time lengths. And in consequence of these contentions 
also, and of apperceptions which they determine, it is quite 
possible that in the original occurrence of familiar sensations 
we may have indefinite cognizance of ' * too short " or il too 
long " without definite memory or apperception of that in re- 
lation to which it is short or long ; it is quite possible that 
these definite memories sometimes are and sometimes are not 
then called up by these apperceived signs. In short, during the 
original occurrence of a series we may, as it were, apperceive 
a general abstract definiteness of length or of time difference or 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 133 

relation, without its being followed by concrete definiteness ; 
that is, we may apperceive that it is definite without apper- 
ceiving its full definiteness, for such subtle tricks are, by no 
means, psychically uncommon. Should that which we have 
tried to describe be true, those theories which have sought to 
explain time relations and time perceptions by " temporal 
signs " ora disparate sense would have herein some founda- 
tion of analogy. 

But more frequently perhaps are the rudiments of time 
measurements to be discovered in a method different from the 
above. Should an image occur simultaneously with its cor- 
responding sensation, the two beginning and ending precisely 
together, this equality of their length, would, in accordance 
with our foregoing nomenclature, constitute the perception of 
their equal length. Without fuller description, we may under- 
stand how by association this perception would rise to apper- 
ception, and thence to apperception of their temporal equality. 
Similarly, if the image and sensation were of unequal length, 
we may comprehend how this would rise to apperception of 
their inequality. Again, if equal temporal series of simul- 
taneous sensations and memories, or yet again, unequal tem- 
poral series of such, occur, we may also prefigure how these 
get apperceived, and what will constitute the nature of such 
apperceptive processes. But before we speak finally of such 
processes, a word must be said as to apperception of number r 
in order fully to elucidate how we apperceive a sensation to 
denote so many units, or to be so many times longer than 
another. 

For four sensations to be perceived, four sensations must 
occur ; for these to be apperceived, the idea of four, i. e., the 
word "four," or some four image reproductions, or both the 
word and the four reproductions must be added in proper ap- 
perceptive process thereto. So of any other number of sensa- 
tions or images. This is the key to the simple apperception 
of number. A sensation, four seconds long, may occur suc- 
ceeded by four different sensations, each one second long ; by 
our first method of measuring time length, combined with the 
apperceptive process of number, we may understand how we 
arrive at an apperception of one sensation being four times the 
length of another. Or a sensation four seconds long may occur 

10 



134 NICHOLS : 

simultaneously with four sensations, each one second long; 
and so by the second method of time measurement, combined 
with the apperceptive process of number, these would rise to 
apperception of the one as four times the length of the other. 
And so on with other multiple number-measurings. 

Before leaving finally this subject of habit rhythm and time 
measurement, a word more regarding those theories which have 
found in our main unconscious bodily rhythms, such as breath- 
ing, pulse-beat, and leg-swing, standard rhythmic measures of 
o ur time j udgments . We have pointed out as obj ections to these 
theories, that we have no reason to conceive why one such 
unconscious process should dominate as a standard more than 
any other ; yet for all to contribute such unconscious distur- 
bances would, indeed, so we must think, lead rather to indis- 
criminate confusion, than to standard discrimination ; such 
views, moreover, run quite contrary to the selective advan- 
tages of unconscious reflex actions, which, by relieving con- 
sciousness of all such disturbing vital processes, have made 
our conscious processes distinct and intelligible. Also we 
have mentioned that, according to the theories of breathing 
standards and the like, it would seem that we ought to have a 
more lively and accurate conception of the definite length of 
such processes as breathing than of any other duration lengths 
or rhythms, while, as a notorious fact, we do not ; but rather 
those rhythms which we most customarily hear are those which 
most vividly rise up with accuracy and as standards. This 
brings us to the point on which we wish to lay further 
emphasis ; and for this we would note that the particular 
function, to which our conscious centres seem to be differ- 
entiated in contradistinction from the reflex unconscious cen- 
tres upon which our vital processes depend, lies in just their 
power and tendency to adapt themselves to the multitudinously 
time varied outer impulses to which consciousness is to cor- 
respond, and whose purpose it is to represent; their very 
peculiarity consists in differentiation to outward susceptibility 
rather than like the unconscious reflex vital nerve centres to a 
particular inward rhythm approximately undisturbed by outer 
influences. Nor must the fact shown by our experiments, that 
unusual frequency of repetition by the conscious cells of im- 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 135 

pulses received from without tends to perpetuate such 
particular time rhythms or habits to the temporary 
detriment of accurate judgments of other rhythms or time 
lengths received from without, be counted against this view, 
but rather for it ; for if there were no tendency for these con- 
scious cells accurately top reserve their habit of repeating the 
occurrences from the outside, which were their original proto- 
types, there would never be any accurate time memories or 
images of our sensations at all, in fact, no rational memory 
whatever. The whole cerebral and central nervous organism 
seems a happy adjustment of fixity of habit, not too fixed, and 
susceptibility, not too susceptible. There would seem reason 
from a priori grounds to suspect, therefore, that which from 
observation seems to be the case, that our standards of time- 
measurements are memories of certain most striking rhythm- 
ical, habit- inducing, and oft-occurring outer occurrences, 
such as the particular length of watch or clock ticks, which 
we are most accustomed to hear ; the sounding-hours ; the 
varying lights and shadows of morning, noon and night ; the 
peculiar Sundayness of Sunday and Mondayness of Monday ; 
the varying seasons ; perhaps also as we have surmised vague 
temporal signs or admonitions of passing moments and as well 
of passing years. 

After all the foregoing, it seems unnecessary particularly to 
explain apperception of such time relations as ' \ yesterday, ' ' 
"to-morrow," "last week," "a week hence," "a year ago," 
or ' ' ten minutes ago ; ' ' these terms are but particular words 
associated with particular time occurrences and number meas- 
urements, which rise into more or less extended and definite 
processes of apperception of such relations, according to our 
reflectiveness of mood or passing mental circumstances. 

We have seen that much of our thinking is comprised of 
image- trains representing past occurrences to which we attach 
no date ; which we do not think of or apperceive as of the Past 
at all ; that is, which we do not actually recognize as of the 
Past or as ever having been seen before. We have to repeat 
that in our belief some of the chief confusions of psychology, 
and as well of philosophy, come from commonly mistaking 
this mere passage before us of trains that are correspondent 



136 NICHOLS : 

to former trains for those mental processes which do properly 
constitute psychological recognition. It is curious to note that 
those metaphysicians and psychologists, who most stickle 
against the possibility of any real recognition of any non-psy- 
chical real world, most unsuspiciously build their systems upon 
fancied real recognitions of past sensations in so-called pres- 
ent representations of such. The truth is that in the absolute 
sense we do not any more recognize sensations in their image 
representations than we recognize real things in their sensa- 
tional representations. Until it dawned upon the human mind 
that its former so-called recognitions of an outer world could 
all be explained without the real existence of such a world, no 
one suspected the reality and validity of these recognitions ; 
we now all admit such so-called recognitions to be but psychic 
processes ; the validity of these processes and recognitions is, 
and we think must for a long time be, a subject of debate. We 
here wish only to point out that these parallel recognitions, 
so-called, of former sensations are likewise but psychic pro- 
cesses, the validity of which is as much open to suspicion, as 
inferred and as hypothetical as that of the so-called recognitions 
of a real world, and, indeed, vastly more so ; for how com- 
monly are our most confident memories mistaken, and our 
insane and hypnotic subjects engulfed in hallucination. 

Still more is this truth forced upon us when we comprehend 
the details of these processes of so-called recognition ; when 
we clearly understand the psychological difference between 
imagination and so-called recognition. If every one of us 
through life were but rational every alternate minute and 
insane turn and turn about every other minute, there would 
be no difference between imagination and reality. The grounds 
for our present belief in some real difference lies in the con- 
stancy of our belief itself, and when we come to examine into 
it, we find this belief is a hypothesis, an inference, and no 
positive knowledge. But what then are the grounds for this 
hypothesis? Plainly not in any simple direct cognitive act 
or state. We have sure reason to believe that our ordinary 
so-called perception of time relation is not a peculiar disparate 
state, but an apperceptive process; and similar analysis, I 
think, discloses to us that recognition is a similar appercep- 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 137 

tive process, and that imagination is still another such a pro- 
cess. The difference between imagination and recognition lies 
first in a marked difference in the character of the thoughts 
which form the objective process of the apperceptions, that is, 
to which the associated ideas are added in the two cases ; and, 
secondly, in the character of these added or associated ideas 
or processes. And as it is the nature of apperceived associa- 
tions to be of like character to the objects of apperception, we 
shall find that the difference between the associated ideas in 
our two cases corresponds in characteristics to the original 
difference between the objective processes themselves. What 
then is this fundamental difference between imagination and 
reality? We can only answer with an hypothesis, and this 
hypothesis is, that all things do occur in a fixed order, that all 
occurrence is a fixed order; that not all this occurrence is 
perceived by us ; that certain of the total occurrences of the 
universe result in fixed and definite influences upon our brain 
organism ; that like causes produce like results ; that like 
stimulations produce like sensations ; that like series of stimu- 
lations are followed by like series of sensations ; that these 
physical stimulations are alike and these corresponding sensa- 
tions are alike, though the mere occurrence of their likeness 
by no means constitutes our recognition of this likeness ; that 
owing to the peculiar nature of our physical organism and 
particularly of our central nervous organism, whereby physi- 
cal processes tend to repeat themselves, certain representa- 
tions or repetitions of sensations corresponding to these pro- 
cesses in certain characteristics do tend to occur whenever these 
physical processes do repeat themselves ; that the accuracy 
and scope of complexity of temporal correspondence between 
these representative processes and their originals depends 
entirely upon the habit validity of these physical reiterative 
processes ; that our recognition of this validity and cor- 
respondence does not consist in some super-added cognitive 
act over and above those psychic processes which correspond 
to these reiterated physical processes, but is entirely depend- 
ent upon, and to be explained by, a hypothetically actual cor- 
respondence or likeness of these reiterative processes, bothphy- 



138 NICHOLS : 

sical and psychical, to former processes, physical and psychi- 
cal; finally, and again, that not even the mere validity of this 
correspondence alone comprises " recognition," but that 
recognition is a psychological process, the validity of which 
rests upon the validity of such correspondence. Our hypoth- 
esis is that the events of our lives do happen in a single 
definite actual order, which so impresses itself upon our 
memory organism, that by proper associative incitement, this 
order tends actually to be repeated. It is true that this same 
memory organism, lacking these major associative incitements, 
forms secondary associations, and these tertiary, and so on 
almost to infinity ; and in proportion to the frequency in which 
these minor associations occur, and in proportion to their 
kinship to original occurrences, do they also tend to rise in 
association processes. These minor and less constant associa- 
tions are the basis of imagination ; " imagination " is a word 
which we associate with these inconstant flights of association ; 
" reality," " actual," are words we associate with the main 
constantly reappearing stream of association. The funda- 
mental difference between imagination and recognition lies in 
the fact that the iterative habit of our nervous organism is so 
susceptible to original outer influences and so accurate and per- 
sistent in repeating these, that they ever do remain a com- 
paratively unbroken series in representation, while those 
series which happen not by any outward actual order of 
incitement, but by secondary associations of portions of those 
primary series, do not persist in like unbroken representation. 
If, by any chance, a new link can be fastened into the original 
or actual memory order with the same associative firmness 
and strength as an actual occurrence would have been, then 
such will actually appear to be recognized as actually having 
occurred and psychologically will be so " recognized." Liars 
who frequently, actively and consistently enough practice 
their imaginary associations, do eventually arrive at such 
psychological " recognitions •; " all of us at times suffer such 
hallucinatory remembrances, and actually believe we did so, or 
so, or that such and such happened, when, actually, they did 
not ; and the hallucinations of the insane and the hypnotic are 



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME. 139 

confirmative of our hypothesis. Imagination is inconstant 
memory ; remembrance is constant memory. As we have said 
both these processes commonly go on without conscious recog- 
nition of the fact that we are imagining or are recognizing. 
When these last processes occur, simply the bodily act rises 
to the focus of apperception; and in apperceiving the " act of 
imagination," imaginative ideas, that is, inconstant memories 
are called up and flit before the mind ; while in apperception 
of the " act of recognition," portions of the constant train of 
memory are called up to constitute the apperceptive associa- 
tion. 

Let us summarize the foregoing : Our simple creature re- 
ceived series of like sensations, but he did not recognize them 
to be alike. So we, if incapable of memory, should experience 
often repeated sensations, but should never recognize them to 
be the same. Even, if endowed with memory, we should 
never recognize a constant actual series of life's events, did 
not life's events happen in a single definite order. Our actual 
remembrances are representations which do follow the actual 
order of original events. Our imaginations are representa- 
tions which do not follow the original order. The validity of 
our imaginations and of our recognitions, depend alike and 
absolutely upon the degree of faithfulness with which the 
neural processes which produce them correspond to the neural 
processes which produced the original psychic events. 

Briefly stated, the final result of this protracted investiga- 
tion of the time problem is as follows : 

The general consensus of past and of current opinion is that 
time perception must alone be accounted for within some 
peculiar simultaneous psychic state, and, according to most 
authors, by some peculiar and disparate form of consciousness, 
in addition to our stream of ordinary sensations and their 
representative images. 

The conclusion which we offer is that the processes of our 
environment, of our bodily organism, and of the sensations 
and images which correspond thereto, are, in themselves, 
within the limits of the insoluble mystery of the existence of 



140 NICHOLS : 

any physical or psychical existence at all, a sufficient explana- 
tion of time-psychology, and that time perception cannot be 
explained by any single state or disparate sense, but can alone 
be accounted for as a process. The bearing of the experi- 
ments of Section III upon these conclusions, and of the con- 
clusions upon the experiments is obvious. The author is 
conscious that neither the one nor the other exhausts the topic, 
and will be content if they draw closer attention and study to 
the habit relations between neural and psychic processes. 



Approved as a Thesis for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Psy- 
chology at Clark University. 

G. STANLEY HALL. 

Worcester, Mass., 

Friday, May 1st, 1891. 




^ 


- ~i 


______ 


L_IjI__ 


_____ 


_. _ . ..____ 


' ■' "j 


i ■ ■ -+'- 


T 


U~' + ^-L 


t---±I 


! ^ i i 




■• !••■ f j ! 


1 -1 t ! 


i +T 


tt_H__E 


'i""_L± _|_ 


-■! - hrf-: " - 


r --p-- 




i- — _... - 


HH - - 


=3:4:— -_± 


-±i*5+ 


,* =: t* - 


-_E ! !■ - 




:+±_4^ 


_±4=±# 


r x -f.-_L ... ) 




L.> ^^ 


•7 -[■ ■' 


■].. :_ft 














w®m. 










as 




;■;.. 




■ 

■j 

1 



- 
: i 



THE AMERICAN SCIENCE SERIES. 



The principal objects of the series are to supply the lack — in 
some subjects very great — of authoritative books whose princi- 
ples are, so far as practicable, illustrated by familiar American 
facts, and also to supply the other lack that the advance of Sci- 
ence perennially creates, of text-books which at least do not 
contradict the latest generalizations. The scheme systemati- 
cally outlines the field of Science, as the term is usually em- 
ployed with reference to general education, and includes 
Advanced Courses for maturer college students, Briefer 
Courses for beginners in school or college, and Elementary 
Courses for the youngest classes. The Briefer Courses are not 
mere abridgments of the larger works, but, with perhaps a 
single exception, are much less technical in style and more 
elementary in method. While somewhat narrower in range 
of topics, they give equal emphasis to controlling principles. 
The following books in this series are already published : 

THE HUMAN BODY. By H. Newell Martin, Professor in 

the Johns Hopkins University. 
Advanced Course. 8vo. 655 pp. 

Designed to impart the kind and amount of knowledge every 
educated person should possess of the structure and activities 
and the conditions of healthy working of the human body. 
While intelligible to the general reader, it is accurate and suffi- 
ciently minute in details to meet the requirements of students 
who are not making human anatomy and physiology subjects of 
special advanced study. The regular editions of the book contain 
an appendix on Reproduction and Development. Copies without 
this will be sent when specially ordered. 

From the Chicago Tribune: " The reader who follows him through 
to the end of the book will be better informed on the subject of 
moderfk physiology in its general features than most of the medical 
practitioners who rest on the knowledge gained in comparatively an- 
tiquated text-books, and will, if possessed of average good judgmen\ 
and powers of discrimination, not be in any way confused by statr 
ments of dubious questions or conflicting views." 



2 THE AMERICAN SCIENCE SERIES, 

THE HUMAN BODY.— Continued. 

Briefer Course. i2mo. 364 pp. 

Aims to make the study of this branch of Natural Science a 
source of discipline to the observing and reasoning faculties, 
and not merely to present a set of facts, useful to know, which 
the pupil is to learn by heart, like the multiplication-table. 
With this in view, the author attempts to exhibit, so far as is 
practicable in an elementary treatise, the ascertained facts of 
Physiology as illustrations of, or deductions from, the two car- 
dinal principles by which it, as a department of modern science, 
is controlled, — namely, the doctrine of the " Conservation of 
Energy" and that of the " Physiological Division of Labor. " To 
the same end he also gives simple, practical directions to assist 
the teacher in demonstrating to the class the fundamental facts 
of the science. The book includes a chapter on the action upon 
the body of stimulants and narcotics. 

From Henry Sew all, Professor of Physiology, University of Michi- 
gan : " The number of poor books meant to serve the purpose of 
text-books of physiology for schools is so great that it is well to 
define clearly the needs of such a work: 1. That it shall contain ac- 
curate statements of fact. 2. That its facts shall not be too numer- 
ous, but chosen so that the important truths are recognized in their 
true relations. 3. That the language shall be so lucid as to give no 
excuse for misunderstanding. 4. That the value of the study as a 
discipline to the reasoning faculties shall be continually kept in view. 
I know of no elementary text-book which is the superior, if the 
equal, of Prof. Martin's, as judged by these conditions." 

Elementary Course, nmo. 261 pp. 

A very earnest attempt to present the subject so that children 
may easily understand it, and, whenever possible, to start with 
familiar facts and gradually to lead up to less obvious ones. 
The action on the body of stimulants and narcotics is fully treated. 

From W. S. Perry, Superintendent of Schools, Ann Arbor, Mich.: 
"I find in it the same accuracy of statement and scholarly strength 
that characterize both the larger editions. The large relative space 
given to hygiene is fully in accord with the latest educational opinion 
and practice; while the amount of anatomy and physiology comprised 
in the compact treatment of these divisions is quite enough for the 
most practical knowledge of the subject. The handling of alcohol 
and narcotics is, in my opinion, especially good. The most admira- 
ble feature of the book is its fine adaptation to the capacity of younger 
pupils. The diction is simple and pure, the style clear and direct, and 
the manner of presentation bright and attractive." 



THE AMERICAN SCIENCE SERIES. $ 

ASTRONOMY. By Simon Newcomb, Professor in the Johns 
Hopkins University, and Edward S. Holden, Director of 
the Lick Observatory. 

Advanced Course. 8vo. 512 pp. 

To facilitate its use by students of different grades, the sub- 
ject-matter is divided into two classes, distinguished by the size 
of the type. The portions in large type form a complete course 
for the use of those who desire only such a general knowledge 
of the subject as can be acquired without the application of ad- 
vanced mathematics. The portions in small type comprise ad- 
ditions for the use of those students who either desire a more 
detailed and precise knowledge of the subject, or who intend to 
make astronomy a special study. 

From C. A. Young, Professor in Princeton College : " I conclude 
that it is decidedly superior to anything else in the market on the 
same subject and designed for the same purpose." 

Briefer Course. i2mo. 352 pp. 

Aims to furnish a tolerably complete outline of the as- 
tronomy of to-day, in as elementary a shape as will yield satis- 
factory returns for the learner's time and labor. It has been 
abridged from the larger work, not by compressing the same 
matter into less space, but by omitting the details of practical 
astronomy, thus giving to the descriptive portions a greater 
relative prominence. 

From The Critic: "The book is in refreshing contrast to the 
productions of the professional schoolbook-makers, who, having only 
a superficial knowledge of the matter in hand, gather their material, 
without sense or discrimination, from all sorts of authorities, and 
present as the result an indigesta moles, a mass of crudities, not un- 
mixed with errors. The student of this book may feel secure as to 
the correctness of whatever he finds in it. Facts appear as facts, and 
theories and speculations stand for what they are, and are worth." 

From W. B. Graves, Master Scientific Department of Phillips 
Academy : " I have used the Briefer Course of Astronomy during the 
past year. It is up to the times, the points are put in a way to inter- 
est the student, and the size of the book makes it easy to go over the 
subject in the time allotted by our schedule." 

From HENRY LEFAVOUR. late Teacher of Astronomy, Williston Semi- 
nary : " The impression which I formed upon first examination, that 
it was in very many respects the best elementary text-book on the 
subject, has been confirmed by my experience with it in the class- 
room." 



-4 THE AMERICAN SCIENCE SERIES. 

ZOOLOGY. By A. S. Packard, Professor in Brown Univer- 
sity. 
Advanced Course. 8vo. 719 pp. 

Designed to be used either in the recitation-room or in the 
laboratory. It will serve as a guide to the student who, with a 
desire to get at first-hand a general knowledge of the structure 
of leading types of life, examines living animals, watches their 
movements and habits, and finally dissects them. He is pre- 
sented first with the facts, and led to a thorough knowledge 
of a few typical forms, then taught to compare these with 
others, and finally led to the principles or inductions growing 
out of the facts. 

From A. E. Verrill, Professor of Zoology in Yale College: "The 
general treatment of the subject is good, and the descriptions of 
structure and the definitions of groups are, for the most part, clear, 
concise, and not so much overburdened by technical terms as in sev- 
eral other manuals of structural zoology now in use." 

Briefer Course. i2mo. 334 pp. 

The distinctive characteristic of this book is its use of the 
object method. The author would have the pupils first examine 
and roughly dissect a fish, in order to attain some notion of 
vertebrate structure as a basis of comparison. Beginning then 
with the lowest forms, he leads the pupil through the whole 
animal kingdom until man is reached. As each of its great 
divisions comes under observation, he gives detailed instruc- 
tions for dissecting some one animal as a type of the class, and 
bases the study of other forms on the knowledge thus obtained. 

From Herbert Osborn, Professor of Zoology, Iowa Agricultural 
College : " I can gladly recommend it to any one desiring a work of 
such character. While I strongly insist that students should study 
animals from the animals themselves, — a point strongly urged by 
Prof. Packard in his preface, — I also recognize the necessity of a 
reliable text-book as a guide. As such a guide, and covering the 
ground it does, I know of nothing better than Packard's." 

First Lessons in Zoology. i2mo. 290 pp. 

In method this book differs considerably from those men- 
tioned above. Since it is meant for young beginners, it de- 
scribes but few types, mostly those of the higher orders, and dis- 
cusses their relations to one another and to their surroundings. 
The aim, however, is the same with that of the others ; namely, 
to make clear the general principles of the science, rather than 
to fill the pupil's mind with a mass of what may appear to mm 
unrelated facts. 



THE AMERICAN SCIENCE SERIES. 5 

PSYCHOLOGY— Advanced Course. By William James, Pro- 
fessor in Harvard University. 2 vols. 8vo., 689, 704 pp. 

From Prof. E. H. Griffin, John Hopkins University : "An important 
contribution to psychological science, discussing its present aspects and 
problems with admirable breadth, insight, and independence." 

From Prof. John Dewey, University of Michigan; " A remarkable 
union of wide learning, originality of treatment, and, above all, of 
never-failing suggestions. To me the best treatment of the whole 
matter of advanced psychology in existence. It does more to put 
psychology in scientific position both as to the statement of established 
results and a stimulating to further problems and their treatment, than 
any other book of which I know." 

From Hon. W. T. Harris, National Bureau of Education: " I have 
never seen before a work that brings together so fully all of the labors, 
experimental and analytic, of the school of physiological psychologists." 

BOTANY. By Charles E. Bessey, Professor in the Univer- 
sity of Nebraska. 
Advanced Course. 8vo. 611 pp. 

Aims to lead the student to obtain at first-hand his knowledge 
of the anatomy and physiology of plants. Accordingly, the 
presentation of matter is such as to fit the book for constant 
use in the labaratory, the text supplying the outline sketch which 
the student is to fill in by the aid of scalpel and microscope. 

From J. C. Arthur, Editor of The Botanical Gazette: " The first 
botanical text-book issued in America which treats the most important 
departments of the science with anything like due consideration. This 
is especially true in reference to the physiology and histology of plants, 
and also to special morphology. Structural Botany and classification; 
have up to the present time monopolized the field, greatly retarding 
the diffusion of a more complete knowledge of the science." 

Essentials of Botany. i2mo. 292 pp. 

A guide to beginners. Its principles are, that the true aim of 
botanical study is not so much to seek the family and proper 
names of specimens as to ascertain the laws of plant structure 
and plant life; that this can be done only by examining and 
dissecting the plants themselves ; and that it is best to confine 
the attention to a few leading types, and to take up first the* 
simpler and more easily understood forms, and afterwards those 
whose structure and functions are more complex. 

From J. T. Rothrock, Professor in the University of Pennsylvania: 
" There is nothing superficial in it, nothing needless introduced, noth- 
ing essential left out. The language is lucid ; and, as the crowning 
merit of the book, the author has introduced throughout the volume 
' Practical Studies,' which direct the student in his effort to see for 
himself all that the text-book teaches." 



«6 THE AMERICAN SCIENCE SERIES. 

CHEMISTRY. By Ira Remsen, Professor in the Johns Hop- 
kins University. 
Advanced Course. 8vo. 

The general plan of this work will be the same with that of 
the Briefer Course, already published. But the part in which 
the members of the different families are treated will be con- 
siderably enlarged. Some attention will be given to the lines 
of investigation regarding chemical affinity, dissociation, speed 
of chemical action, mass action, chemical equilibrium, thermo- 
chemistry, etc. The periodic law, and the numerous relations 
which have been traced between the chemical and physical 
properties of the elements and their positions in the periodic 
system will be specially emphasized. Reference will also be 
made to the subject of the chemical constitution of compounds, 
and the methods used in determining constitution. 

Introduction to the Study of Chemistry. i2mo. 389 pp. 

The one comprehensive truth which the author aims to make 
clear to the student is the essential nature of chemical action. 
With this in view, he devotes the first 208 pages of the book to 
a carefully selected and arranged series of simple experiments, 
in which are gradually developed the main principles of the sub- 
ject. His method is purely inductive ; and, wherever experience 
has shown it to be practicable, the truths are drawn out by 
pointed questions, rather than fully stated. Next, when the 
student is in a position to appreciate it, comes a simple account 
of the theory of the science. The last 150 pages of the book 
are given to a survey, fully illustrated by experiments, of the 
leading families of inorganic compounds. 

From Arthur W. Wright, Professor in Yale College : — The student 
is not merely made acquainted with the phenomena of chemistry, but 
is constantly led to reason upon them, to draw conclusions from them, 
and to study their significance with reference to the processes of 
chemical action — a course which makes the book in a high degree dis- 
ciplinary as well as instructive. 

From Thos. C. Van Nuys, Professor of Chemistry in the Indiana 
University : — It seems to me that Remsen's " Introduction to the 
Study of Chemistry" meets every requirement as a text or class book. 

From C. Les Mees, Professor of Chemistry in the Ohio University : 
—I unhesitatingly recommend it as the best work as yet published for 
the use of beginners in the study. Having used it, I feel justified in 
-saying this much. 



THE AMERICAN SCIENCE SERIES. ? 

CH E M ISTR Y— Continued. 

Elementi of Chemistry. i2mo. 272 pp. 

Utilizes the facts of every-day experience to show what chem- 
istry is and how things are studied chemically. The language 
is untechnical, and the subject is fully illustrated by simple ex- 
periments, in which the pupil is led by questions to make his 
own inferences. The author has written under the belief that 
"a rational course in chemistry, whether for younger or older 
pupils, is something more than a lot of statements of facts of 
more or less importance; a lot of experiments of more or less 
beauty; or a lot of rules devised for the purpose of enabling 
the pupil to tell what things are made of. If the course does 
not to some extent help the pupil to think as well as to see it 
does not deserve to be called rational." 

Chase Palmer, Professor in the State Normal School, Salem, Mass.: 
—It is the best introduction to chemistry that I know, and I intend to 
put it into the hands of my pupils next Fall. 

A. D, GRAY, Instructor in Springfield (Mass.) High School : — Neat, 
attractive, clear, and accurate, it leaves little to be desired or sought 
for by one who would find the best book for an elementary course in 
our High Schools and Academies. 

GENERAL BIOLOGY. By William T. Sedgwick, Professor 
in the Mass. Institute of Technology, and Edmund B. Wil- 
son, Professor in Bryn Mawr College. Part L 8vo. 193 pp. 
This work is intended for college and university students as 
an introduction to the theoretical and practical study of bi- 
ology. It is not zoology, botany, or physiology, and is intended 
not as a substitute, but as a foundation, for these more special 
studies. In accordance with the present obvious tendency of 
the best elementary biological teaching, it discusses broadly 
some of the leading principles of the science on the substantial 
basis of a thorough examination of a limited number of typical 
forms, including both plants and animals. Part First, now 
published, is a general introduction to the subject illustrated 
by the study of a few types. Part Second will contain a de- 
tailed survey of various plants and animals. 

W. G. Farlow, Professor in Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. : 
— An introduction is always difficult to write, and I know no work in 
which the general relations of plants and animals and the cell-struc- 
ture have been so well stated in a condensed form. 



8 THE AMERICAN SCIENCE SERIES. 

POLITICAL ECONOMY. By Francis A. Walker, President 

of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Advanced Course. 8vo. 537 pp. 

The peculiar merit of this book is its reality. The reader is 
brought to see the application of the laws of political economy 
to real facts. He learns the extent to which those laws hold 
good, and the manner in which they are applied. The subject 
is divided, as usual, into the three great branches of production, 
exchange, and distribution. An interesting and suggestive 
"book" on consumption is added, which serves to bring in con- 
veniently the principles of population. The last part of the 
volume is given to the consideration of various practical appli- 
cations of economic principles. 

From Richmond Mayo Smith, Professor in Columbia College, 
N. Y.: — In my opinion it is the best text-book of political economy 
that we as yet possess. 

From Woodrow Wilson, Professor in Princeton University, N. J.: 
— It serves better than any other book I know of as an introduction 
to the most modern point of view as to economical questions. 

Briefer Course. i2mo. 415 pp. 

The demand for a briefer manual by the same author for the 
use of schools in which only a short time can be given to the 
subject has led to the publication of the present volume. The 
work of abridgment has been effected mainly through excision, 
although some structural changes have been made, notably in 
the parts relating to distribution and consumption. 

From Alexander Johnston, late Professor in Princeton Univer- 
sity, N. J.: — Using the "Briefer Course" as a text-book, suited to 
any capacity, lam able at the same time to recommend the "Ad- 
vanced Course" to those who are better able to use it as a book of 
reference, or more inclined to carry their work further. 

Elementary Course. i2mo. 323 pp. 

What has been attempted is a clear arrangement of topics ; 
a simple, direct, and forcible presentation of the questions 
raised; the avoidance, as far as possible, of certain metaphys- 
ical distinctions which the author has found perplexing ; a fre- 
quent repetition of cardinal doctrines, and especially a liberal 
use of concrete illustrations, drawn from facts of common ex- 
perience or observation. 

HENRY HOLT & CO., Publishers, N. Y. 



THE 



PSYCHOLOGY OF TIME 



Historically and Philosophically Considered 
with Extended Experiments 



by 



HERBERT NICHOLS 

Fellow in Psychology at Clark University 




NEW YORK 

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 

1 891 



